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ABSTRACT 
In recent years renewed efforts have been made to enforce the edict of family 
responsibility, culminating in the enactment of the Child Support Act, 1991. 
Under this legislation, the duty of absent fathers to provide for their former 
families has been reinforced which great rigour. The primary aim of this study is 
to see if the outcomes of this Act could have been predicted through an historical 
analysis of past precedent. 
The period from 1900-1940 is investigated for comparison with the present day. 
Statutory measures which attempted to ensure that fathers complied with court 
orders were also enacted in these years. Moreover, they were passed in a 
political, economic and moral climate not dissimilar to the 1980s and 1990s. 
Through an examination of archival sources, this study looks at the reasons why 
governments then were anxious to find ways of preventing lone mother families 
from becoming a burden on central or local finances - and why they believed 
their support should not be the responsibility of the community. It then explores 
the outcome of these measures in terms of their success, or otherwise, from an 
administrative and financial perspective. Following a similar examination of the 
Child Support Act, a comparative analysis of efforts to reinforce the financial 
duty of absent fathers in both the early and late twentieth century is undertaken. 
From these findings it is concluded that important lessons from the past have 
been ignored at our peril. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
This thesis focuses on legislation to make fathers pay for the support of their 
former families in the early decades of the twentieth century. Mainly through an 
examination of material held in various archives, it seeks to understand \\hy 
governments, then, extended their efforts to reinforce the edict of paternal 
responsibility. More importantly, it also explores the consequences of such 
efforts. The primary purpose of undertaking this research was to see if lessons 
learnt from this era could have been used to predict the outcome of the 1991 
Child Support Act. As this is not a methodology that has been applied to this 
piece of legislation, the research was also conducted to fill this gap in our 
knowledge. 
Later sections of this chapter will explain why the years 1900-1939 were chosen 
for comparative analysis with the present day. There will also be some 
discussion of the validity of adopting this approach and its limitations. However, 
by way of a prologue to the study, this introduction begins by outlining the 
background to the 1991 Act, and its objectives and outcomes to date. 
i) The Child Support Act, 1991 1 
THE BACKGROUND 
From the late 1960s fears that many western capitalist societies were falling into 
a deep moral decline began to be expressed, especially in the USA and Britain. 
Blaming this collapse on the liberalisation of sexual mores in the previous 
decade, a movement calling for a moral revival began to emerge with some force 
in both countries. Those belonging to this movement demanded to see the 
restoration of for example, the stable family, law and order, and indiyidual self-
I This summar: is based on the findings of this research. For a more detailed account and further 
statistical information see Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
help.2 In Britain, the Christian entrepreneur Mary Whitehouse spearheaded this 
movement in the 1970s. By the 1980s. she was largely supplanted by a new 
breed of Conservative politicians - the so-called 'New Right' - who came to 
power in 1979 with Margaret Thatcher as their leader. This government was not 
only intent on reversing what it perceived to be a moral crisis but it also intended 
to reverse Britain's economic crisis by introducing a strict form of economic 
liberalism. Deeply critical of the 'nanny state' and escalating public expenditure, 
its primary objective was to encourage individual effort and private enterprise by 
'rolling back the state'. 
The Conservatives began their mission by setting in motion a process whereby 
social and economic policies were introduced which were designed to reduce 
dependency on the state. When Thatcher first came to power, her initial concern 
was to improve the country's economic performance and reduce the official 
unemployment figure she had inherited from her Labour predecessors. By 1979 
this had reached 1,184,600. To achieve this, her government began deregulating 
the labour market by, for example, reducing the power of trade unions, restricting 
wage regulations and undermining employment rights. It also restructured the 
benefit system. For example, by making them less accessible and less generous, 
the Conservatives believed that the unemployed would have greater incentives to 
find employment. Public sector competitive tendering was also introduced. It 
was hoped that this reform would lead to greater efficiency and competitiveness 
and generally improve employment opportunities.3 By leaving the market 
unfettered in this way the Conservatives expected Britain to become prosperous 
once again. They also argued that the country's greater prosperity would benefit 
eyeryone on the grounds that, according to their economic philosophy, wealth 
'trickled down'. 
It was not however, until the Conservative Government's second term in office, 
following the 1983 general election, that it began to devote more of its attention 
2 For an in-depth discussion see Weeks, 1989. 
3 For a discussion of these policies and their outcomes see, for example, HC Social Securit) 
Committee, 1994b, memorandum submitted by Everson and Woods. 
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to restructuring Britain's moral climate. Weeks4 has argued that this delay was 
deliberate because Thatcher felt that implementing moral change required a more 
cautious approach than economic reform. Thus, during its third term in office. 
that is from 1987 onwards, 'morality came to the fore'.5 
Lone mother families, in particular, came to represent the epitome of this decline. 
Thatcher and her sympathizers in the government had been greatly influenced by 
American right-wing publications, such as Murray's Losing Ground,6 in which 
these families were largely blamed for a multitude of social evils, from spawning 
an 'underclass' to the increase in the crime rate. Moreover, their fears were 
exacerbated by a sense of alarm at the growing numbers of such families and the 
cost of state support for them. In Britain the number of lone parent families had 
increased from almost 600,000 in 1971 to over a million in 1986 by which time 
they represented 14 per cent of all families. There had also been an increase in 
the numbers of these families dependent on Income Support. In 1980, 330,000 
were dependent on this type of benefit (then Supplementary Benefit), whereas in 
1989 there were 700,000 dependent on Income Support. In the same year only a 
quarter of these families were in receipt of maintenance. Although separation 
and divorce remained the major causes of lone parenthood, there was also alarm 
at the growing trend towards unmarried motherhood. From 1971 to 1986 the 
number of these families - the majority of which, in common with other lone 
parent families, were female headed - had more than doubled. 7 
THE SOLUTION 
The Conservative Government began their attempts to reduce the cost to the 
taxpayer of lone mother families by introducing the Social Security Act, 1986. 
Under this Act, for example, grants for one-off payments were replaced by loans 
from the Social Fund. Subsequently, the principle aim of the government was to 
cut public expenditure and reform morals by replacing, wherever possible. the 
4 1989. p.293. 
) Ibid. 
6 198'+. 
7 DSS. 1990b, p.i. 
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financial support lone mothers received from the state with private support from 
fathers. Thatcher repeatedly stressed the need to return to 'Victorian "alues' 
which encapsulated the notion that fathers should bear the financial costs of their 
offspring. Thus, in January 1990, she announced that her government was going 
to take steps to ensure that all absent fathers paid for the maintenance of their 
children, or paid more, 'where they could afford to do so'. 8 Unlike other 
legislation, such as the 1989 Children Act, biological rather than social 
fatherhood became the determining factor of who was responsible for paying. 
Moreover, there was to be no distinction between men who, for example, had 
fathered children as the result of a one-night stand and those who had spent many 
years jointly bringing up their children in long established relationships with one 
partner. However, this did not seem to cause concern to the general public. Its 
initial response to Thatcher's proposal was overwhelmingly supportive. As was 
that of the media and political parties of all persuasions. There was a general 
consensus that many absent fathers were 'errant' and that they simply chose not to 
pay maintenance even though they could afford to do so. Thatcher and her 
supporters in the Conservative Party also believed this for they blamed low 
compliance rates with maintenance orders on inefficient administration and 
enforcement procedures by both the courts and the Department of Social 
Security. 
By 1991 the Child Support Act had been introduced to reverse this trend. 
Having rapidly passed through Parliament because of its popularity, the Act 
looked set to revolutionise the child support system by placing the administrative 
responsibility for the assessment, collection and enforcement of payments in the 
hands of a newly created 'Next Steps' agency (the Child Support Agency). As a 
semi-autonomous organisation slightly removed from the state and run on market 
principles, the government seemed convinced that it would be able to operate a 
more efficient and effective system than its predecessors. In common with the 
introduction of other similar agencies which were also set up to reform British 
public administration along the lines of private enterprise, such as National 
Health Service Trusts, the key notion was 'distance from the central department' 
8 See. for example, The Sunday Times, 21 January 1990. 
so that there was 'freedom to manage'. As with other such agencies. the chief 
executive was not a permanent civil servant and was appointed in open 
competition. They were to be held personally responsible for their agency's 
performance while the Minister remained responsible for policy.9 
New administrative procedures under the Child Support Act included the 
introduction of a rigid formula to asses the amount an absent father had to pay. 
By removing any form of discretion from the scheme, the traditional practice of 
treating each case individually was ended. In contrast to previous policy, absent 
fathers on most benefits were also expected to pay by having a proportion of 
their benefits deducted at source. Lone mothers, in tum, were required to co-
operate with the Agency, for example, by naming the fathers of their children 
unless they could successfully argue that to do so would cause them 'undue harm 
or distress'. Failure to co-operate for any other reason, would incur a penalty by 
having a proportion of their benefits deducted. Although this requirement caused 
some concern, particularly to those organisations who claimed to represent the 
interests of lone mothers, such as the National Council for One-Parent Families, 
they too did not disagree with the principle of the Act. 
Some features of the Child Support Act were not new, however. Enforcement 
procedures remained largely unchanged. If a father failed to pay the Agency 
could make attachments to his earnings. If this failed, or could not be applied 
because he was self-employed, then the Agency could apply to the court for a 
distraint on his goods. Finally, if this proved unsuccessful, magistrates could 
impose a deferred prison sentence to give him time to payor, if need be, impose 
an immediate sentence. 
Along with the new scheme came some new jargon. As the government wanted 
to stress the point that the Act was to benefit children the term 'maintenance' was 
replaced by 'child support'. Under the Act, fathers, regardless of the reasons for 
them not living under the same roof as their children, were jointly to be referred 
to as 'absent parents' - despite the gender neutrality this implied and the negati\c 
9 Rhodes. 1997, p.95-p.96. 
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connotations implied by the word 'absent'.J 0 There was also a change to the way 
lone mothers were to be described. From now on they were to be called 'carers' 
which. in common with older terms such as, 'lone parents' or 'single parents', 
disguised the fact that the majority of them were female. 
As noted earlier, although Thatcher claimed to be putting the child first when she 
introduced the Child Support Act, it was not difficult to see that this was empty 
rhetoric. Even though some people may have wanted to see the poverty of such 
families alleviated following the implementation of this policy, the Conservative 
Government had been notorious for denying the existence of poverty in Britain. 
This was evident when it abolished the official publication which provided 
statistics on the 'numbers of low income families' and replaced it with a new 
series on 'households below average incomes'. However, as Millar and 
Whiteford have noted: 
This series also showed more and more lone parents in the lowest 
income bands. Taking account of family size, and measuring income 
after meeting housing costs, the proportion of lone parents with 
incomes of less than half the average rose from 19% in 1979 to 50% 
in 1988/89. I I 
There was certainly nothing in the Child Support Act that indicated that the 
government was concerned about this phenomenon. On the contrary, all lone 
mothers on Income Support were to have any maintenance deducted pound for 
pound from their benefits. Their only way of escaping poverty was through paid 
employment in the labour market. However, the government did not at the same 
time pass any measures that may have made this any more of a viable proposition 
than it had been previously. With a lack of adequate, affordable child care 
provision and opportunities to train, the majority of lone mothers had little choice 
but to remain on benefits. It was therefore clear that if the government 
10 This e\.pression will be used in this thesis for the sake of convenience. However. it is not 
intended to be derogatory. 
I I 1993, p.63. 
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succeeded in clawing back money from absent fathers, the Treasury would be the 
main beneficiary. 12 
- THE OUTCOME 
Within a short time of beginning its operations, the Child Support Act came 
under attack, especially from absent fathers. While some strongly objected to the 
idea that they should pay support to a child that was the outcome of a brief 
relationship, most of the criticism was directed towards the details of the policy. 
Aspects of the formula were most contentious, particularly as it did not recognise 
the financial responsibilities many had towards other dependants, such as, step-
children or elderly parents. There was also an outcry because under the formula 
fathers were also expected to pay a 'carers element' which many construed as 
maintenance for women. Absent fathers who had made clean-break settlements 
in the courts before the Child Support Act was introduced saw this as unjust. 
Under these settlements such men had, for example, given their former partners 
the family home on condition that they gave up any claim to maintenance for 
themselves. For all these reasons, many absent fathers joined together to form 
organisations to campaign against the Act, such as the Network Against the 
Child Support Act. They inundated their MPs and the media with complaints 
who, in tum, also began to show doubts about the appropriateness and fairness of 
the new scheme. 
In time, the Agency also came under attack for being inefficient, incompetent 
and failing to meet its targets. Its performance after its first year was described 
as 'dire'.13 It had been expected to clear one million cases during 1993-1994 but 
instead had only dealt with 200,000. 14 This was to further fuel antagonism 
towards the new scheme. However, if this was bad enough, the hostility towards 
the Agency deepened when it was revealed that instead of chasing 'errant' 
fathers, it had prioritised those cases which it saw as being 'easy' targets. In other 
words, it concentrated its efforts on making those fathers who were already 
12 See. for example, Gamham and Knights, 1994, for a persuasive argument on this topic. 
13 He Social Security Committee, 1997, p.l O. 
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paying, pay more so that it could increase its chances of meeting the benefit 
savings target it had been set. lS This was clearly contrary to what the majority of 
people saw as being the purpose of the new scheme. The hypocritical, personal 
behaviour of some members of the Conservative Party also did not help. 
Accusations in the press of government 'sleaze' became more frequent and the 
outrage against the Child Support Act also intensified when cases of politicians 
creating lone mother families were revealed. In the face of the leaderships 
espousal of family values, this reaction was not surprising. '6 
Faced with the Agency's failure and the unpopularity of the Child Support Act, 
the government began to climb-down. As early as December 1993, it announced 
that the Act was going to be amended. The changes made resulted in many 
absent fathers seeing reductions in the amount they had to pay, ironically, 
through the introduction of some discretion in the formula. In order to deal with 
the administrative crisis of the Agency, the government replaced the Chief 
Executive and abandoned its plans for the Agency to take on all new cases from 
1996. Originally it had hoped to create a single-tiered system by which all child 
support cases would be dealt with by the Agency, thus, removing any 
responsibility for financial assessments and payments from the courts. By 
instructing the Agency to just administer child support for parents on benefits, 
another of the Act's objectives was also undermined. 
Following these and other revisions, by the mid-1990s, it became apparent that 
whatever criteria the Act was judged by, it had been a failure. Not only were 
there no more fathers paying maintenance than under the previous system, which 
meant that the objective of making public expenditure savings was not achieved, 
but evidence suggested that the new scheme was costing the taxpayer more to 
administer than it had under the former administration. Moreover, lone mothers 
and their children had certainly not benefited. As the formula had been designed 
to ensure that fathers paid a higher proportion of their incomes to their former 
families, it was obvious from the beginning that this would leave the majority of 
14 DSS, 199'+, p.l. 
15 Garnham and Knights, 1994, p.70. 
8 
men with less money. The 'treats' many had formerly been able to give their 
children, which had clearly enhanced the quality of lives, were now a thing of the 
past. It also meant that there was less money to be spent on the children living in 
second families. 
However, the widely held belief that the Agency and an unfair formula were to 
blame for the resulting fiasco was not entirely correct. If the majority of absent 
fathers had been more willing, or able, to pay, the Agency's task to save public 
expenditure may have been achievable. Faced with having to deal with many 
absent fathers who were clearly determined not to pay, there was little the 
Agency could do. Although, it could, and frequently did, take steps to force men 
to pay by making attachment of earnings orders the administrative expense of 
resorting to this method made it self-defeating. Moreover, it was not surprising 
that it chose to give up on some cases where men were really determined not to 
pay. Indeed, the Agency rarely used the ultimate deterrent - imprisonment -
presumably because of the additional burden to the taxpayer of the expense. 
Consequently, many absent fathers continued to avoid making payments and the 
government's aim to save the Treasury money was not realised. Moreover, when 
the cost of running the new scheme is compared with that of its predecessor 
evidence shows that the latter was more successful. In 1989/90, before the 
introduction of the Child Support Act, for every £1 million pounds spent on 
recouping maintenance, savings to the Treasury of £4.7 million were made. 
Under the Child Support Agency only £2.1 million was saved for every £1 
million pounds spent in 1996/7.17 
Clearly, Margaret Thatcher and her supporters were over-optimistic in believing 
that public expenditure savings could be made by passing the administration of 
child support into the hands of a new agency. As the above has shown, it was 
not a new and more efficient bureaucracy_ run along the lines of private 
enterprise, that was needed. Coercing absent fathers into paying costs money 
v..hoever is responsible for undertaking this task. There is also a limit to the 
16 For an insiders view of Conservative 'sleaze' see Sedgemore MP (1995). 
17 See p.170 of this study. 
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amount that can be extracted from them. Experts in this field frequently point 
out that absent fathers are more likely to be over-represented in lower income 
groups because of the greater tendency for relationship breakdown to occur 
among the young and under-qualified. 18 As Cretney and Masson 19 have also 
pointed out: 
... it can in retrospect be seen that those responsible for setting up the 
scheme ignored the real difficulties of enforcing substantial 
payments against unwilling parents ... the obligation is connected 
with an intimate personal relationship; and divided loyalties may be 
involved. The debtor may in consequence be angry, unreasonable 
and determined not to pay. 
However, this was not a phenomenon unheard of before the Child Support Act 
was introduced. These authors have also stated that any practising solicitor could 
have predicted its failure. 2o But, Margaret Thatcher was notorious for not 
seeking guidance from experts when formulating policies. It was also not her 
style to tum to the universities and civil service for advice21 for in 
so far as the Thatcher revolution needed information at all, it was as 
likely to come from right-wing 'think-tanks' or outside 
sympathizers.22 
But having said that, even if Thatcher had wanted to be informed of, for 
example, past precedent there was little by way of published books and articles 
that she could have drawn upon. As the following section shows, the history of 
child support in Britain has been largely overlooked not only by campaigners and 
politicians but also academics. Moreover, although Harrison23 has argued that 
'problems allegedly new tum out to be old problems in disguise\ the application 
of an historical methodology to the analysis of the Child Support Act is 
unknown. 
18 See, for example, Eekelaar, 1984, p.29; Ford and Millar, 1997, p.5. 
19 Cretney and Masson, 1997, p.542, p.556. 
~o Ibid., p.543. 
21 Harrison, 1996, p.312. See also Gamham and Knights, 1994, p.39. 
22 Harrison. 1996, p.312. 
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ii) Filling the Gap in our Knowledge 
Although there is an overview of the history of child support in the Finer Report 
- which indicates the problematic nature of such policies - the discussion is all 
too brief and relegated to an appendix.24 The same applies to Brown's25 
publication because, in common with the authors of the Finer Report, her main 
objective was to suggest alternative policies by which lone mother families 
would be better provided for. Other secondary sources also fail to provide 
sufficient information because the subject is only briefly referred to as part of 
more specific discussions about, for example, the history of bastardy, separation 
or divorce.26. Moreover, despite the existence of a few academic works which 
have looked specifically at this issue in times past, these works are not 
comparative. They also only focus on this aspect of British history in the 
nineteenth rather than the twentieth century. 27 
Although many writers have now explored the Child Support Act, the tendency 
has been to restrict critical analysis to the formulation and implementation of the 
Act. For example, through researching the impact of the Act on a sample of lone 
mothers in Liverpool, Abbott28 focused on its effect on their financial 
circumstances, employment opportunities and on their personal lives. Other 
authors, in contrast, have been concerned to expose the purpose of this policy. 
Despite the government's claim that Children Come First29 - even though it did 
not deny that it also wanted to relieve taxpayers of the expense of supporting 
23 Ibid., p.430. 
24 Finer and McGregor, in Finer, 1974, Vol 2, p.85-p.149. 
25 1988. 
26 See, for example, Laslett et aI., 1960, on bastardy; McGregor, et aI., 1970, on separated 
couples; and McGregor, 1957; Rowntree and Carrier, 1958; and Stone, 1992, on divorce. 
27 See, for example, Henriques, 1967, who discussed the operation of the Bastardy Laws in the 
nineteenth century; or Thane, 1978 who explores attempts to make fathers pay for their deserted 
or illegitimate children in Victorian and Edwardian England. 
28 1996. Similarly, see also, Glendinning, Clarke and Craig, 1995. 
29 This was the title of its publication (DSS, 1990a) in which it's proposals for the Act were 
outlined. 
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lone mother families30 - the work of Garnham and Knights,31 revealed that in fact 
this reform was primarily for the benefit of the Treasury rather than children. 
Meanwhile, other publications have highlighted the philosophical and 
sociological ramifications of the Child Support Act, either in terms of its impact 
on family law,32 or its influence on shifting the power of the public within the 
realm of family obligations.33 Finally, because the Act was largely an import 
from Australia, some authors have studied the operation of the Australian scheme 
often arguing that it met with more success there because of differences in detail 
and methods of collection, for example)4 However, it should be noted, that 
when they describe the success of the Australian scheme they are not referring to 
its cost effectiveness. Nor do they argue that Australia's new scheme has been 
more effective in making the non-payers pay. On the contrary, the scheme has 
only been successful in so far as it has operated without too much hostility and 
has succeeded in making those already paying pay more.35 
As the above indicates, there was therefore a need for this piece of research to be 
conducted and not least because 
History is that branch of knowledge which caters to society's need to 
understand particular aspects of the human past, an understanding 
without which it would be impossible even to attempt to grapple with 
the problems of the present.36 
However, that is not to say that a single account could make any claims to be the 
definitive work on this subject. Clearly, there are limits to the extent that any 
piece of social research can make any claim to the 'truth'. As general 
epistemological problems have been extensively debated elsewhere37 they will 
not be expanded upon here, other than to say that this research was carried out in 
30 Ibid., p.5. 
31 1994. 
32 See, for example, Maclean, 1994; Diduck, 1995; Wallbank, 1997. 
33 Boden and Childs, 1996. 
J-l Millar and Whiteford, 1993, 1995; Maclean, 1994; Rhodes, 1995. 
35 Millar and Whiteford, 1993, p.70. 
36 Marwick, 1995, p.8. 
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the awareness that facts are not completely detachable from theory. 
Methodological problems can also place limitations on the extent to which one 
specific study can lay claim to the truth. As this study had to rely on archival 
material in order to reconstruct the past, there was also an awareness that the 
problems this posed would also mean that some reservations would have to be 
attached to the findings. Booth and Glynn have identified 'completeness' and 
'accuracy' as the two major problems associated with public records.38 With 
regard to the former they quote Lord Denning who said that 'if Departments do 
not want to disclose their records they may overlook them, miss them or even 
destroy them' .39 Alternatively other records may have been destroyed because of 
a lack of firm guidance by archive keepers over the destruction of files by lower 
level archivists.4o As far as accuracy is concerned, these same authors claim that 
state papers and 
departmental files cannot be regarded as an infallible guide to the 
making of decisions or the preoccupations of governments. . ... 
Inevitably, there is a self-justificatory element in Cabinet, 
departmental, and other political papers, including memoirs. The 
records may be more revealing in their omissions than in their 
contents.41 
There is, therefore, always a danger that the documents examined may not be 
truly representative of their time. 
Finally, the scope of the research could not be exhaustive because of time 
limitations. Therefore, decisions had to made as to what to include and what to 
exclude. In the case of this study, it was decided to omit an analysis of the 
subject from the perspective of race. Although it is interesting to note that, as 
today, the ethnicity of lone mother families was an important dimension of the 
problem, it was not possible to give this subject the attention it deserved. The 
problems posed by Irish women coming to England to give birth to illegitimate 
children at the ratepayers expense in the first half of the twentieth century is a 
37 See, for example, Medawar, 1984; Neilson, 1990; Kuhn, 1970. The work of post mode mists 
has also drawn attention to this issue, for example, Foucault, 1973, 1977. 
38 Booth and Glyn, 1997. 
39 Ibid., p.306-307. 
40 Ibid., p.307. 
41 Ib"d ,., 1 -I "' p.-' ). 
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fascinating topic but an examination of it needs to be left to future researchers. 
Similarly, it was also not possible here to cover the problems arising from an 
increase in the number of illegitimate births of mixed race babies during this 
period. 
Despite the above difficulties and those imposed by limited financial resources, 
they were not sufficient to outweigh the benefits of conducting this specific piece 
of research. 
iii) The Period for Comparison 
Because Britain has undergone many fundamental changes in the last one 
hundred years or so - as have the causes of lone motherhood, the degree of the 
stigma attached to this condition and the financial sources available for their 
support - there would have been some logic in choosing the era immediately 
preceding Thatcher's term in office as the one for companson. However, 
although governments also attempted to improve compliance rates with 
maintenance orders during the years from 1940 to 1979, by introducing the 
Attachment of Earnings Act in 1971 for example, as a period for comparative 
analysis with the present day it had to be rejected. 
Despite such efforts to make fathers pay, on the whole very different solutions to 
the problem of lone mother families were sought during these decades as 
compared to the ones that preceded and succeeded them. Although no 
government in the twentieth century has abandoned the male breadwinner model, 
efforts to make fathers pay in these years were contracted as opposed to 
extended. 
Graham Dixon's42 work reveals that these were exceptional times for lone mother 
families because there was a greater acceptance that the primary responsibility 
for them should lie with the community. This was also a period - at least from 
the 1960s - in which there was a movement away from seeing lone mothers as 
42 1981. 
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immoral and deviant towards regarding them as unfortunate. This was reflected 
in their treatment. Not only were they given rights to benefits which were not 
conditional on their seeking employment but public housing was also made 
available to them. Moreover, when supplementary benefit replaced Public 
Assistance in the 1960s lone mothers received extra allowances. They also made 
further gains in 1976 when family allowances were extended to the first child in 
such families (Child Interim Benefit). Absent fathers also benefited. As 
Maclean43 points out 
With the acceleration of divorce in the mid-twentieth century, and 
the consequential growth of reconstituted families, Western legal 
systems began to attenuate the extent of the obligation of a former 
breadwinner towards the family from which he was separated, out of 
concern for his later-acquired dependants. 
This phenomenon was not simply due to the liberalisation of attitudes towards, 
for example, divorce and pre-marital sex.44 Nor was it due to any greater state 
ability to afford the support lone mother families. After all, the economic boom 
following World War 2 was already showing signs of a downturn by the early 
1960s. The dominant ideology which combined Keynesianism with welfare 
statism also influenced change. This combination which 'stressed the limitations 
and failures of market economies and the beneficial capacities of the state for 
promoting both social welfare and economic prosperity', 45 also made this era 
exceptional. Many writers have commented on the welfarist consensus of these 
years which marked in out from the one that it followed and the one that was to 
come after. Finlayson,46 for example, comments that 
It is hard to deny that the change in the period from 1949 to 1979 
was in favour of the state; and, even if this did not win universal 
approval - thus detracting from the completeness of 'consensus' - it 
did command a substantial body of support. 
43 1994, p.50 I. 
44 Weeks, 1989, p.282. 
4-
:> Self, 1993, p.56. 
46 1994. p.398-p.399. 
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But having said that, it must be noted that the benefits reaped by lone mothers 
during this time were not sufficient to lift them out of poverty.47 As the authors 
of the Finer Report into one parent families were anxious to point out in the mid-
1970s: 'divorced, deserted or separated wives and unmarried mothers remained 
throughout dependent on the Poor Law or its substitutes, in the event of their 
receiving no support from their husbands'.48 Moreover, although these radical 
authors had recommended that the state should provide a Guaranteed 
Maintenance Allowance for such families, a proposal that the government was to 
reject, even they were reluctant to completely exonerate fathers from any 
financial responsibility. Thus, many lone mothers continued to rely on means-
tested benefits and even though they were more generous than they had been, or 
were to become, they remained inadequate. 
In contrast to the period discussed above, as we shall see, the interwar years had 
more in common with the 1980s and were therefore chosen for a comparative 
analysis with the present day. Clearly, as there were certain hypotheses to test, 
such as, the correlation between high levels of unemployment and the failure of 
policies to make fathers pay, it was necessary to compare, as far as possible like 
with like. Socially, politically and economically,49 there were some striking 
similarities between then and now. For example, governments then as now were 
predominantly Conservative, or certainly conservative in a non-political sense. 
The economy was also in decline and levels of unemployment high especially in 
the depressed areas which, as now, had been dependent on heavy industry. The 
response of governments then to these phenomena were also similar. 
Governments in the interwar years reasserted the orthodox belief that the free 
market, rather than state intervention, would end the crisis - helped by 
government attempts to restrain central and local government spending. 50 
-17 See, for example, Townsend, 1979. 
-18 Finer, Vol. 2, p.148. 
-Il) See, for example, Peden, 1993; Whiteside, 1991; Crowther, 1988; Stevenson and Cook, 1977; 
Deacon, 1976; Branson and Heinemann, 1971 ;Graveson and Crane, 1957; Drage, 1930. 
50 Whiteside, 199L p.73; Middleton, 1996, p.322; Finlayson, 1994, pA19. 
16 
Voluntarism and self-help, rather than state aid, were also called for. 51 As now, 
it was believed that this could be achieved by turning the clock back to some by-
gone age. As one commentator at the time put it: ' We have to bring back the 
thrift, independence, self-help and self-reliance of years gone by' .52 
The social climate also bore similarities. For example, there were widespread 
fears about the behaviour of young people during the interwar years. Research 
has shown that there was a growing concern about the 
impact of dance halls, the cinema and a Hollywood culture on the 
morals of young working class girls who were perceived as both in 
danger of corruption from such sources and as corrupting in their 
lack of deference, their "cockiness" and "loudness". 53 
As today, contemporary newspapers showed that there was alarm about 'youths 
stealing joyrides in cars.' 54 This sort of behaviour led to fears that the family was 
in crisis. 55 It seemed under greater threat of survival in the face of the wider 
availability of birth control and the emergence of discourses which suggested 
that women could find pleasure in sex. As in recent years, this led to a backlash 
with many calling for a return to 'moral purity'. Giles has argued,56 that this 
campaign met with some success as married hetero-sexual behaviour became 
increasingly defined as the norm as the interwar years wore on. Thus, as Martin 
points out, then as now, market individualism co-existed with social discipline in 
the 1920s: 
While Tory economic policy in the 1920s saw an initial rolling back 
of the wartime state, at the Home Office William Joynson-Hicks .. , 
sought to use the power of the sate to reform public morals ... 57 
51 Finlayson, 1994, pA16. 
~2 
- Drage, 1930, pA3. 
53 Ibid. 
5-1 Carnegie UK Trust, 1943, p.7. 
55 See, Haste, 1994; Gittins, 1983. 
56 1992. p. 239-240. 
-7 ) 1996, p.65. 
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As in the 1990s, statutory efforts to make fathers pay, not dissimilar to the Child 
Support Act, were passed in the 1920s. As now, they were introduced primarily 
as part of a general effort to reduce expenditure and in order to reinforce the edict 
of paternal responsibility. However, unlike the Child Support Act, measures 
taken in the 1920s were part of a continuum that had begun with Acts passed in 
1914. As these measures, in tum, had their own immediate history it became 
necessary to begin the research for this study at approximately 1990. 
Furthermore, as the failure of all these reforms did not come to light as rapidly as 
the Child Support Act, it seemed appropriate to extend the period for comparison 
to the end of the 1930s. 
Obviously, as history never exactly repeats itself it is not surprising to also find 
major differences between these two periods. These include, for example, 
differences in the demographic make-up of lone mother families and in their 
treatment. Although these do not invalidate the study, it is necessary to draw 
attention to them. 
To begin with, policies to make fathers pay in the earlier period were simply 
reinforcing established principles rather than attempting to reverse a trend which 
had seen it undermined. Moreover, prior to the creation of the classic welfare 
state lone mother families would only have resorted to the community for 
support as a last resort, where help was given on a deterrent basis. When they 
did turn to the Poor Law for assistance, it was only after their own efforts to 
support themselves had failed, for example, through employment or by seeking 
help from friends and family. 
Society was also far less tolerant of lone motherhood in first half of the twentieth 
century.58 But having said that, in contrast to recent years, this stigma was 
slightly attenuated over these years. Indeed, it was partly because of the greater 
categorisation of lone mothers, by which some became defined as 'deserving', 
that led to pressure to improve their chances of getting maintenance. In 
particular, it was those unmarried mothers who only had one illegitimate child, as 
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opposed to the 'repeaters', who were no longer considered to deserve the same 
treatment as common criminals. Whether or not this change came about as a 
result of the declining birth-rate which could have meant that even illegitimate 
children came to be seen as valuable assets, especially if Britain was going to 
retain her place in the Empire, is controversial. However, it did mean that 
instead of being placed in the workhouse, many first-time unmarried mothers 
became more and more likely to be confined in mother and baby homes. 59 As 
the expense of these placed a further burden on ratepayers, and later taxpayers as 
grants were made from central funds, this, in tum, motivated others who were 
perhaps less concerned about the women themselves, to demand legislation to 
make fathers pay. Therefore, in contrast to the later years of the twentieth 
century, action taken in the earlier period had less to do with any backlash 
against lone mother families. Although research from America, which suggested 
that there was a link between juvenile delinquency and family breakdown, 
filtered across to this country it was not until the 1920s that its impact began to 
be felt. Making the father pay also had little to do with Eugenicism because the 
impact of this creed did not reach its zenith until the 1930s.60 Thus, although 
Eugenicists were expressing much of the same hostility towards what was then 
known as the 'social problem group', - as ethical socialists, such as Murray,61 
and Dennis and Erdos,62 have in recent years - they did not have much influence 
on policy in the years immediately before and after the First World War. 
The causes of lone motherhood during these two periods were also significantly 
different. In the early part of the twentieth century the primary cause was 
widowhood. As this group of women are obviously not the subject of this 
discussion, in contrast to today, this study is not looking at the majority of lone 
mothers during the first decades of the century. Even though divorce at the end 
of the twentieth century is the primary cause of lone motherhood, divorced 
women in the earlier period also do not enter this particular discussion. 
58 See, for example, Lewis, 1995a. 
59 The Annual Reports of the NCFUM&HC document the growth of mother and baby homes. 
60 For an in-depth discussion see Searle, 1979. 
61 1984; 1990. 
62 1992. 
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Although divorce had become a civil process in 1857, under the Matrimonial 
Causes Act, it remained too expensive for ordinary people until the early 1950s.63 
Moreover, it could only be obtained on the limited grounds of desertion for seven 
years or more, or a wife's adultery - but not a husband's. The difficulty of 
obtaining a divorce was reflected in the statistics: by 1911 there were less than 
1,000 divorces a year, out of a population of 6.6 million married couples in 
England.64 As the High Court only granted divorces after financial settlements 
had been reached between the wealthy couples who could obtain them, it was 
extremely unlikely that divorced women would have resorted to the Poor Law. 
When the marriages of other couples broke-down, their only recourse was to go 
to the magistrates court where a separation order could be obtained. Although 
these were also only granted on limited grounds, unlike those who divorced, 
those who separated were unable to remarry. By the early twentieth century, 
approximately 8,000 separation orders were granted each year.65 
In this study therefore there is some difference in type among the lone mothers 
that are compared. Having excluded the divorced from the earlier period, the 
mothers considered in this era are therefore those who were either separated or 
deserted, or unmarried with illegitimate children. The scale of the problem has 
also changed over time. Although there are statistics showing the numbers of 
illegitimate births in the early years of the century - for example, between 1906 
and 1910 there were 39.5 illegitimate births for every 1,000 births66 - there is no 
way of knowing how many women who gave birth to such children managed to 
conceal this fact. As with unmarried motherhood, bastards (as they were 
commonly referred to) were also legally and socially stigmatised to a greater 
extent than today. Because of this, it has to be presumed that some of the 
mothers of these illegitimate children found ways to avoid having them officially 
recognised as such by, for example, giving them to their own mothers to be 
brought up as child rather than grandchild. Similarly, it is difficult to say how 
63 Ro\\ntree and Carrier, 1970, p.185. 
o~ Stone, 1992, p. 10. 
65 McGregor et aI, 1970, p.16. 
66 Registrar General, 1918, p.xxvii. 
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many deserted or separated women there were and for the same reason. As some 
of these women probably tried to pass themselves off as widows, Census and 
pauper figures cannot be taken as reliable statistics. 
But having said that, their numbers then were undoubtedly far less than today for 
the simple reason that there was no benefit system that enabled them to live 
outside the workhouse without men. In contrast to today, such women were 
therefore probably more likely to find another man to live with. Indeed, during 
this period evidence began to emerge that many working class couples were 
"living in sin' because they had formed "irregular unions' following the 
breakdown of their marriages. Moreover, it was evidence such as this that 
contributed to fears, mainly among the middle classes, that moral standards were 
declining. It does not seem to have been of much concern to the upper and lower 
classes though. Evidence suggests that in the Ewardian era it was common for 
the upper echelons of society to indulge in liberalised sexual mores.67 As far as 
those lower down the social scale were concerned, Charles Booth had already 
noted in the 1890s that among "the lowest classes pre-marital relations are very 
common, perhaps even usual' .68 This probably explains why pre-nuptual 
conceptions were common place in the early part of the twentieth century. In a 
survey carried out in the late 1930s, it was discovered that 72.5 per cent of a 
sample of unemployed youths living in Liverpool and Glasgow had fathered 
children before they were married. However, in contrast to today, this did not 
lead to an increase in the numbers of lone mothers, for most were forced to marry 
to retain "respectability' .69 
Finally, it is also necessary to note that the legal treatment of lone mothers has 
changed significantly over the course of the century. In the earlier period, 
mothers of illegitimate children could obtain affiliation orders against putative 
fathers under the bastardy laws. Separated and deserted mothers in contrast were 
dealt \vith under maintenance legislation. The different recourse these groups 
had under the law was another reflection of their differential treatment by society 
67 See, for example, Priestley, 1970. 
68 Cited in McGregor. Blom-Cooper and Gibson, 1970, p.17. 
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in general. The history of this will not be expanded upon here as it has been 
dealt with in other studies.7o 
iv) The Plan of the Book 
Because the study concentrates on past precedent the main body of the book is 
devoted to the period from 1900-1940 - only returning to the Child Support Act 
by way of an epilogue. For the sake of convenience, and because no legislation 
appears in a vacuum but has its own history usually in the immediate past, the 
book is also set out chronologically. Moreover, because the study aims to fill the 
gap in our knowledge of the history of child support generally during the earlier 
period, where appropriate, other themes in addition to statutory reforms are also 
discussed. For example, in the chapter that looks at the impact of World War 1, 
part of the discussion is devoted to exploring alternative suggestions that were 
voiced at the time for dealing with the problem of lone mother families. 
A section of each chapter is also devoted to a discussion of the experience of 
lone motherhood at that particular point in time. Firstly, to demonstrate the need 
for reform and secondly, to see if once changes were instituted they were of any 
benefit to these women. As legislation should primarily be concerned with 
removing them and their children from poverty, the impact of legislation on their 
material circumstances is clearly important to this study. 
Chapter Two of this study focuses on two pieces of legislation - the Affiliation 
Orders Act and the Criminal Justice Administration Act - that were passed by the 
Liberal Government in 1914 in an attempt to ensure that absent fathers fulfilled 
their financial obligation to their former families. (Two pieces of legislation 
were necessary - the former was for unmarried mothers and the latter for 
separated and deserted mothers). Under both Acts, separated husbands and 
69 The Carnegie UK Trust, 1943, p.69-p.74. 
70 For example. McGregor, Blom-Cooper and Gibson, 1970 on the history of maintenance for 
separated wives: Laslett et al. 1980, on the development of bastardy laws for illegitimate 
children. 
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putative fathers were required to infonn the courts of any change in their address 
and the latter were also obliged to make payments to the newly installed 
collecting officers in magistrates courts. These officers, in tum, were obliged to 
infonn unmarried mothers if payments fell into arrears and were given the power 
to take proceedings against putative fathers at the mothers request. 
This chapter is concerned to show how and why these measures came about. It 
also shows how, in contrast to recent years, these earlier efforts to make fathers 
pay were not government led but very much instigated by outside pressure 
especially from within the women's movement. Indeed, ministers and civil 
servants then were particularly hesitant about passing such refonns and not least 
because of the misogyny felt in these predominantly male circles. However, 
although policy-makers were anxious to protect men from being blackmailed by 
'unscrupulous' women, they had other reservations. In contrast to Mrs 
Thatcher's Government, we see how they had sought advice from experts who 
argued that refonns to the administration of orders would not be cost effective. 
Chapter Three focuses on the impact of World War 1 on the next round of 
legislation to make fathers pay in the early 1920s. In particular, it shows how the 
war intensified demands for better provision for lone mothers because of 
increasing concerns about, for example, the declining birth rate and high infant 
and mortality rates in general. However, as Chapter Four shows, it was not these 
concerns which were primarily responsible for the introduction of more stringent 
measures to make fathers pay in the years that followed the war. On the 
contrary, in common with the Conservatives in the 1980s, the government then 
was primarily reacting to another enonnous increase in Poor Law expenditure 
which during the Slump had risen from £173 million in 1919 to £332 million in 
1921.71 However, by passing legislation that increased the limits on bastardy 
orders in 1918 and 1923, and introducing additional allowances for the children 
of mothers who were deserted or separated in 1925, the government was once 
again also reacting to pressure from interest groups. In particular, the newly 
founded National Council for the Unmarried Mother and Her Child played a 
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crucial role in lobbying the government for change and also helped shape the 
policy. Making fathers pay, or pay more, was very much what they had decided 
was in the best interests of lone mothers. In contrast to this, we see how other 
policy makers, particularly some politicians and civil servants, continued to have 
reservations primarily because they still feared that making improvements to the 
administration of the scheme may have negative financial consequences. Indeed, 
many anticipated that if men were required to pay more, or face harsher penalties 
if they refused to, then the numbers being sent to prison for default of payment 
would increase. Keeping them there would obviously increase Home Office 
expenditure and thus put a greater burden on taxpayers. However, as this was the 
heyday of the women's movement and as the National Council for the Unmarried 
Mother and Her Child had gained access to the corridors of power with Neville 
Chamberlain as its President, their demands were more difficult to resist. 
However, because of the fears that such policies would not succeed, Home 
Office officials and the Home Secretary began to devote more of their attention 
to finding alternative solutions to the problem. Chapter Four, therefore, also 
considers how governments in the 1920s attempted to relieve the burden of lone 
mother families on ratepayers by passing legislation which they believed would 
meet with more success than forcing fathers to comply with maintenance or 
affiliation orders. It looks at how, for example, adoption became legalised for 
this purpose. By allowing lone mothers to have their children adopted, the 
government hoped that this would reduce the numbers of such women turning to 
the Poor Law for assistance. Similarly, the grounds for divorce were extended 
in the hope that more separated mothers would find another husband to support 
them upon re-marriage. And, finally, we see how, through the Legitimacy Act, 
the government aimed to encourage putative fathers to marry the mothers of their 
illegitimate offspring. 
Chapter Four concludes the study of the years from 1900-1940 by exploring the 
outcome of the legislation to make fathers pay. It shows how, by the 1930s, it 
had become clear that attempts to claw back money from absent fathers had, as 
71 0 a \9"0 ")") rabe, .), p.~~. 
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many in government circles had predicted, the ironic effect of costing the public 
more. This was because prisons became silted up with maintenance defaulters 
which placed an extra burden on Home Office finances. In order to put a stop to 
this unintended consequence, the government at the time bent over backwards to 
find a way of preventing such men from being sent to prison. Just as the 
Conservative's blamed the failure of the Child Support Act after its first year on 
the administration, so did the government then. 
However, as this chapter reveals, there was plenty of evidence to show that these 
measures primarily failed for the same fundamental reason as the Child Support 
Act appears itself to have failed. Although, then, there was a correlation between 
unemployment and imprisonment - there were more committals during periods 
of high unemployment - the wilful refusal of many men to pay played a more 
important part in bringing about the downfall of measures to make them pay. As 
Chapter Four and previous chapters show, the attitudes and reactions of absent 
fathers to renewed efforts to make them pay, have changed little over the 
century. In common with today, commentators in the earlier period also pointed 
out that no amount of coercion and tinkering with the administration could force 
those fathers to pay who were determined not to. Although many have been able 
to get away with this in recent years because the Child Support Agency has 
decided to abandon them rather than spending time tracing and prosecuting them, 
in the past magistrates were more willing to send them to prison. However, 
many men at the time wanted to go to prison rather than pay for the simple 
reason that imprisonment wiped out all their arrears. In order to overcome this 
problem and free itself from the financial burden of keeping men in prison, the 
government passed the Money Payments (Justices Procedure) Act in 1935. 
Under this Act, which once again made modifications to the legal scheme for 
maintenance and affiliation orders, the numbers of men going to prison was 
drastically reduced. 
Having realised that making fathers pay was not going to remove the financial 
burden of lone mother families on ratepayers, the emphasis of policies once 
again shifted. Just as the new Labour government in the late 1990s has decided 
to find alternative ways of reducing the cost of lone mothers families by 
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'encouraging' them to enter the paid labour market, governments then sought 
alternative strategies to keep such families off the Poor Law. For example, under 
the Summary Procedure (Domestic Proceedings) Act of 1937, provision was 
made for probation officers to 'encourage' couples to reconcile. In the same year, 
the grounds for divorce were again extended to make divorce easier to obtain. 
The Epilogue to this thesis appraises the 1991 Child Support Act. In particular, 
its rise and fall is discussed in greater depth. This account clearly demonstrates 
the extent to which history has repeated itself. This is especially evident when 
discussing the reasons for the failure of the Child Support Act. Now as in the 
past, the fundamental problem lies in the inability of governments to extract 
money from men who are unable, or unwilling, to pay. In each period 
governments were not inclined to persevere in coercing new cohorts of absent 
fathers. Then and now, governments abandoned their efforts in order to avoid 
the short-term additional expense of imprisonment. Not only did this allow those 
who chose not to pay to get away with it, but it also meant that governments 
were unsuccessful in their attempts to deter the creation of lone mother families. 
Although at the time of writing it is not possible to provide evidence that the 
Child Support Act failed to have this impact, there is evidence that measures 
passed in the earlier period had little effect. Writing of the era following World 
War Two, Wootton noted that 
maintenance orders are not well observed. What the 
National Assistance Board has called the problem of the 
'disappearing husband' has indeed to be reckoned amongst one of 
the major social problems of the time; and the ranks of the 
contemporary poor get substantial recruitment from deserted 
wives and children. 72 
She also quoted an extract from the 1953 Report of the National Assistance 
Board: 
72 1967, p.35. 
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extracting money from husbands to maintain their wives from whom 
they are separated is at best an uncertain business; it is easier to 
enforce the maintenance of those with whom the man is living than 
of those from whom he is parted... Faced, therefore, with this 
'delicate problem', the National Assistance Board has been forced to 
allow principle to give way to those 'important practical 
considerations' which lead 'inescapably to the other view' - not least 
of which is the need to avoid the unnecessary expenditure of public 
monies. 73 
This theme is explored further in the final chapter of this thesis. The new Labour 
Government's strategy to resolve the problem of lone mothers by 'encouraging' 
them to enter the paid labour force is also discussed. However, as this policy 
will be enormously expensive to implement, for example, in terms of child care 
provision, it is not concluded here that this is the best way forward. 
Consequently, more appropriate policies to alleviate the poverty of lone mother 
families are examined, even though their implementation is not anticipated. 
After all, similar suggestions have been mooted a number of times over the 
course of the twentieth century. 74 However, as they require the community to 
take primary responsibility for supporting lone mother families they have not, 
and probably will not, come to fruition. On this rather depressing note the study 
ends by explaining the reasons why it is not, and has not been, possible to make 
better provision for lone mother families. By exploring the continuing 
attachment to the male breadwinner model and the family as the primary unit for 
the support of women and children in British society, it is argued that there is 
little prospect of change. Theoretical perspectives75 of how the legal system, the 
market and social policies shore up this standard model of the family are also 
reviewed in order to explain why lone mothers are likely to remain in the same 
situation as they are at present, and have been for the entire twentieth century. 
Although their circumstances may not be as desperate as they were in the past, 
73 Ibid., p.35-p.36. 
7--t In Chapter Three of this study alternative proposals which were suggested during World War I 
are explored in some depth. Beveridge, 1942, also toyed with the idea of making better and 
separate provision for lone mother families. So too did the authors of the Finer Report, 1974 and 
Brown, 1988. 
75 For example, Wilson 1977; Freeman, 1984; Smart and Brophy, 1985; Pedersen. 1993. 
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the conclusion reached here is that they have to remain 'less eligible~ so that the 
family unit can be preserved. 
Despite this negative conclusion the study will hopefully indicate to others new 
avenues for further research. In particular~ by demonstrating the difficulty of 
coercing men to pay~ future studies could also explore and expose the futility of 
this approach and thus~ demonstrate the need for more appropriate policies. Only 
one study to date~ conducted by Bradshaw and Millar~ has focused on the Child 
Support Act from this perspective. Moreover, in common with the findings 
related in this thesis~ their research confirms that if 
the men felt responsible for the break-up, then paying maintenance 
may be seen as a kind of reparation for past injury, whereas when the 
woman is perceived to be at fault~ not paying might be a form of 
retribution. ... a sense of responsibility springs~ not from a vacuum, 
but from negotiations in the context of an ongoing relationship with a 
specific history. 76 
As it has mainly been feminist academics who have shown the greatest interest in 
researching the Child Support Act, it is understandable that they have wanted to 
give a voice to the victims of this policy. However, as this study suggests future 
research needs to explore the psychology of absent fatherhood and its 
relationship to the payment of maintenance. Even though absent fathers have 
been able to speak for themselves, in doing so they have managed to mask the 
fact that many do not want to pay. Wallbank, one of the few authors who has 
looked at the Act from this angle, has argued that absent fathers in the 1990s 
successfully convinced the media and public that were the real victims of the Act 
by constructing themselves 'as non-residential fathers who remained responsible 
for and responsive to their children~s needs~.77 The same thing happened in the 
1930s. As the following extract from the News of the World demonstrates~ the 
contraction of men~s obligation to pay in 1935 was welcomed on the grounds 
that: 
76 Bradshaw and Millar, \989, p.20. 
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It is certain that many - if not most - ... imprisonments have been 
secured by what a well-know magistrate has described as 'malicious 
spite on the part of wives' .... In the vast majority of cases of default 
brought before the courts the defaulters have been harried and 
hunted by disgruntled or jealous wives. 78 
Research is also needed to explore the ability of men to afford to pay child 
support and the extent to which they are able to make a dent in public 
expenditure on lone mother families. Although some authors, such as Millar, 79 
have addressed this problem, it is interesting that there has been no in-depth 
analysis of this aspect of the Child Support Act. Perhaps if this issue was 
brought to the public's attention, governments intending to resurrect policies to 
make fathers pay in the future may receive less support. 
Finally, as this research has highlighted the failure of some organisations, such 
as, the National Council for One Parent Families and its predecessor the National 
Council for the Unmarried Mother and Her Child, to act in the best interests of 
the lone mothers they claim to represent, this also requires further investigation. 
In helping to shape policies to make fathers pay in both of the periods studied 
here, it has become clear that they have done the majority of lone mothers a 
disservice. Indeed, this history shows that such measures are only of benefit to 
middle class mothers in employment and those whose children have been 
fathered by affluent men. As the majority of lone mothers today have to rely on 
state benefits and have children fathered by men in low income groups, it is not 
unreasonable to question the motives of those who have the power to suggest 
what is in their best interests. 
In short, what is needed is research that primarily looks at the principle of 
making fathers pay, rather than the all too common practice whereby details of 
such arrangements are analysed. As Flynn points out, the following scenario is 
not uncommon: 
77 Wallbank, 1997, p.192. 
78 17 November, 1935. 





If a politician has an idea about a policy which is wrong, he or she 
may be able to blame the failure on implementation, rather than on 
policy itself. 80 
This clearly happened in relation to all the measures that are examined in this 
study. However, until our knowledge of the subject increases significantly as 
described above, governments will be able to continue tinkering with the 
administration of the child support system. Needless to say this will not be of 
benefit to the majority of lone mother families, just as the Child Support Act was 
not. As the following statistics show, the numbers of such families living in 
poverty at the end of the twentieth century is alarming: 
In 1994/95, 53 per cent of lone parent families were in the bottom 
quartile of the income distribution after housing costS.81 
Or, put another way, 
in 1996, 60 per cent of all lone mother families had gross weekly 
incomes of less than £150 per week compared with only 7 per cent 
of married couples with dependent children.82 
The numbers of lone parent families in poverty has also increased since 
Margaret Thatcher's Party came to power. After housing costs, they made up 9 
per cent of the bottom quintile in 1979 and 23 per cent in 1994/5.83 
80 Flynn, 1997, p.227. 
81 DSS, 1995b, p.24. 
82 Office for National Statistics, 1998, p. I 7. 
83 DSS, 1995, p.6. 
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CHAPTER 2: 1900-1914 
i) Introduction 
In the years immediately preceding the First World War, measures of welfare 
reform were extensively discussed in policy-making circles and a range of new 
legislative measures found their way onto the statute book. The Liberal welfare 
reforms have been much studied: as the foundations for the later development of 
the welfare state, as a transformation in the nature of Liberal politics, and as a 
revolution in the scope and responsibilities of government. The literature 
documenting these debates and their outcomes is now copious. It is not proposed 
to review it in any depth here. However, some discussion is necessary for 
legislation to reinforce the financial responsibility of absent fathers, enacted in 
1914, was an, albeit small, part of the same process of reforming the provision of 
welfare in England and Wales. 
As with many of the more widely discussed welfare reforms introduced by the 
Liberal Government, the Acts of 1914 were, to a large extent, a reaction to ever 
increasing levels of Poor Law expenditure. Although, as we shall see, the 
government was unable to sustain this increase in the face of escalating ratepayer 
hostility, to do so would also not have been compatible with their ideological 
position. In common with traditional liberals they were anxious that individuals 
should make provision for themselves wherever possible. In contrast to the 
former though, they did recognise that this required greater state regulation and 
control of the social. Early twentieth century Liberals therefore saw government-
run insurance schemes as the answer social problems wherever possible, leaving 
those for whom this was not an option subject to a deterrent system of relief. 
Squires and others I have argued that Liberal social policy was disciplinary in the 
sense that it attempted to encourage individuals to reform their characters. This 
moralistic ingredient was reflected in, for example. unemployment insurance 
1 1990. p.1 02-p.140; Thane, 1978 
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benefits which required a record of regular work and corresponding contributions 
before access to help could be assured. 
However, there were to be some categories of people in need of relief who were 
to spared from the Poor Law even though they could not provide for themselves. 
The trend since the late nineteenth century to view some forms of poverty as not 
of an individuals own making became more widely accepted in the early years of 
the twentieth century. Moreover, this was a view that could not easily be ignored 
following the publication of the Majority and Minority Reports of the Royal 
Commission on the Poor Laws and the Relief of Distress in 1909. Despite their 
disagreements, the authors of both reports were united in their condemnation of 
the appropriateness of the Poor Law for many of its clients. Many old people, 
and also needy children, for example, thus came to be seen as 'deserving' of 
public support. 
The once popular interpretation of the Liberal welfare reforms as representing a 
humanitarian departure from the previous, individualistic principles that had 
governed relief for the destitute as manifest in the 1834 Poor Law,2 is not a view 
endorsed by many historians today. Pearson and Williams,3 for example, have 
argued that the new liberalism of the early twentieth century necessitated a 
'delicate juggling of the traditional values of individuality and the need for a 
collectivist concept of society'. Other writers have concluded that the Liberal 
Government's expansion of state involvement in the pre-war years through the 
provision of, for example, old age pensions, and unemployment and health 
insurance, as 'reluctant collectivism'.4 
Indeed, when the Liberal party, under the leadership of Lloyd George, fought the 
election in 1906 they did not do so on the grounds of social reform. Although 
there were some civil servants, such as Churchill, who supported the idea of 
.2 See, for example, Rose, 1972. 
J 15') 1984, p.151-p. ~. 
-I Gt.'orge and Wilding, 1985: Lowe. 1993. 
radical social reform and bigger government,5 the reforms that did occur were 
generally ad hoc responses to a variety of factors that aroused increasing concern 
in this era. In addition to mounting Poor Law expenditure, fears about national 
efficiency and the political threat posed by the perceived growth in the popularity 
of the Labour party all played a role in prompting the Liberal government to take 
action. One historian has argued that both Lloyd George and Churchill 
deliberately used social insurance 'as a means of making socialism less likely', 
as Bismark had done in Germany. 6 But having said that, when measures of 
reform finally reached the statute books they were very much the product of 
various struggles between the dominant political parties, pressure groups and 
individual campaigners who managed to force their opinions onto the agenda. 
In this chapter it will be argued that the 1914 Affiliation Orders Act and the 
Criminal Justice Administration Act - which sought to ensure that fathers paid 
their orders primarily by making administrative improvements to the scheme for 
the collection and enforcement of payments - were typical Liberal reforms in the 
sense described above. Although these measures have been largely neglected by 
historians, the reform of provision for lone mother families did become an issue 
of some importance in the pre-war years. It formed one focus of attention for 
two key investigations: the Select Committee on Bastardy Orders, 1909, and the 
Royal Commission on Divorce, 1912. It also came under the scrutiny of the 
Royal Commission on the Poor Laws, 1905-1905, in their inspection of the 
causes of pauperism. 
The chapter begins by detailing why attempts to improve the system for the 
collection and enforcement of bastardy and maintenance orders was desperately 
needed by lone mothers. Although this need did encourage some organisations 
and individuals to fight for reforms on their behalf, the remaining sections of the 
chapter \vill show that a concern for the plight of lone mother families was not 
what primarily motivated the government to accept the need for change. Even 
though the Liberals did. to an extent, give into this pressure, their efforts to make 
~ Middleton. 1996, p.210. 
fathers pay need to be interpreted as having been largely motivated by the desire 
to demonstrate that they did not wish to undermine the principle of paternal 
responsibility. In that sense they were clearly disciplinary and moralistic. 
However, as this chapter will also demonstrate, in common with governments in 
the 1980s and the interwar years, these Acts were partly implemented in the hope 
that the cost to the community of supporting lone mother families would be 
reduced. The remaining sections of the chapter therefore explore these other 
reasons for the introduction of 1914 Acts: the Poor Law crisis; the growing 
movement for national efficiency (and the consequent interest in infant welfare); 
and the politics of welfare reform. 
ii) The Scale of the Problem 
Of course, the problem of lone mother families then was not as pronounced as it 
is now. But then, it is not possible to say exactly how big this problem was. 
There was no definitive way of distinguishing the real widow from the deserted 
wife (or unmarried mother) who claimed to be a widow. There was also no way 
of knowing how many unmarried mothers passed their offspring on to their own 
mothers to be brought up as child rather than grandchild. Official statistics on 
the illegitimate birth rate show a decline since the late nineteenth century and the 
First World War. Between 1876 and 1880,47.5 out of every 1,000 births were 
illegitimate. This figure had fallen to 39.5 for every 1,000 births between 1906 
and 1910.7 As far as separated and deserted wives are concerned, there are no 
statistics to show how many there were, or whether their numbers had increased. 
Because of the stigma attached to this status it was not perhaps something that 
would have been admitted to Census officials. Even the pauper census at the 
time revealed little about this group of women. Although women on outdoor 
relief without husbands were classified according to whether they were widows, 
single women without children, mothers of illegitimate children or wives 
relieved in the absence of a husband, these distinctions were still not applied to 
6 Fraser, 1984, p.163. 
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those receiving institutional relief. As most lone mothers before 1914 were not 
considered 'deserving', most of them would only have been offered the 
workhouse. The statistics for women in receipt of indoor relief were only 
classified according to whether these women were 'able-bodied', or 'not able-
bodied'. 8 This lack of information suggests that this group was probably not on 
the increase. If it had been, presumably the government would have instructed 
officials to provide some information on their numbers. 
Although this indicates that other poverty stricken groups were more visible 
because of their greater numbers, the issue of lone mother families was not 
entirely neglected. As noted earlier, they did become the focus of some attention 
and there were some individuals who wanted to bring their plight to the public's 
attention in the hope that they would be better provided for. Indeed, it is though 
records documenting these concerns that it is possible to describe the legal and 
material difficulties faced by these families in the pre-war era. 
iii) The Failure of the System to Make Fathers Pay before 1914 
The law before the First World War dealt separately with deserted and separated 
wives on the one hand, and unmarried mothers on the other. The former group 
of women had only been able to obtain maintenance orders (and separation 
orders) in their own name since 1878 when the Married Women (Maintenance in 
Case of Desertion) Act was passed. This Act was then repealed in 1895 by the 
Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act which remained intact throughout 
this period with only one minor amendment - the 1902 Licensing Act. Before 
the 1920s, there were no separate orders for the maintenance of children, and the 
upper limit on maintenance orders for wives was £2 a week. Moreover, a wife 
was only entitled to maintenance on certain grounds: if her husband had been 
convicted of assaulting her; or had deserted her; if he had been guilty of 
persistent cruelty to her; or if he had forced her to leave him by not providing 
7 Registrar General, 1918, p.xxvii. 
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reasonable maintenance for her and any children. If the wife had committed 
adultery she lost any right to maintenance, unless 'the husband had connived at or 
condoned it, or conduced to it by his own neglect or misconduct'.9 
If a separated woman became chargeable, any relief that was given to her and her 
children was considered to be given to the husband/father. The guardians could 
apply to the justices for an order upon the husband to pay a sum towards their 
relief under the Poor Law Amendment Act, 1868, section 33. Any man who 
'wilfully refused' or 'neglected to maintain his family', 'although able to do so', 
could be prosecuted under section 3 of the Vagrancy Act, 1824, as an 'idle and 
disorderly person'. This made him liable to be sent to prison with hard labour for 
a period of up to a month. (This, however, did not apply to men whose wives 
had left them and committed adultery). Soldiers were treated in exactly the same 
way. However, the Army Council could make deductions from their pay under 
the Army Act of 1911. Men who had deserted their wives and made them 
chargeable were deemed to be a 'rogue' or 'vagabond' and liable to a period of 
imprisonment for up to three months under section 4 of the Vagrancy Act, 1824. 
Mothers of illegitimate children, providing they were unmarried or widowed, had 
been able to take proceedings in their own name against putative fathers since the 
1834 Poor Law Amendment Act. As a result of various amendments to the law 
from the middle of the nineteenth century,1O mothers could obtain orders against 
putative fathers for their children's 'maintenance and education', up to a limit of 
5/- a week until the child reached the age of 13 years. Firstly, however, a mother 
had to prove that a particular man was the putative father by providing 
corroborative evidence to the satisfaction of the magistrates. More often than 
not, the only way this could be proved was if the father admitted paternity as 
blood testing was not available yet.I I 
8 See. for example, RCPL. (1910), Appendix Vol. xxv, p.68 and p.116-p.117. 
9 Finer and McGregor, in the Finer Report, (1974), Vol. 2, p.1 07. 
I () The Bastardy Act, 1845; The Bastardy Laws Amendment Acts, 1872 and 1873; The Bastardy 
Oders Act 1880. For further discussion see Henriques, 1967. 
II SCBO. 1909, Appendix 4, p.65. 
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If the illegitimate child became chargeable the guardians had to follow a similar 
procedure to obtain an order against the putative father, under the Bastardy Laws 
Amendment Act, 1873. (Although some relieving officers may have preferred to 
put pressure on the father to marry the mother of the illegitimate child to 'keep 
her off the rates',12 under section 8 of the Poor Law Amendment Act, 1844, 'any 
Poor Law officer endeavouring to induce any person to contract marriage by 
threat or pressure respecting any application to be made or order to be enforced 
with reference to the maintenance of a bastard child is guilty of 
misdemeanour'). 13 Payments under orders granted to guardians had no upper 
limit and were recoverable until the child ceased to be chargeable. However, any 
orders made either by the mother or the guardians were subject to appeal by the 
father to the Quarter Sessions if he wanted to have the amount reduced. 
(Mothers had no similar right to appeal when a magistrate refused to grant an 
order - they could only apply for a second summons if they had 'fresh evidence'). 
If a putative father failed to pay and either the mother or the guardians took 
proceedings out against him, the justices could issue a warrant and have the man 
returned to court. If he still did not pay they could then issue a distress warrant 
on his goods and, if that was not successful, he could then be imprisoned for up 
to three months. 14 Maintenance orders for separated and deserted wives were 
enforceable in the same manner, that is, by distress and/or imprisonment. ls 
Although this system was, in theory, satisfactory to ensure the payment and 
recovery of maintenance or affiliation orders, in practice, it was an administrative 
failure. The following table illustrates this failure by showing the numbers of 
men imprisoned for non-payment during this period in those cases where the 
mother had made the order in her own name. 
I' 
- RCD. 1913, Vol. 2, p.199. 
13 SCBO. 1909, Appendix 4, p.66. 
14 Bastardy Laws Amendment Act. Section 4, 1872. 
1 ~ PRO H0451 16270, Sate on the Law Relating to Affiliation Orders and their Enforcement, 
with Text on the Principal enactments Relating to Enforcement. 
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TABLE 2.1: Numbers committed by Magistrates' Courts for non-payment 
of wife's and children's maintenance, and bastardy arrears. (Yearly 
averages). 
Matrimonial Orders Bastardy and Affiliation Orders 
0/0 0/0 
Year No. of No. Imprisoned No of No. imprisoned 
Orders imprisoned to orders Orders imprisoned to orders 
1900104 7,375 1,662 23 6,182 1,081 17 
1905/09 7,500 2,114 28 6,699 1,693 25 
1910/13 7,408 2,154 29 6,767 1,683 25 
Source: McGregor et aI., 1970, p.32. 
However, the system did not just fail those mothers who had been granted an 
order. Although their numbers are unknown, evidence suggests that many lone 
mothers were often deterred from even seeking an order in the first place. This 
was because 'once in court innocent young girls are cross-examined ... and the 
public who watch very often only go there to be amused and entertained' .16 In 
these, predominantly male, courts lone mothers also had to endure 'filthy talk 
and disgusting names in the presence of children which is often worse than 
blows' .17 As a consequence, evidence suggests that many women remained in 
intolerable marriages rather than go though this ordeal. As one such woman 
reported at the time: 
The boys say 'leave him mother', but I could not wash our dirty linen 
in public, and if I did, it is the children who would suffer. I8 
16 SCBO, 1909, Minutes of Evidence, p.SO. 
17 RCD. 1913, Vol. 2, p.191. 
18 Ibid., Vol. 3, p.167 
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The experience of attending a magistrates court could be even more unpleasant 
for separated wives who were required to give details of adultery. Moreover, 
their cases were often published in newspapers for the press thrived on feeding 
the public's taste for such scandals, even though there was widespread concern at 
the time about the corrupting influence of such stories on young readers. 19 
Many lone mothers were also handicapped by their ignorance of the legal system. 
When giving evidence to the Royal Commission on Divorce a Court Missionary 
said: 
It is pitiable for one who knows what they have suffered to see them 
try and put their case. They cannot see the legal aspect of the case, 
and the magistrate and the clerk are often at their wits-end to get at 
the facts; yet I have seen frequently the hardships a poor woman 
endures and her forbearance and patience before she comes to the 
court.20 
Lone mothers who did go to court and managed to be awarded orders, often 
found that the amounts granted were for far less than the statutory limits. In the 
case of separated wives, this was a deliberate ploy used by some magistrates who 
hoped that, through a lack of money, they would go back to their husbands. 21 
The amount a woman was granted could also depend on where she lived 
because, generally speaking, county or police courts were less generous than 
borough courtS.22 
Separated or deserted wives who were granted maintenance orders also had to 
wait for one month before payments could commence. This was not some legal 
anomaly but another measure which had been designed to encourage 
reconciliation.23 They also had to remain 'chaste', otherwise their husbands could 
19 Ibid., 1912, Vol. 1, p.441. 
20 Ibid., 1913, Vol. 2, p.191. 
21 Ibid., Vol. 3, p.440. 
22 Ibid. 
23 This claim was made by a number of witnesses appearing before the ReO, see, for example, 
1913, Vol. 2, p.254. 
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have their orders discharged, although there was no penalty on the man if he 
committed adultery.24 
If absent fathers failed to pay maintenance or affiliation orders, or got into 
arrears, the remedy was not as easy as the law implied. If the lone mother had 
not resorted to the Poor Law, she alone was responsible for chasing the 
husband/putative father and had to pay the costs involved. In 1912 the cost of a 
summons was half-a-crown, and 5s. 6d. to take out a warrant if the summons was 
unsuccessful. This was clearly too expensive for the vast majority of women in 
this situation.25 Attending court again also meant having to take time off work 
and many lone mothers could not afford to risk losing their jobs by being absent 
for the day and a half it entailed.26 In any case, there was little that the courts 
could do if an absent father was determined not to pay. Just as in the present 
day, absent fathers resorted to various tactics to avoid paying. It was certainly 
not unusual for fathers to abscond. Nor did they have to go very far, as the 
following case illustrates: 
Woman had been ill-treated by her husband almost from the time of 
the marriage, sometimes brutally, and he has not been faithful to her 
for many years. Not only has she seen him with other women, but 
the children too have seen him. A deed of separation was drawn up 
and he agreed to pay lOs. a week, but left the town with a woman 
and did not pay. The wife spent her hard-earned savings, nearly 201., 
in trying to find him. She found him living with a woman under an 
assumed name and applied for a summons, but he did not appear and 
left the town again.27 
As today, men were also known to cause the mothers of their children 
'unpleasantness' in order to evade payment.28 
If absent fathers were arrested and imprisoned for failure to pay, this was not 
necessarily to their disadvantage because imprisonment wiped out all the arrears. 
~-t RCD. 1913,Vol. 2, p.254. 
25 Ibid., 1912, Vol. 1, p. 441. 
261bid .. 1913, Vol. 2, p. 297. 
27 Subm itted by Margaret Llewellyn Davies to the RCD, 1913. Vol. 3, p. 163. 
28 ReO. 1912. Minutes of Evidence, Vol. I, p.173. 
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Some men even went back to the courts and asked to be sent to prison so that 
their arrears could be wiped out.29 Once a man had been imprisoned though 
there was even less chance of him making regular payments. This was not just 
because of the effect it had on his employment but because 
once he has been to prison ... he seems to lose heart, and does not 
care to keep up his payments at all, and very rarely does.3o 
Even when payments were regular, the majority of lone mothers found that they 
were not enough to survive on. It was very rare for all categories of lone 
mothers to be awarded orders near the statutory limits which had not, in any 
case, been increased since the 1870s. Then, as now, the average income of a 
working man was insufficient to keep two households. 
The income of working men affected by these orders may be taken to 
vary roughly between 20s. and 40s. per week. This sum represents, 
when properly expended in a joint home, a tolerable degree of 
comfort, and, administered with a fair amount of skill, does often 
result in a wholesome and satisfying home. When, however, instead 
of being applied to the upkeep of one home it has to support two 
different homes its inadequacy becomes at once apparent. It is in 
many cases impossible for either of the parties to maintain a standard 
of life necessary to keep them either reasonably comfortable or 
moderatelyefficient.31 
Moreover, magistrates were reluctant to award an order for a large proportion of 
a man's wages because 
the magistrates take a rather lenient view of the man and rather a 
large view of the man's necessities, and say the man must be able to 
keep himself respectable; and ifhe is to be at work he must live well; 
these things are taken into consideration and dwelt upon too largely 
32 
29 Ibid., 1913, Vol. 2, p.234. 
30 SCBO, 1909, Minutes of Evidence, p.29. 
31 RCD, 1913, Minutes of Evidence, Vol. 2, p.l06. 
32 Ibid., p.315 
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Even though the limits on bastardy orders existed primarily to protect 'innocent' 
men from being blackmailed, 
in many of these cases the fathers of the children are boys earning 
very little; the order is made for half-a-crown a week. 33 
In common with lone mothers, the Poor Law guardians also had little success in 
making fathers pay. Annual Reports of the LGB from this period, however, give 
no indication of the amounts recovered from absent fathers. However, there are 
statistics which show the number of applications for orders made by the Poor 
Law and the number of imprisonments that occurred for non-payment. If this is 
used as a yardstick by which to judge their success then, as the following table 
shows, the guardians had even less chance of recovering money than a lone 
mother did. Although the high rates of imprisonment may have indicated the 
greater poverty of men chased by guardians, or the greater propensity for Poor 
Law officials to chase them, there is no evidence to suggest that magistrates were 
less lenient on these men when they set the amount of an order, or when they 
were summoned to court for non-payment. 
TABLE 2.2: Numbers committed by Magistrates' Courts for non-payment 
of Poor Law, bastardy and maintenance orders. (Yearly averages). 
0/0 
Year No. of orders No. imprisoned imprisoned to 
orders 
1900104 4,244 2,039 48 
1905/09 4,506 2,202 49 
1910/13 3,661 2,015 55 
Source: McGregor et al, 1970, p.33 
33 SCBO, 1909. p.52. 
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Poor Law guardians faced many of the same difficulties as lone mothers, when 
they attempted to obtain or enforce orders. For example, in cases where the man 
had absconded the guardians were in the same situation as the mothers and 
unable to do anything. Like the women, they also had no power to recover 
maintenance from men who had gone to live in the 'British Colonies' or abroad 
and left their dependants chargeable. Moreover, in bastardy cases the guardians 
were doubly disadvantaged. Not only were they unable to charge a putative 
father with the cost of maintaining the mother before, during and after her 
pregnancy,34 but they were also hampered because these women often left the 
workhouse so soon after their confinement that the guardians did not have 
sufficient time to even apply to the courts for an order.35 Even when they did 
manage to get an order, some guardians complained that it was not unusual for 
mothers and putative fathers to collude to agree that the man should make 
inadequate payments.36 This was perhaps because, as today, the mother would 
not have benefited from any money the man paid to the guardians. Presumably 
some unmarried women had on-going relationships with the fathers of their 
illegitimate children, and simply had no choice but to enter the workhouse. Poor 
Law officials also claimed that the system encouraged desertions by married men 
because it seemed to them that they occurred especially at the time of a wife's 
confinement. They therefore concluded that many wives knew where their 
husbands were and should not have been given relief.37 However, even though 
desertion was a criminal offence, if a wife and her children became chargeable 
husbands still managed to avoid prosecution: 
I have known many cases where, under the threat of prosecution, the 
husband has taken the wife out of the workhouse and then left her in 
the street.38 
J.t RCPL 1911, Vol. xi, p.138. 
35 SCBO, 1909, Minutes of Evidence, pAl. 
36 Ibid., p.6. 
J7 RCPL, 1909, Appendix Vol. xviii, p.ll. 
38 This was according to a Court Missionary cited in RCD, 1913, Vol. 2, p.191. 
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Finally, if the mother of an illegitimate child was 'insane' or died there was no 
legislation by which guardians could seek an order from the putative father for 
the maintenance of his child because this was prohibited without the mother's 
evidence.39 
The laws relating to the collection and enforcement of bastardy and maintenance 
orders during this period were, therefore, practically dead letters. As a result of 
having set up the Royal Commission on Divorce, 1912, and the Select 
Committee on Bastardy Orders, 1909, this state of affairs was something the 
Liberal government could not ignore. This Commission and Committee gave 
those who had a genuine desire to improve the material circumstances of lone 
mother families a chance to make themselves heard. In particular, it was 
individuals who belonged to organisations, such as the Associated Societies for 
the Protection of Women and Children, which had direct contact with lone 
mothers, who were most forceful in demanding reform. Similarly, the increase 
in the number of Lady Guardians on Boards of Guardians in some parishes also 
helped to bring this matter to the governments attention. Having responsibility 
for the female inmates in her charge one Lady Guardian, for example, told the 
Select Committee on Bastardy Orders that the law should be strictly formulated 
so "that the father should be made to feel what a responsibility fatherhood is' .40 
Thus, as now, it was predominantly middle class women who decided that the 
best solution to the plight of lone mothers was not collective provision but 
private provision by fathers. Although the majority of population at the time 
would not have questioned this principle, it was this sector of society who 
instigated the movement towards harsher legislation to coerce men into paying. 
Their primary motive was not, however, to save ratepayers money but to 
strengthen the family and reinforce their own notions of morality. One of the 
reasons why the Royal Commission on Divorce had been set up was because of 
fears that the family was in crisis. Evidence had emerged showing that as the 
39 RCPL, 1911, Vol. xi, p.122. 
40 Miss Mary James, of the Parish ofSt Matthew, Bentnal Green, SCBO. 1909, Minutes of 
Evidence, p.46. 
majority of people could not afford divorce they had little choice but to form 
'immoral unions' following the breakdown of marriages. The mam 
recommendation of the commissioners was to call for legislation to make 
divorce easier so that when new unions were formed couples could re-marry. 
This was not only to prevent any children being born to such couples from being 
illegitimate but also as an attempt to improve the moral standards of the lowest 
sections of the community whose moral behaviour they described as 
'deplorable' .41 
iv) The Experience of Lone Motherhood before World War 1 
Lone mothers struggle for survival during this period also demonstrates that 
there was an urgent need to find a more adequate system for their financial 
support. The following will describe the difficulties they encountered in their 
attempts to be self-supporting in the period from 1900 to 1914. However, there 
is no evidence to suggest that their needs were of any concern to the majority of 
politicians and civil servants, just as the need to ameliorate the poverty of lone 
mother families was of no concern to the Conservative Government in the 
1980s. Even though some of the witnesses to the various Commissions and 
Committees in the early years of the century may have wanted change primarily 
for the benefit of these women, the authors of the various reports gave no 
indication that this was behind their calls to improve the opportunities for these 
women to obtain orders. 
Needless to say, the deterrent Poor Law was the last resort for lone-mothers, as it 
was for anyone who found themselves destitute at the beginning of this century. 
The surest route to financial security was, therefore, either by marriage in the 
case of unmarried mothers (if they had kept their illegitimate children and had 
not for example, had them illegally adopted), or cohabitation for separated or 
deserted women. Although it is not known how many women succeeded in 
41 ReO, 1912. Report, pAO. 
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taking either of these routes out of poverty, as previously noted, cohabitation. or 
'illicit unions" were not uncommon in this period. A solicitor who appeared 
before the Royal Commission on Divorce claimed to have come across 
several cases where women have deliberately gone to live with men 
because they have been unable to keep themselves and their children 
on the amount of moneys which have been granted to them by the 
justices.42 
Other witnesses pointed out that cohabitation often occurred when women 
sought to supplement their income by taking in lodgers: 'If she takes in lodgers 
she invariably enters into another connection'.43 
If lone mothers did not go down this path, they tried to support themselves and 
their families through work or even prostitution. Obviously, it is impossible to 
gauge the extent to which such women resorted to prostitution. However, the 
fact that the Criminal Law Amendment Act was passed in 1912 to deal with the 
problem of 'disorderly houses' suggests that prostitution was widespread enough 
for it to be seen as a problem. Moreover, Willis claimed that he came across 
mothers of illegitimate babies who had turned to prostitution when he was 
conducting his investigation into sweated labour in 1914.44 Some of those 
giving evidence to the Gorell Commission also claimed that some unmarried 
mothers joined the ranks of 'public women'. 45 
It is also difficult to estimate the number of lone mothers who were successful in 
supporting themselves paid employment. If they were able to, it was unlikely 
that would have been very well off. The type of employment available to them 
was usually poorly paid.46 In any case, unless they were able to find someone to 
care for their children, and at a rate they could afford, working as a route out of 
poverty would not have been an option. If they did manage to overcome these 
42 RCD, 1912, Vol. 1, pA40. 
43 Ibid., 1913. Vol. 2, p.301. 
-l-l Willis, 1914, pAO-pA2. 
45 See, for example, RCD, 1913, Vol. 2, p.l07. 
-l6 For further discussion on this subject. see, for example, Lewis. 1984, p.l-l5-p.217. 
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problems, working and bringing up children was often a struggle. The following 
case submitted by Margaret Llewellyn Davies to the Royal Commission on 
Divorce was not untypical: 
Her husband left her five years ago ... she heard soon after that he 
had gone away to America with another woman. Anyhow she had 
neither seen nor heard of him since he went away. She had to go out 
and work. They had nothing to depend on, only what she earned. 
The work was very hard, she had not been used to it, and after a few 
months she broke down, was ill in bed for weeks .... 47 
The obstacles to employment outside the home explains why such women took 
in lodgers, if they had the room. Alternatively, they may have become 
homeworkers but, as the evidence put before the 1907 Sweated Labour 
Committee shows, this would not have provided them with the means to support 
their families adequately. Writing in 1914, Willis described such workers as 
'White Slaves of Toil' for most of them spent their lives working extremely long 
hours, often in the most appalling conditions, for far less than a living wage. 
Although it is impossible to say how many lone mothers undertook 
homeworking, Willis provides evidence that some did: 
The number of heart-broken deserted women one finds toiling alone, 
dispirited and utterly hopeless, is terrible and a great blot on the 
manhood of our country.48 
If lone-mother families could not support themselves with maintenance and/or 
wages, as seems to have been the case for the majority, their next recourse was 
to seek aid from friends and family members. Even though it was more likely 
that lone mothers then would have lived in closer proximity to their families than 
they do today, there was obviously a limit to their ability to help, at least for any 
length of time. When this support was not available or ended, lone mothers had 
no choice but to tum to the guardians. The deterrent nature of the system of 
-17 I 9 I 3 , Vol. 3, p. 164. >JIVt::RSITY 
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relief made this an undesirable experience. Also, the principle of 'less eligibility' 
ensured that they were only provided with the barest means of survival. 
Until the First World War, and beyond it, there were no uniform scales of relief. 
Nor was there any uniformity between Unions with regard to the way they 
treated the poor. Generally speaking, however, unmarried mothers were 
compelled to enter the workhouse where, according to regulations, they would 
have been separated from their illegitimate babies after their confinement. (This 
perhaps explains why so many took their babies and left as soon as they could 
after the birth). Deserted wives were also usually only offered the workhouse. 
A Local Government Board Circular of 1872 instructed guardians that 'Outdoor 
relief should not, except in special cases, be granted to any woman deserted by 
her husband during the first twelve months after desertion'.49 This was 
supposedly to guard against collusion by husbands and wives making false 
claims for relief. Guardians were also only supposed to offer separated wives 
the workhouse. 50 
In practice, however, not all unions respected these rules. In England and Wales 
in 1906, some 284 mothers of illegitimate children received outdoor relief as did 
5,431 wives without husbands.51 The authors of the Majority Report on the Poor 
Law and the Relief of Distress cited the parishes of St. Pancras and Camberwell 
in order to illustrate the impact of local variation. They claimed that in the 
former the wife was always taken into the workhouse but in the latter they 
always got outrelief. 52 Possibly the small numbers of women with illegitimate 
children getting outrelief reflects the heavy stigma that was attached to this 
condition. However, the numbers of separated or deserted women getting 
outdoor relief suggests that the guardians had little incentive to implement the 
recommendation of the 1872 circular. This may have been because it was 
cheaper to offer a separated or deserted woman outdoor relief rather than take 
48 Willis, 1914, p.85. 
~9 LGB, 1872, p.67, para. 2. 
50 RCD, 19 \3, Vol. 3, p.306. 
51 RCPL, 1910, Appendix, xxv, p.116-p.117. 
52 Ibid., 1909, Majority Report, p.207. 
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her into the workhouse. The cost of keeping an indoor pauper in 1912 was £29 
13s. OV2d. compared to £7 4s. 7d. for an outdoor pauper. 53 
Sometimes a women was offered a choice as the following case shows: 
She applied to the guardians to grant her a small sum per week till 
her children got a little older ... they told her they could not do 
anything till she sold part of her home. The proceeds of her furniture 
they said, would keep them a few months longer. There was one 
alternative, she could go in the workhouse if she liked. 54 
Other lone mothers were refused relief because of the settlement laws. We know 
of one case where this happened to a deserted woman with 6 children: she 
originally came from Bradford but because of her husband's employment, had 
moved to Leeds where the family lived for four years. When he deserted her, 
she and her children could not find work in Leeds so they returned to Bradford. 
The Bradford guardians refused them relief and would only give them the money 
for their fares back to Leeds where their settlement was. However, because this 
woman knew she would not be able to find employment there, she could not 
accept the guardians offer. Eventually this women did manage to find work in 
Bradford but 
Mrs G .... says that she wishes that she had not to go to the mill, for 
when she comes home she is far too tired, after standing all day, to 
start baking and washing ... On her way home from the mill this 
evening she pawned the shawl which she was wearing, to get money 
for bread and jam for their tea ... Mrs G. told me (without any 
complaints) of the hard struggle they have had since they came to 
Bradford, and being strangers, they did not know where to turn for 
help. One day they were nearly all starving and the little children 
were crying for food. 55 
Guardians were prepared to supplement lone mother's wages in some cases. 
Although this was more commonly a method use to relieve widows (because 
they were considered more respectable and 'deserving' than other categories of 
:iJ LGB.1913, p.126. 
:i~ Case submitted by Llewellyn Davies to the RCD, 1913, Vol. 3, p.164. 
55 RCPL. 1910, Appendix Vol. xxi, p.18. 
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lone-mothers), a case of this happening to a deserted wife was referred to in the 
Majority Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws.56 
Constance Williams and Thomas Jones conducted an enquiry for this Royal 
Commission to look into the effect of outdoor relief on the level on women's 
wages. Although it was not in their remit to inquire into the status of the women 
they investigated, it is safe to assume that the information contained in their 
report also applied to separated and deserted wives. They found that there was 
much local variation in the amount of outrelief that women received: 
Some guardians encourage applicants to earn all they can and do not 
reduce the relief; others cut down the relief as wages rise, or as 
children begin to earn; others seen to think changes in income 
irrelevant to the amount of relief given ... No board in the unions we 
have examined gives adequate relief on condition that the mother 
ceases work. 57 
Even though it may appear that the guardians who granted relief without 
deductions were being generous, it has to be noted that these guardians relied 'on 
there being undisclosed resources and relieve[d] accordingly'. 58 Women in the 
other categories could find themselves in the equivalent of what is known today 
as a 'benefit trap': 
A.B. deserted by husband. A strong able-bodied woman in receipt of 
out-relief. Work was found for her by the Charity Organisation 
Society. She Demurred: 'What's the use? I shall be no better off; my 
relief will be stopped: she had not been on relief long. Previously, 
for five years, she supported herself bravely, but grew tired.59 
Boards of guardians determined the treatment of such women on mainly moral 
criteria but where possible they used this as a means of saving ratepayers money. 
It is not surprising, therefore, to find that some women tried passing themselves 
)6 Ibid., 1909, p.205. 
)7 Ibid., 1909, Appendix. Vol. xvii, p.3. 
58 Ibid. 
)9 Ibid., Majority Report, 1909, p.205. 
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off as widows rather than let it be known that they were separated. 60 The 
relieving officers job was to keep such women off the rates. This meant that 
other tactics were also used to deter women from seeking relief. For example. 
the procedure that had to be gone through when asking for relief was designed to 
be as unpleasant as possible: 
A young woman overtaken by the consequences of her transgression, 
and applying for maternity relief, had first to detail her story to the 
Relieving Officer; next she had to appear before a Board, composed 
mainly of men, where she was liable to be questioned by anyone who 
chose to speak. 61 
This treatment was also applied to deserted women, and one described the 
questions the guardians asked as 'revolting and insulting'. 62 
As a result many women would have delayed seeking relief for as long as they 
possibly could. They may also have done this out of fear of losing their children 
altogether for under the Poor Law Acts of 1889 and 1899, Boards of Guardians 
were empowered to adopt children who became chargeable if their parent(s) 
were deemed to be 'unfit, by reasons of mental deficiency or of vicious habits or 
mode of life, to have charge of them'.63 Although the extent to which these 
powers were used against separated, deserted or unmarried women is not known, 
the numbers of children adopted by guardians increased considerably between 
1902 and 1908, from 7,724 cases to 12,417.64 Evidence from the Birmingham 
Board of Guardians shows that it adopted 1,213 children between 1912 and 1921 
and that out of this total 393 were orphans, 196 had been deserted, and 623 were 
of 'parents unfit to control them either by reason of mental deficiency or because 
of vicious habits or modes of life'.65 Moreover, the guardians had every 
incentive to take this kind of action because children adopted by them could be 
boarded-out which was considerably cheaper than maintaining them in 
60 RCD, 1913. Vol. 3, p.167. 
61 RCPL, 1910, Appendix, Vol. xxi, p.87. 
6~ Case submitted by Llewellyn Davies, RCD, 1913, Vol. 3, p.164. 
63 LG B. 191 I, p. 16. 
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institutions. This would also have kept the mothers out of the workhouse, giving 
the Guardians another advantage - if the mother became employed the Poor Law 
authority could then pursue her for contributions towards the child's 
maintenance. One district inspector at the time went so far as to say that the 
boarding-out method was too frequently used by boards because of its 
cheapness. More importantly, he also added that 
where cheapness is the chief consideration, or there is insufficient 
inquiry into the suitability of the home the results are not 
satisfactory. Generally speaking, people do not become foster 
parents from actual love of the children; the object is to increase the 
family income by the pay which guardians allow. This pay is 
sometimes not more than 2s. 6d. a week with an allowance of 10s. a 
quarter for clothes but this latter amount is not always given.66 
However, where this did not happen, and mothers and children became 
chargeable, it then became the guardians responsibility to do all they could to 
recoup the expense from the husband or putative father. 
Having demonstrated that legislation was clearly required to overcome the 
problems faced by lone mother families the following section outlines the main 
features of the reforms that were eventually enacted in 1914. 
v) The Affiliation Orders Act and the Criminal Justice Administration 
Act, 1914 
The Affiliation Orders Act, 1914, aimed to make it more difficult for putative 
fathers to evade paying orders and to ensure that they did not fall into arrears. In 
order to achieve the former objective, a putative father was required under 
section 4 of the Act to inform the courts of any change in his address. If he 
failed to do so, he could be fined up to a maximum of £2. Under section 1 of the 
Act, magistrates courts were required to appoint a collecting officer. After the 
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commencement of the Act, all existing and future affiliation orders were to be 
paid to this officer. It was then his duty to pass the money on to the mother of 
the child. The only exceptions to this were in cases where either party satisfied 
the court that it would be 'undesirable' for payments to be made to this third 
person. If payments fell into arrears, after seven days the collecting officer was 
required to inform the mother in writing. At the mothers request, the collecting 
officer could then proceed in his own name for the recovery of the payments. If 
the arrears continued to remain unpaid, then magistrates, under section 2 of the 
Act, could order the attachment of any income or pension payable to the putative 
father67 . However, some kinds of income and pension were not capable of being 
attached. As a result of a successful campaign by organised labour in the late 
1860s, which led to the Wages Attachment (Abolition) Act, 1870, the wages of 
'servants, labourers and workmen' became protected from any form of 
attachment.68 Pensions such as Army and Navy Pensions and Old Age Pensions 
were also protected.69 As the 1870 Act had not been repealed, the 1914 Act 
therefore only had a limited ability to attach earnings. 
Similar legislation to tighten up on the payment of maintenance orders was 
provided for under section 30 of the Criminal Justice Administration Act, also 
passed in 1914. Under this Act the magistrates courts could also direct that 
maintenance payments be made through an officer of the court 'if it thinks fit'. In 
practice, the officer of the court was to be the person appointed as the collecting 
officer under the Affiliation Orders Act. However, under the Criminal Justice 
Administration Act, no provision was made for the collecting officer to recover 
arrears. This was because the Married Women (Maintenance) Bill was expected 
to become law in 1914 which would have empowered collecting officers to 
notify a married women if arrears equivalent to four weeks' payments had 
accumulated. It also intended to give collecting officers the power to instigate 
66 LGB, 1911, p.62. 
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proceedings at the woman's request. Although the War interrupted the passage 
of this Act because Private Members Bills were not permitted during the war 
years, for reasons which will be described in chapter four these measures where 
not introduced until 1925.70 
In addition to the above, if either maintenance or affiliation orders fell into 
arrears, under section 4 of the Criminal Justice Administration Act, money as 
well as goods could be taken if a distress warrant was issued. The court could 
then use this money in part or full payment of any arrears. Section 3 of the Act 
also empowered magistrates to reduce the sentence of a man already in prison, if 
he paid part or all of the sum owing. The amount it could be reduced by was to 
be calculated 'by a number of days bearing as nearly as possible the same 
proportion to the total number of days in the term as the sum paid bears to the 
sum adjudged to be paid'. Clearly, both of these provisions were aimed at 
encouraging men to buy themselves out of prison and thus, spare the Home 
Office from further expense should more men be imprisoned as a result of either 
of the 1914 Acts. 
In order to prevent the cost of employing collecting officers from falling on 
ratepayers, the government also specified that lone mothers or absent fathers 
should remain liable for the costs of proceedings.71 Even though initially 
collecting officers were to be paid out of local funds, this was only to be a short-
term measure. It was intended that the functions of collecting officers would be 
taken over by justices' clerks when the Justice of the Peace Bill was passed. As 
this function would then be part of the clerks duties they would not need to be 
separately remunerated. 72 
Although, as previously noted, these Acts were in part the outcome of efforts by 
groups and individuals who believed that lone mothers deserved better treatment 
under the law, it was not this concern that prompted the Liberal Government to 
70 Under the Summary Jurisdiction (Separation and Maintenance) Act. 
71 Section 31, Criminal Justice Administration Act. 
72 PRO HO-lS/23128 ref: 4269. 
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concede to their demands. Although the 1914 legislation to make fathers pay 
may not have come about if Private Members of Parliament, such as Captain 
Bowyer who helped draft the Bills, had not fought hard on behalf of the 
campaigners, at the end of the day Liberal politicians and members of the civil 
service could see a point in supporting them. In order to understand the reasons 
why they finally conceded to support the passing of the 1914 Acts, it is necessary 
to explore the context within which they took place. 
vi) The Context of Reform 
THE CRISIS IN THE POOR LAW 
As is commonly recognised, official interest in social refonn in the early 
twentieth century was largely stimulated by the crisis in Poor Law finance. 73 
Between the 1870s and 1906, the mean annual expenditure per pauper had 
increased from £9 8s. 11 d. to £ 14 13 s. 11 d. 74 The rising cost of indoor relief was 
mainly responsible for this increase: between 1871172 and 1905/6 this had risen 
by 113 per cent although the number of indoor paupers had only gone up by 76 
per cent. 75 Although this had forced up rates to an unacceptable extent, private 
investment in suburban development added to the strain on local finances. 
Ratepayers had found themselves responsible for paying for roads, sewerage, 
lighting, police and schools for expanding urban areas.76 
The problem of local government finance came to infonn the whole tenor of 
political debate over social refonns in general. As the direct cost of local and 
national expenditure was mainly borne by a disgruntled and poverty stricken 
labouring population,77 it was impossible for the government to instigate any 
measures which would have increased local expenditure. Moreover, between 
73 See, for example, Offer, 1981. 
74 Gilbert, 1966, p.275. 
75 Rose, 1972, pA I. 
76 Offer, 1981, p.23 1. 
77 Ibid., p.288-p.289. 
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1905-7, ratepayers were already demonstrating their disapproval of existing rate 
levels through the formation of ratepayers associations. Having demanded rate 
cuts, they would not have been prepared to finance further government reforms 
that relied on the community for finance. As one Local Government Board 
Inspector put it in 1912: 
the fast growth of expenditure very naturally 
explains the reluctance which the guardians have in 
initiating reforms suggested by the Royal 
Commission on the Poor Laws and the Relief of 
Distress where such reforms might be expected to 
add ... to the already heavily burdened ratepayer.78 
Because of this the majority of the Liberal welfare reforms were framed to avoid 
placing a greater financial burden on local communities wherever possible. This 
was certainly the principle behind compulsory insurance schemes. Where this 
was not possible, as in the case of making better provision for the administration 
of bastardy and maintenance orders, making the father pay may have appeared to 
offer a way of saving ratepayers money on supporting lone mother families. 
However, the Liberal Government's initial lack of enthusiasm to pass any 
measures to coerce more men into paying suggests that they did not believe that 
that there would be significant financials gains to made from such intervention. 
However, once it had become apparent that one of the reasons for the increase in 
the cost of the Poor Law was the rising cost of children, the government came to 
view the idea of making fathers pay more favourably. 
The numbers of children being relieved increased in the first decade of the 
twentieth century. On 1 January 1900 there were 199,370 children in receipt of 
indoor relief and 158,190 on outdoor relief. By the 1 January 1910 their numbers 
had increased to 270,655 and 184,095 respectively.79 Moreover, in the few years 
until 1909, during which time there had been attempts to reduce the numbers of 
children in workhouses, there was a 25 per cent increase in the number of 
78 LGB. 1912, part I, p.114. 
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children in cottage homes and scattered homes.8o In the context of the growing 
concern over infant mortality (see next section) the focus on children, childcare 
and their treatment became the central cause of public concern.8] This was 
reflected in legislation that was passed to deal with the consequences of child 
poverty: the Midwives Act, 1902; the Education (Provision of Meals) Act, 1907; 
the Notification of Births Act, 1907; and the Children Act, 1908. As all these 
measures necessitated greater local and central expenditure, the Liberal 
Government became less opposed to the idea of making the father pay if there 
was a chance that perhaps some of this expenditure could be recouped. 
However, the welfare reforms that affected needy children did not simply cause 
alarm to those who had to fund them. Much of the opposition to the provision of 
school meals or medical services sprang from politicians and moralists who 
argued quite convincingly that, by offering public provision for the support of 
children, the government might be saving child life and securing the health and 
well-being of future generations, but it was also undermining the legal obligation 
on husbands and fathers to provide. This perceived diminution of paternal 
responsibility was also a anathema to the working classes to whom 'community, 
solidarity, parental authority, family integration, and mass membership of a wide 
range of self-governing associations' 82 were of great importance. Within these 
quarters it therefore seemed that the government was intent on pauperising the 
working classes. Paternal provision had been the foundation of Poor Law 
orthodoxy and the premise upon which legal provision was founded. It was not 
easily abandoned, as we shall see. The economic substructure on which family 
life was based stressed this obligation. Under it, wives and children were viewed 
as legal dependants and the man who failed to provide subjected his family to 
imprisonment (so to speak) in the workhouse. He also earned a reputation for 
himself and them, second only to that of the convicted criminal. Within this 
context, the lone mother unsupported by an individual male provider was 
unacceptable: it signified that some man was not doing his duty. Given this 
79 Ibid., p.ISI. 
80 RCPL. 1909, Appendix Vol. xviii, p.2. 
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moral climate, the Liberals realised that they could alleviate fears that the state 
was taking over the father's duty through passing statutory measures such as the 
Affilation Orders Act and the Criminal Justice Administration Act. 
Increasing demands to bring about a change in the treatment of lone mothers also 
threatened the status quo. It also had the potential to add to the ratepayers 
burden. Even though such women were not a large component of workhouse 
inmates (as far as we know), their role in the problem of pauperism also came to 
the publics attention through the work of the Royal Commission on the Poor 
Laws. The authors of the Minority Report were particularly critical of mixed 
workhouses and the practice of placing all destitute women together: 
The young servant out of place, the prostitute recovering from 
disease, the feeble-minded women of any age, the girl with her first 
baby, the unmarried mother coming in to be confined of her third or 
fourth bastard, the senile, the paralytic, the epileptic, the respectable 
deserted wife, the widow to whom outdoor relief has been refused, 
all are herded indiscriminately together. ... to the reputable clean-
minded inmate this association with the depraved is the bitterest and 
most humiliating experience of life. 83 
The authors of the Minority Report were eager to distinguish different categories 
of lone mother, to separate the deserving from the less deserving cases, leaving 
only the latter as candidates for Poor Law treatment. They argued that women 
who became pregnant with illegitimate children for the first time should be cared 
for in voluntary homes paid for out of local funds. This proposal was based on 
the growing belief that such women had more chance of being 'rescued' if they 
were kept away from harmful influences inside the workhouse. 'Incurable' cases, 
that is those who had sinned for a second time, were more problematic and 
believed to be in need of greater surveillance. In the proposals of the Webbs, the 
local authority (following the abolition of guardians) would be given charge of 
such women: 
82 Harris. 1993, p.214. 
83 Minority Report. RCPL, 1909, Vol. 3, p.IO and p.16. 
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... the girl expectant mother (already presumably within the 
supervision of the health visitor under the chief medical officer), who 
might come into the maternity ward for her confinement, would 
remain under the same supervision after her discharge, and, in fact, 
throughout the infancy of her child, and would, if certifiable as feeble 
minded, be reported to the Town or County Council Committee 
dealing with the mentally defective.84 
Hence, the unrespectable unmarried mother was liable to remain a client of the 
workhouse, or possibly a similar institution, where sexual segregation removed 
the likelihood of the problem being further complicated or repeated. 
The authors of the Majority Report were in full agreement with the above: 
we urge that careful discrimination should be exercised in dealing 
with the unmarried mothers who apply for relief... For young 
mothers coming for the first time we recommend treatment in special 
homes, voluntary where possible... For depraved women we 
recommend that the Local Authorities should have power to arrange 
for their detention in suitable institutions. 85 
Clearly, if some lone mothers were to be saved from the deterrent workhouse and 
be 'rescued' in more costly, private homes then this would also increase 
expenditure as it was unlikely that the expense could have been met by charity 
alone. Similarly, the capital and running costs of providing specialist institutions 
for the 'depraved' would also have to come from somewhere Therefore, in 
addition to wishing to avoid the extra cost of keeping children out of the 
workhouse, the government may also have been encouraged to save itself from 
the expense of maternity homes by making fathers pay. However, it was the 
issue of national efficiency which largely gave rise to the belief that the 
wellbeing of most mothers and their children (including some of those whose 
fathers were absent) was vital to the community. Moreover. it was this issue that 
84 S. and B. Webb, 1910, p.243. 
X:'i Majority Report, RCPL, 1909, Vol. 1-2. p.154. 
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lay behind many of the demands calling for a better standard of provision for 
those lone mothers and children who came to be seen as "respectable'. 
THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL EFFICIENCY 
The question of Poor Law reform became inextricably bound up with what 
historians commonly refer to as the National Efficiency Movement, although it is 
clear that this was not one movement, but several, containing elements that 
viewed the causes of a projected national decline from very different 
perspectives. From the late nineteenth century, variable economic performance 
combined with the growing respectability of eugenic studies focused public 
attention on various threats, both internal and external, to Britain's imperial pre-
eminence. In this context, the exposed poverty of major conurbations and the 
rising costs of pauperism were symptomatic of wider problems, rooted largely in 
a malfunctioning labour market; in casual employment, sweating and the lack of 
conciliation mechanisms to forestall industrial conflict. The issue gained a 
further political dimension as an indirect consequence of the Boer War, with the 
reports of the Interdepartmental Committee on Physical Deterioration (1904), 
which reinforced the messages being signalled by eugenic and other studies 
concerning the physical plight of many working class children whose health and 
development was blighted by poverty before they entered adult life. Again, this 
story, and its consequences for the spate of legislation to safeguard the physical 
development of babies and children, has received extensive historical attention. 86 
How the lone mother fitted into the picture has, however, received far less. 
The position of the lone mother, as a subject of statutory intervention, remained 
unclear. On the one hand, those disturbed by the declining birth rate and high 
infant mortality, who promoted legislation to secure the professional training of 
midwives (1902) and fostered schemes to provide unadulterated milk to poor 
babies, sought to extend help to lone mothers, whose babies were more at risk of 
86 See Harris, 1995; Dwork, 1987. 
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an early death than the rest of the population. This reinforced the move towards 
separate provision of institutions for deserving cases: 
The mother herself would derive great benefit from good food and 
lodging for a few months after her confinement and the child nursed 
by its mother during that time would have a better chance of a 
healthier life ... 87 
The drive to safeguard infant life, apparent both in charitable endeavour and 
official policy, was taking place at the same time as the move to outlaw 
'sweating': the exploitation of home-based, largely female workers labouring in 
the box-making, clothing and auxiliary industries. The alternative solution to the 
poverty of the lone mother family, that is, encouraging the mother to work to 
support herself and her child, was thus doubly viewed as undesirable. Not only 
did waged work for the mother upset established notions about the primacy of 
her domestic duties, it was also unlikely that she would be able to secure 
employment which would remove her and her infant from poverty. Hence the 
Affiliation Orders Act, 1914, which set up the machinery for collecting payments 
from putative fathers, might also be interpreted as the means to secure the 
paternal obligation to maintain without punishing the destitute and deserted 
mother (the earlier pattern under the Poor Law) which had placed her infant at 
risk. In this, we see that, far from refonn securing collective provision, it 
actually reinforced earlier principles of family responsibility by seeking their 
enforcement. 
Not all promoters of national efficiency concurred with this approach. For the 
eugenicists, the twin problem of a low birth rate and high infant mortality were 
not to be attacked by offering more help to lone mothers. On the contrary, they 
argued that such an approach was 'dyseugenic'; policy ought to aim at improving 
the national 'stock' by encouraging reproduction among the fit and healthy, not 
the pauperised classes. Within a rubric of proposals involving the identification 
87 Miss Zanetti, Inspector under the Infant Life Protection Act to the Chorlton Board of 
Guardians quoted in Majority Report of RCPL, 1909, Vol. 1-2, p.153. 
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of the 'unfit' and the issuing of marriage licences to those couples identified as fit 
to breed, there was clearly no place for lone mothers and their children in a 
eugenicist society. 
Although eugenicism was to be thoroughly discredited by the end of the 1930s 
following evidence of its impact in Nazi Germany, its influence was something 
of a force in the first two decades of the century. For example, the 1912 Mental 
Defectives Act, which reinforced institutional treatment for those we would now 
identify as having 'learning difficulties', signified the impact of this creed on 
policy making at the time. Thus, the government had to tread carefully in taking 
any measures that might artificially enable lone mothers and their children to 
improve their chances of survival especially if they were financed by the rates. 
Therefore, making the father pay also gave the government the opportunity to 
show that it had no desire to associate itself with any proliferation of the birth 
rate among the 'residuum'. It also satisfied many feminists who had campaigned 
for state involvement in the provision of maternity services, school medical and 
meal services, but who still saw marriage as the norm for women. 88 In general, 
the peculiar combination of increased official reinforcement of family structures 
and state provision to safeguard children's health, that characterised the Liberal 
welfare agenda was not unique to them. Wholesale state maintenance for 
children only commanded support from the small Social Democratic Federation 
and from some members of the Independent Labour Party. The Leader of the 
nascent Labour Party, the most likely beneficiary of any failure to reform on the 
Liberal government's part, Ramsey Macdonald, was more interested in measures 
of labour market reform which would reinforce existing parental obligations than 
in providing state help for children (although he was born illegitimate himselt).89 
Then as now, there were votes to be gained for standing by the status quo. 
Parents who had struggled hard to raise a family in inauspicious circumstances 
were unlikely to support political measures which effectively rewarded, or at 
least excused, the behaviour of parents whose 'respectability' (and therefore 
88 See, for example. Pember Reeves, 1984; Llewellyn Davies, 1978. 
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'deserving' - ness) was in any doubt. Those who had done their duty, in short, 
were keen to see that others did likewise. 
vii) Conclusion 
The attempt to make absent fathers pay in 1914, was therefore a typical Liberal 
reform. Although there may have been a number of people during this period 
who were genuinely concerned about the health and well-being of children 
belonging to lone mother families, their concerns were of less significance than 
the government's desire to contain local expenditure. The same argument can be 
applied to concerns about falling moral standards at the time. Although many of 
the witnesses appearing before the Royal Commission on Divorce seemed 
concerned about the prevalence of cohabitation among certain groups in the 
population on moral grounds and, therefore, wanted the divorce laws reformed to 
make divorce an option for the less well-off, the main objective of the 
Commissioners proposals was to ensure that 
the divorced wife could marry again and so get another bread-winner 
to support the former husband's family.90 
While this argument could just as well be applied to present day legislation, the 
1914 Acts were not nearly as radical as the Child Support Act in 1991. The 
earlier legislation did not go as far as some had hoped. Herbert, for example, 
had also wanted legislation to allow guardians to recover the cost of a woman's 
confinement in bastardy cases and also for them to be able to obtain an order 
against a man where the mother was dead or refused to give evidence. 
Numerous other suggestions were also made at the time which the government 
failed to implement. For example, the Women's Industrial Council wanted 
wives to be able to take out a summons free of charge and to make the courts 
89 Stewart, 1993. 
90 ReO, 1912, Vol. I, p.399. 
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responsible for tracing husbands.91 It is interesting to note that suggestions for 
reform which involved further public expense were not included in the 
legislation when it was introduced. While this reinforces the argument that the 
attempt to make fathers pay was essentially a cost-cutting measure, it also 
demonstrates the Liberal government's awareness that if measures were too 
strict, more men may have ended up in prison for failure to pay which would 
effectively write off all their arrears and reduce the chance of future payments. 
As the government was not prepared to repeal the Wages Attachment (Abolition) 
Act of 1870, this outcome was fairly predictable. Moreover, concern had already 
been expressed before 1914 about the numbers of men who were being sent to 
prison for failure to pay maintenance and affiliation orders. This was why the 
Home Office had issued a Circular in December 1906 recommending 'the 
justices to exercise an informal discretion by imposing nominal sentences in 
certain of these cases both in the enforcement of affiliation orders and orders 
under the Summary Jurisdiction Married Women's Act, 1895'.92 It would 
therefore seem that although there was a will to make fathers pay, and thus save 
ratepayers money, legislators during this period had enough foresight to predict 
that this policy could fail. 
The government must also have been aware of the need to avoid increasing the 
cost to the police authorities if stricter measures of enforcement were passed. 
The police frequently complained that even without new measures, which may 
have further burdened their load, the costs to them of the existing system of 
enforcing maintenance orders was often enormous in proportion to the amount 
recovered. The following illustrates a typical complaint of this type: 
I had a case yesterday morning from Bristol. There was a warrant for 
a man for 3/. 8s. lId., ... In order to get that 3/. 8s. lId. it will be 
necessary to send a policemen from Hull with his return fare costing 
37s. 6d., and he will have to take the man down, that costs another 
18s. 6d. A cost of 56s. excluding all such things as subsistence 
allowances for the policeman and other expenses. It will cost that to 
91 Ibid .. p.I?3. See, also, SCBO, 1909. p.138-p.147; RCD, 1912, Report. p.68-82. 
92 SCBO. 1909, Minutes of Evidence, p.22. 
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get the man down to Bristol, and then when he gets there he probably 
will not pay, and he will go to prison to wipe out the debt.93 
The 1914 legislation can therefore be described as a pragmatic solution to the 
problem. There was no point in introducing any kind of measure that may. in the 
long-term, have increased public expenditure. Governments took a less rational 
approach in the interwar years; which perhaps suggests that, in periods of 
recession, then as now, governments are prepared to take greater risks if they 
believe there is an outside chance of cutting local or national expenditure. 
The Liberal government was also anxious not to implement any measures that 
would make the process of obtaining and enforcing orders so easy as to 
encourage the formation of lone mother families. This made it difficult for the 
government to undermine the deterrent nature of the Poor Law because it would 
be 
an encouragement to vice ... there would be far less fear on the part 
of women of getting into trouble knowing that the state would 
provide for them and relieve them possibly of the responsibility of 
their child.94 
But having said that, it would be wrong to give the impression that discussions 
and debates at the time about a father's responsibility were always expressed in 
the language of harsh economics. As this discussion has show, humanitarian 
concern about the well being of some lone mother families was the motivating 
force behind some of the campaigns to pressure the government to reform 
legislation. Similarly, reinforcing the fathers financial responsibility was not 
simply a measure to ensure that the financial burden did not fall on the 
community. As today, the family was venerated for sentimental and not just 
economic reasons. As Bosanquet wrote: 
93 Major P. Malcolm, Chief Constable of Kingston-upon-Hull, quoted in RCD, 1912, Vol. 1, 
p.397. 
94 LGB. 1909. p.59. 
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[The family] is greater than love itself, for it includes, ennobles, 
makes permanent all that is best in love. The pain of life is hallowed 
by it, the drudgery sweetened, its pleasures consecrated. It is the 
great trysting-place of the generations, where past and future flash 
into the reality of the present.95 
Indeed, it is not surprising to find that the so few people in the early twentieth 
century would have wanted to see the father's duty attenuated when: 
We find the family weak ... and perverted whenever there is an 
extensive reliance upon external sources of maintenance. It is as if 
the man in abdicating from his economic independence inflicts an 
injury upon his moral nature which poisons all his natural relations.96 
However, as it became more apparent that not all families could produce children 
healthy enough to ensure that Britain maintained its place in the empire, some 
state assistance was clearly required. However, the resulting legislation, when 
coupled with efforts to make fathers pay, ultimately reflected the delicate 
balancing act the Liberals had to perform so as not to antagonise varIOUS 
competing interest groups. By attempting to ensure that the burden of lone 
mother families remained, wherever possible, the responsibility of individual 
fathers, they could appease ratepayers, women's groups and eugenicists while at 
the same time attempting through other policies to improve the fitness of the 
nation. By not conceding to all the demands for change by women's 
organisations they were also able to retain the principle of 'less eligibility' for 
lone mothers. In this way the government could not be accused of threatening 
the family as the basic economic unit of society. This cautious approach to the 
problem also saved the government from having to contend with any backlash 
from absent fathers. Overall this demonstrates that there were significant 
differences in the way the government then, compared to now, approached the 
problem. However, then and now, governments shared the belief that it was 
simply a matter of making improvements to the administrative schemes 
95 Bosanquet, 1915, p.342. 
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responsible for making fathers pay. As we shall see, this fundamental mistake 
meant that all policies to coerce men to fulfil their duty were largely failures _ 
whether or not they had been implemented forcefully by radical, right wing 
governments or as ad hoc responses to pressure by less dogmatic 
administrations. 
96 Ibid .. p.339. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE IMPACT OF WORLD WAR I 
i) Introduction. 
Many historians have charted how the war was responsible for intensifying 
worries about the welfare of women and children.! This was primarily because 
the huge loss of life exacerbated the pre-war fear surrounding the declining birth 
rate, and high infant and maternal mortality rates. Indeed, the health of infants 
became 'a subject which aroused great emotion during the war, as indicated in 
the well-publicised argument that high infant mortality made it more dangerous 
to be a baby than a soldier'.2 Other social issues also came to the forefront of 
people's attention because of the war. In relation to lone mother families, 
criticisms of 'hasty' war-time marriages led to a revival of the earlier demands for 
divorce reform. Similarly, fears about 'war babies' led to calls for the legalisation 
of adoption.3 It has also been argued that the plight of the illegitimate child 
began to 'appeal to the public conscience',4 although more cynical writers have 
stated that this was perhaps because 'it became clear that the methods of modem 
warfare required cannon fodder in even greater quantity's. Finally, concerns 
about sexual morality intensified. This was to develop into a moral panic during 
the war because of so-called 'war nymphomania',6 or 'Khaki fever'.7 Although 
the attention this drew to lone mothers was negative, the exceptional difficulties 
many faced because of their inability to take on paid work during the war, was to 
arouse sympathy in some sections of they community. 
These factors meant that lone motherhood became a subject for greater 
discussion during the war than it had been previously. Moreover, many more 
I See, for example, Lewis, 1994; Crowther, 1988; Winter; 1985, Bland, 1982; Graveson and 
Crane. 1957. 
2 Crowther, 1988, p.27. 
3 Graveson and Crane, 1957, p.4l. 
4 Reeves, 1993. p.413. 
5 Davin, 1978, p.43. 
h Bland, 1982. 
7 \\oollacott, 1994a. 
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people became aware of the struggle this entailed for the simple reason that the 
majority of married women also had to cope on their own while their husbands 
were away fighting. This made lone mothers less visible, allowing the issue of 
paternal responsibility to be discussed under less fraught conditions than had 
previously been the case in the past. Finally, as the efforts of all women were 
needed on the Home Front, the Coalition Government had less inclination to 
operate social polices which attached heavy penalties on those mothers who had 
traditionally been deemed 'unrespectable'. This was reflected in the provision of 
separation allowances. Also as an enticement to encourage men to enlist. the 
payment of these allowances marked a break with tradition because the War 
Office permitted them be given to the cohabitees of men joining the forces. 
Although it really had little choice in the matter, following the discovery that 
many potential recruits were not married but cohabiting with partners, it was 
certainly a very radical step. Although measures were taken to try and ensure 
that these allowances were not abused by lone mothers, by only allowing them to 
be paid on the strict condition that 'there was evidence that a real home had been 
maintained',8 it must have been very difficult to prevent this from happening in 
the circumstances. 
Because the Affiliation Orders Act and the Criminal Justice Administration Act 
of 1914 failed to address many of the problems that had been identified before 
the war, those who had previously been campaigning on the behalf of lone 
mother families continued with their campaign throughout this period. However, 
during the war, as a result of the greater awareness of the hardships of lone 
motherhood and the even greater concern about the health and fitness of children, 
new organisations, such as the NCFUM&HC (the National Council for the 
Unmarried Mother and Her Child), were formed specifically to fight for the 
interests of unmarried mothers. Other organisations, who had previously shO\\TI 
little concern for the plight of lone mothers and their children, also joined the 
cause. And it was not just marginal groups in the community who became part 
of this movement. Even the Women's Co-operative Guild took up the cause and 
8 Marwick. 1991, p.83; Thane, 1982, p.128. 
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after sending a deputation to the Home Office on behalf of unmarried mothers, 
one civil servant was prompted to note that 
the members of the guild are essentially the respectable married 
women of the superior working classes - i.e., those who are popularly 
supposed to be more prejudiced against girls [who] ... have made a 
mistake.9 
Finally, many feminist organisations also became involved, such as, the National 
Union for Equal Citizenship which was later to draft its own Bastardy Bill. 
Feminist involvement, although greater than in the prewar years, was not a new 
phenomenon, it was simply that, during the war and immediately after it, the 
women's movement reached it zenith, because of women's contribution to the 
war effort. Feminist demands also entered mainstream debates because, as a 
result of the suffragette movement, they presented a more visible political profile 
during this period. I 0 
Various suggestions for change were proposed. Although the majority were 
mainly concerned with making it harder for men to avoid paying orders, and 
making them pay more in a period of inflation, during the war even collectivist 
proposals for the provision of such families were advocated. In common with 
many other plans for the reconstruction of British society after the war, the war 
made such ideas possible because in the face of the 
hideous ugliness of war, good people of humanitarian aspirations 
yearned for compensation, weaving fond dreams of social 
regeneration. In the Press were fairy-tale stories of the great schemes 
afoot for manifesting national unity .... All the children of the nation 
were to stand as one.... Socialism was to advance, war-time was to 
be a period of national rebuilding. Lloyd George declared the 
country would be a nation worthy [of] the prowess of heroes. I I 
9 H.O. notes on deputation received on 12 November, 1918, PRO HO-lS/l1190. 
10 Dyhollse, 1989, p.193. 
II Pankhurst, 1987, p.19-p.20. 
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In complete contrast, however, most politicians and civil servants had no 
inclination to alter the status quo in relation to the lone mother families. 
Although they were obviously pre-occupied with military matters, and in any 
case, private members were unable to present bills to parliament from 1914-
1920, they remained dismissive of the need for change until the Slump in 1921. 
As a result only three rather meagre changes to the existing bastardy and 
maintenance laws were introduced before this date. This chapter will look at 
why the need for reform remained by looking at the wartime experiences of lone 
mothers. It will then investigate the various suggestions that were made which 
aimed to solve the problem of supporting lone mother families. Finally, it will 
explore the reasons behind the government's failure to instigate the vast majority 
of them. 
As we shall see, there were numerous reasons why the government chose not to 
act at this point. It should be noted though, that although their disinclination to 
concede to the demands of the various groups mentioned above were 
unreasonable in the light of clear evidence of the need for reform, it seems that 
they were right in dismissing the alarm about illegitimacy as 'hysterical'. When a 
member of parliament asked the Prime Minister in 1915 what he was going to do 
about illegitimate babies, he replied 'nothing' and blamed the press for 
overreacting to the issue. 12 Whether or not illegitimacy did increase during the 
war is contentious. As the following table shows, it very much depends on 
which set of statistics are used: 
12 He. Parliamentary Debates, 1914-1915, col. 963. 
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Table 3.1: Illegitimate births in England and Wales, 1901-1918 
In proportion to In proportion to In proportion to the 
total Births total Population Unmarried and 
Period Widowed Female 
(Rate per 1,000) (Rate per 1,000) Population aged 15-
45 years. 
(Rate per 1,000) 
1901-1905 39.5 1.1 8.4 
1906-1910 40.2 1.1 8.1 
1911-1915 43.1 1.0 7.8 
1915 44.5 1.0 7.4 
1916 48.0 1.0 7.6 
1917 55.6 1.0 7.4 
1918 62.6 1.1 8.2 
Source: Registrar General, 1918, p.xxvii. 
As the legitimate birth rate had been declining in this period, the figures in 
Column 1 exaggerate the increase in the numbers of illegitimate births in 
absolute terms. For example, although the number of illegitimate babies born in 
1918 was 4,295 more than in 1917, during these two years the total number of 
births decreased by 5,685.13 This is not, therefore, the best indicator of what was 
going on at the time. Column 3, on the other hand, shows that even in 1918, 
despite the increase since 1917, the illegitimate rate was lower than it had been 
between 1901-1905. If this indicator is used then the Prime Minister was quite 
right to imply that the press had over reacted. Although there are no statistics 
showing the number of separated or deserted lone mothers, according to one 
estimate there were over 1 million separated persons in 1917.14 However. as the 
following section will show, the need for reform was not at this stage based on 
the numbers of unmarried mothers. 
13 Registrar General, 1918, p.xxvi. 
\--1 r-.lcllwraith, 1917. p.335. 
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ii) The Experience of Lone Motherhood in World War 1. 
In recent years historians, such as Winter, I 5 have concluded that wartime 
conditions were beneficial to those who remained on the Home Front. His 
argument is based on evidence of an improved life expectancy during the war, 
especially amongst the worst off section of British society, and a reduction in 
social inequality. He claims that these gains were achieved as a result of the 
increased earning capacity of working class families which enabled them to 
improve their nutritional levels. This was also aided by the more equitable 
distribution of food during the war, despite the shortages. Moreover, the 
earnings of most working class families kept pace with, or out -stripped, price 
rises. Winter also points out that war was good for women and children as infant 
and maternal mortality rates sharply declined. 16 
Clearly, these improvements were achieved by the entry of large numbers of 
women into the workforce. Over 1,500,000 women entered industry and 
commerce during the war, 1,200,00 of whom had not worked outside their 
homes before it began. 17 For working class women munitions work was the best 
paid and, as the legal restrictions on women's labour were removed, they had 
every opportunity of increasing their earnings by taking on overtime, Sunday 
work and night work. 18 The prohibition on child employment was also eroded 
during the war. Thus, a family's income could also be increased where there 
were children able to take advantage of wartime employment opportunities. 
Because of these undoubted benefits it could be argued that perhaps the rise in 
the standard of living for those on the Home Front in general, lessened the need 
for government intervention to improve the situation of lone mother families. 
However, this was not the case. As Table 3.2 shows, the wide differential 
between the legitimate and illegitimate mortality rate remained throughout this 
period. Although the slight decline in the illegitimate mortality rate indicated 
15 1985. 
16 Ibid., p.278-p.280. 
17 For a detailed discussion see Ministrv of Reconstruction, 1919; Braybon. 1989. , . 
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that some lone mother families did see an improvement in their lifestyles during 
the war. this was certainly not the case for all of them. Unless a lone mother 
managed to get a reasonably paid job, or was somehow able to get a separation 
allowance or a war widows pension, or else was on the receiving end of the 
generosity of family and friends who became more affluent during the war, she 
probably saw a deterioration in her standard of living. Even though many more 
lone mothers would have received regular payments of maintenance for their 
legitimate or illegitimate children, as a result of more fathers joining the forces, 
this did not necessarily mean that they received more money. Some would have 
seen a reduction in the value of their orders for under the Army and Navy Acts 
only 7 d. a day could be deducted from the pay of a class 2 sergeant and 4d. a day 
from the pay of other soldiers.19 Therefore, if Winter (1985), had categorised 
women according to these factors, he may have found that it was lone mothers in 
particular who failed to reap the benefits war conditions created. 
Table 3.2: Legitimate and illegitimate infant mortality rates per 1,000 
births, in England and Wales, 1914-1918 
All Aged Under 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 
One Year 
All causes Legit 99.9 105.11 86.32 90.09 91.02 
Illigit 206.38 203.00 182.68 200.79 185.06 
Source: Adapted from Registrar General, Annual Reports, 1914-1918. 
But having said that, the difficulties that women in general suffered during the 
first two years of the war should not be forgotten. Pankhurst described seeing 
women and children starving in the East End of London at the beginning of war 
for want of employment and relief.2o The hardship this caused was further 
18 Ministry of Reconstruction, 1919, p.51; National Birth-rate Commission, 1920, p.135. 
IL) See file dated, 29 October 1917, PRO HO 4511 1181. 
20 Pankhurst, 1987 ed., p.20-p.24. 
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exacerbated by the accelerating cost of food. Following the introduction of 
separation allowances in 1914, for the dependants of soldiers, there were often 
long delays of up to several months before the payments were made.21 
There is reason to doubt that the majority of lone mothers were less in need of 
legislation to improve their situation because of the greater employment 
opportunities that were available to women during the war. Not only did 
women's wages remain lower than men's during the war,22 but it is wrong to 
assume that all women were able to work. Some were unable to because of their 
family responsibilities, and evidence suggests that many lone mothers simply 
could not work because the demand for women's labour reduced the numbers of 
women free to mind their children. By 1917 this difficulty had been brought to 
the notice of the Child Welfare Council and the Social Welfare Association for 
London, who reported that appeals from unmarried mothers for their assistance 
had increased dramatically. Other societies were also confronted with the same 
problem which they were unable to cope with. This meant 
at the best, malnutrition for both mother and child, and at the worst 
moral disaster to the mother and neglect and death to the child.23 
Even if some of these lone mothers managed to receive affiliation or 
maintenance payments, the sharp wartime price increases meant that the value of 
orders steadily depreciated during the war. 
If account is also taken of the type of work women undertook during the war, 
then further doubt is cast on any notion that the majority of lone mothers gained 
much during this period. Obviously, most women with children could not take 
up work in the munitions factories which was the most highly remunerated type 
of work for unskilled females. The distance these industries were located from 
residential areas meant living in hostel-type accommodation which was only 
provided for single women and girls. The long hours of overtime and shift \vork 
21 Ibid., 1987, p.24. 
22 Thane, 1982, p. 128. 
23 NCFUM&HC, 1918, p.2-p.3. 
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also meant that this was an unsuitable occupation for the majority of mothers to 
undertake. The only category of lone mothers who were able to work in 
munition factories were those who became pregnant after they had started 
working in them. However, this did not apply in the early days of the war, for if 
a woman working in munitions became pregnant she was dismissed as soon as 
her condition was discovered - 'for a woman entirely dependent on her own 
exertions it was disastrous'.24 This led many single women either to conceal 
their pregnancy, or resort to abortion which was both illegal and dangerous.25 
The government was eventually forced to recognise this problem, and in the 
autumn of 1916 the Ministry of Munitions provided grants in aid of creches and, 
in April 1918, the Treasury set aside a sum of money to provide accommodation 
for munitions workers at the time of confinement and for pre-natal and post-natal 
periods. As a large number of the women who became pregnant were unmarried. 
the policy was also extended to them. It is interesting to note that they were 
treated in exactly the same way as the married women.26 This was certainly a 
break with tradition that only the abnormal circumstances of war could have 
brought about. Some welfare supervisors also introduced new systems to make 
it possible for pregnant women to take on gradually lighter work, whether they 
were married or otherwise.27 As an exception to the rule, therefore, unmarried 
mothers working in munitions during the second half of the war were given the 
opportunity to provide for themselves and their babies without having to resort to 
the Poor Law. 
There is little evidence that other lone mothers were as fortunate, or that they 
even managed to sustain their pre-war standard of living. Willis'28 investigation 
into the 'sweated' trades at the beginning of the war, revealed that this type of 
employment was often undertaken by deserted wives.29 Even though their lives 
were 'a tale of poverty, toil and weariness', many were able to escape the clutches 
24 National Birth-rate Commission, 1920, p.135. 
25 Ibid., p.136. 
26 Ibid., 1920, 136-140. 
27 Woollacott, 1994b, p.3-l-35. 
2X 191-l. 
29 Ibid .. p.87. 
76 
of the Poor Law. However, this became less likely as the war progressed. 
Pankhurst described how homeworking became more difficult physically as 
employers transferred to making army clothing.30 The heavy and rough material 
used also meant that it took workers longer to produce garments. Moreover, 
their wages were often reduced as the sub-contractors creamed off larger and 
larger profits. The Chairman of the Liverpool Anti-Sweating League found that 
women employed to make kit-bags and military uniform were paid 25 per cent 
less than the low minimum of 3V2d. per hour prescribed by the Clothing Trade 
Board.3l 
The numbers of women in receipt of Poor Law relief during the war also 
suggests that many lone mother families failed to benefit from wartime 
conditions. Although the total number of persons in receipt of relief in England 
and Wales - excluding those in lunatic asylums, casuals, and persons in receipt of 
medical relief only - declined from 633,600 on 1st January 1915, to 456,600 on 
28 December 1918, it was men who were far less likely to be in need of relief 
during this period than women.32 As the following table shows, while the 
number of adult men under 70 years of age in receipt of relief was reduced by 
nearly 50 per cent, the number of women was reduced by less than 25 per cent, a 
figure similar to that for the aged and children. 
Table 3.3: Percentage decrease by age and sex of recipients of Poor Law 
Relief in England and Wales between 1 January 1915 and 28 December 
1918 
Men aged 16-70 years 
Women aged 16-70 
Persons over 70 years of age 
Children aged under 16 years 
Source: Ministry of Health, Annual Return, 1919, p.9. 
30 Pankhurst, 1987. p.91-p.94. 







It should be noted that the percentage decrease was calculated from the 
beginning of January 1915, so as not to be skewed by the sharp rise of about 
30,000 people seeking relief at the beginning of the war when industry was in a 
state of disarray. Indeed, as the numbers on 1 January, 1915, were only 500 in 
excess of the corresponding number on the preceding January,33 it can be 
assumed that only about one in four of all women of working age previously in 
receipt of relief were saved from the Poor Law during the war. Moreover, given 
that part of the decrease in the numbers of women claiming relief would have 
been the dependants of able-bodied men in receipt of indoor relief, it cannot be 
assumed that a quarter more lone mothers were able to survive without relief 
during the war. Nor is there any reason to suspect that the rise in the illegitimate 
birth rate (if there was one) increased the numbers of unmarried mothers reliant 
on the Poor Law and, thus, acted to keep the percentage of women in receipt of 
relief much higher than that of men. Since 1914, the number of unmarried 
mothers, at least 'first cases', being taken in by voluntary organisations increased 
as a result of the reluctance to send them to the workhouse.34 Furthermore, there 
was probably more chance of an unmarried mother being able find employment 
in domestic service during the war. Between 1914 and 1918, the number of 
domestic servants declined from 1,658,000 to 1,258,000 in 1918.35 Presumably, 
this shortfall would have made employers more amenable to taking on an 
unmarried mother and her child. It has also been suggested that many wartime 
illegitimate births were the outcome of adulterous relationships by the wives of 
men absent at the front. 36 Because in some cases husbands would have 
continued to support such women, or else the mothers would have set up new 
households with the fathers of their illegitimate children, this also indicates that 
the increase in the rate of illegitimacy (if there was one) does not explain why so 
fe\v women were able to survive without relief. The C.O.S. also found that 
32 Ministry of Health, 1919, p.9. 
33 Ibid., p.8. 
3.t National Birth-rate Commission, 1920, p.94. 
3~ Marwick. 1991, 132. 
36 Harrison, 1978, p.39--l. 
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although there was an overall drop in applications during the war, it was less 
than expected.37 This evidence lends credence to the argument that only a 
minority lone mothers witnessed an improvement to their standard of living as a 
result of the war. 
When lone mothers did take on employment outside the home, they often ended 
up in the worst paid jobs. One of the arguments for giving widows pensions was 
to stop them under-cutting the wages of the other women because it was \vell 
know that 'such women and the needs of their dependants, make them ready to 
accept wages below the Trade Union rates'.38 As the term 'widow' was all-
encompassing, it can be safely assumed that deserted, separated and unmarried 
mothers would have been prepared to accept extremely low paid work. 
For all the reasons given above, many lone mothers must have seen their living 
standards deteriorate during the war - although, of course, some may have 
benefited from extra help from family and friends due to their improved financial 
circumstances. In addition, because government attempts to make fathers pay 
were put on hold during this period, they received no compensation for the 
greater hardships that the war imposed on them. The numbers of men going to 
prison for non-payment of maintenance and affiliation orders fell drastically 
during the war, from 3,608 in 1914 to 931 in 1918.39 This may have been 
because many more men were having bastardy and maintenance payments 
deducted from their pay as soldiers in the war, even though, as we have seen, this 
often meant that lone mothers were receiving smaller amounts. However, some 
of the decrease may have come about as a result of magistrates continuing to 
heed the Home Office's 1906 Circular requesting them to only impose nominal 
sentences in bastardy and maintenance cases. The reduction in the numbers of 
absent fathers being sent to prison could also have occurred because of the 
failure of the legal system to run efficiently during the war. Many of those 
employed by it joined the forces, leaving it somewhat depleted. For the same 
37 Rooff. 1972, p.118. 
38 Ministry of Reconstruction, 1919, p.55. 
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reason. boards of guardians were less likely to have been chasing errant fathers 
for the cost of maintaining their deserted families, or illegitimate children. 
During the war 'large drafts were made, for the fighting forces, upon the Poor 
Law establishment, from Relieving Officers and Workhouse Nurses to doctors 
and the secretariat' .40 Even though there were fewer paupers which meant that 
fewer administrators were needed, the fact that attention was drawn to the 
shortfalls of staff in both of these services does suggest that they were probably 
not running as efficiently as they should have been. 
As for those abandoned in workhouses, the conditions they experienced within 
them were even worse than before the outbreak of war. The quality and quantity 
of the food they received was severely curtailed, which was to effect the health of 
inmates. Attempts to more rigorously classify lone mothers were also abandoned 
with the result that in many workhouses the only divisions made were according 
to the sex of the inmates.41 . Moreover, 'Boards of Guardians - in many cases 
Workhouse Masters - were left to administer as seemed right in their own eyes'.42 
The First World War did not therefore, even temporarily, remove the necessity to 
make fathers pay. However, as the following section shows, various groups 
recognised the plight of lone mothers and took action on their behalf. 
iii) Proposals for Change 
The campaigners for reform hoped that once the War was over, lone mothers 
would be more adequately provided for financially. While some wanted to see 
this come about though stricter measures to make absent fathers pay, others were 
more concerned to achieve it by freeing such women from dependency on 
individual absent fathers, who all too often managed to evade paying 
39 PRO H045117094 (Annual Volumes of Criminal Statistics and the Prison Commissioners 
Annual Reports). 
40 Webb, 1929, p.Sl O. 
41 Ibid., p.SI O-SII. 
42 Ibid., 1919, p.Sl O. 
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maintenance or affiliation orders. Representatives of the latter approach wanted 
to achieve this either through the provision of mothers' pensions or the 
'endowment of motherhood'. Although these schemes were devised specifically 
for the benefit of mothers in general, some of them, almost by default, included 
provision for pensions or allowances to be paid to deserted and separated 
women. Others even went as far as to include unmarried mothers. 
The scheme for the endowment of motherhood emerged from the belief that as 
motherhood was of vital importance to the nation, it should be financed by the 
state. The demand for pensions' for mothers, on the other hand, was underpinned 
by the notion that women should be provided for collectively, not because they 
were mothers, but because on their husband's death they became the trustee of 
the family.43 Obviously, this distinction was of the greatest significance for the 
majority of women. However, for deserted, separated and unmarried mothers, it 
was the proposals for mothers' pensions that gave them the greatest hope of 
being provided for outside the stigmatising Poor Law. 
The authors of the Finer Report,44 and more recently, Pedersen,45 have provided 
an in-depth analysis of these proposals. Broadly speaking, those proposed by 
Eleanor Rathbone and the Fabian Society, for example, who campaigned for the 
'endowment of motherhood', did so on the grounds of national efficiency in the 
face of the declining birth rate and the huge loss of life among those fighting. 
However, because their aspirations were underpinned by eugenic principles, that 
is, that the birth-rate should only be increased by encouraging the upper and 
middle classes to have more children, they favoured far stricter maintenance laws 
for lone mothers.46 Rathbone certainly did not want unmarried mothers to be 
given allowances because she had tailored her scheme specifically to fit a 
43 Davies, 1923, p.6. 
44 Finer, 197.t. Vol. 2, p.128-p.136. 
45 1993. 
46 Ibid, p.I.t3. 
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'healthy society' and she saw the unmarried mother and her child as representing 
a 'social sickness'.47 
This contrasts with proposals but forward by the Women's Employment 
Committee in 1918 for the Ministry of Reconstruction. They wanted pensions 
not only for widows, but also for deserted wives. The object of their scheme was 
to encourage these women to leave the labour force at the end of the war because 
of the negative influence they had on women's wage rates in general. Another 
proposal, put forward by Mrs Vaughan Nash of the Women's Advisory 
Committee for the Ministry of Reconstruction, went much further. She proposed 
pensions for all mothers 'in need', defined as 'widows; deserted, divorced and 
separated wives, wives of men in prisons, asylums etc; and unmarried mothers'.48 
Later she changed her mind and in a separate memorandum argued instead that 
improvements should be made for recovering money from defaulting husbands 
and the fathers of illegitimate children.49 However, it was her initial scheme, 
which included all lone mothers, that was submitted by the Ministry of 
Reconstruction to the Government Actuary for consideration in early 1919. 
The Labour Party also had a similar scheme, this time to remove more women 
from the Poor Law. As this Party was becoming larger - it was to established 
itself as the second political party following the 1922 general election - there was 
reason to suspect that their proposal might eventually be adopted. Labour 
supported the idea of mothers' pensions and wanted to see them centrally funded 
and administered by a body outside the Poor Law so that the recipients would not 
be stigmatised. In their report which outlined their scheme,50 they expressed 
their intention to include all women with dependent children who had once 
maintained a home with the father, but who were no longer living with them. 
This was surprising in view of the fact that they referred to all such women as 
'widows'. Davies stated that allowances would go to: 
47 Statement of Mrs Stocks, Member of the the Family Endowment Committee. National Birth-
rate Commission, 1920, p.241. 
48 Finer, 1974, Vol. 2, p.130. 
49 Ibid., p.131. 
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a widow with one or more children dependant upon her; to a woman 
(with the same dependents) deserted by her husband; to a woman, in 
the same circumstances whose husband is incapacitated or an 
invalid; and finally to a woman who is left to care for the children of 
herself and a man with whom she habitually lived. Every type of 
woman, except the immoral, should be given the chance of caring for 
her home ... 51 
One amendment was made to this general rule, however. 
The woman who was an 'unmarried wife', deserted by the man after 
the birth of the child, would be provided for as a deserted wife. 
Should she, however, subsequently have a second child while still 
unmarried, she could be justifiably considered as an immoral 
woman, and removed from the scope of the scheme.52 
It is interesting to note that in this outline of the party's proposals, Davies made 
no mention of any desire by a future Labour government to make those fathers or 
husbands who were not deceased pay maintenance. It, therefore, seemed that if 
Labour was elected, lone mothers would be freed from the difficulty of obtaining 
and enforcing maintenance orders. The only thing they would have to endure 
would be greater official interference into their lives because 'discreet 
supervision would, no doubt enable many of the present shiftless types to pull 
themselves up to a high class'. 53 The Labour party also proposed that if a 
'widow', that is, all those 'moral' women mentioned above, remarried then the 
pension for her children would be continued, and only her own portion stopped. 
Davies believed that 'it would be manifestly unfair to expect the second husband 
to maintain the first husband's children'.54 The radical nature of this statement is 
an important one to emphasise for it indicates, for the first time, the recognition 
that if the biological father was no longer able to provide for his children, then it 
should be the duty of the state to do so before that of the social father. 
~ I Ibid., p.18. 
~1 Ib'd II 
. ~ I., p.~~. 
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These various schemes are indicative of the tremendous impact that World War 
1 had on forcing some sections of British society to consider alternative methods 
for dealing with social problems. But having said that, other proposals for the 
treatment of lone mothers, which were put forward at the same time, reveal that 
the pre-war belief in the financial obligation of the father was not entirely 
eradicated. Even though it was to take an economic depression to prompt the 
government into reinforcing the father's duty, there were plenty of voices during 
the war calling for stricter bastardy and maintenance laws. 
The main proponents of this individualistic approach were the representatives of 
the National Council for the Unmarried Mother and Her Child. Above all, they 
wanted to see a scheme that would firstly, enable the mother and child to stay 
together and secondly, would recognise the responsibility of the father. 55 The 
Council's chairman, Mrs H. A. L. Fisher outlined the organisation's main 
proposals to the National Birth-rate Commission which reported in 1920. As the 
following list shows, the solution to the problem of lone mother families was 
sought along the traditional lines which had been recommended earlier by, for 
example, the Select Committee on Bastardy Orders in 1909: 
1. Facilities should be made available to enable unmarried 
mothers to make known their condition in the proper quarters 
and to take paternity proceedings; and also by relieving them 
from all costs of any such proceedings. 
2. That provision be made for enabling a magistrate on 
application by an expectant mother, to summon the parties 
before the birth of the child, and to hear the case in camera, 
and where paternity is admitted to make a final order. 
3. Once an affiliation order has been granted the amount awarded 
should run from the date of the child's birth and at the 
discretion of the magistrate, from a period prior to the birth not 
exceeding 2 months. It shall be the duty of the state itself to 
institute proceedings for the enforcement of such payments, as 
if they were a state debt, and without charge to the mother. 
Failing enforcement of payment by fathers, adequate provision 
shall be made by the State before and after the birth for the 
children of such necessitous mothers. 
55 NCFUM&HC, 1918, p.3. 
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4. That the limit of lOs a week under an affiliation order be 
abolished, and the amount granted be in proportion to the 
circumstances of both parents. 
5. That the subsequent marriage of the mother and the father of 
the child shall legitimise the child. 56 
Many of these proposals, and others, were finally incorporated into two Bills 
which were put to Parliament by Neville Chamberlain and the private member, 
Captain Bowyer. Had all the main the clauses been passed, an Act very similar 
to the 1991, Child Support Act would have come into being. As well as wanting 
to make putative fathers take greater financial responsibility by raising the limits 
on orders to 40/- week, Chamberlain wanted to make it the duty of a public 
authority to ensure that the father contributed to the child's support. In addition, 
he intended to create two new offences against the mother - one which would 
penalise her for refusing to give any information which the Registrar may 
demand, and one which would make it an offence to give false information 
concerning the birth or paternity of the child. Working on similar lines, Bowyer 
(who was responsible for drafting both of these Bills) wanted unmarried mothers 
to be compelled to disclose the names of the putative fathers so that the Registrar 
could serve papers on the father. The Registrar would then be responsible for 
forwarding these papers to the collecting officer who would be responsible for 
taking all the necessary action to recover the money payable by the putative 
father. 
Finally, the suggestions of other bodies who had become involved in the debate 
were as follows: the National Union of Women Workers wanted the Local 
Government Board to produce a leaflet for unmarried mothers explaining the law 
and their rights to maintenance;57 the National Council of Women of Great 
Britain and Ireland no longer wanted imprisonment to exonerate the father from 
56 Cited in National Birth-rate Commission, 1920, p.lxix-p.lxx. 
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his liability to pay arrears;58 the National Council for Equal Citizenship wanted 
limits removed and argued that the amounts of orders should be decided on by 
magistrates according to a father's means.59 
The number of suggestions proposed was clearly illustrative of the extent of the 
problems lone mothers faced, and, although their difficulties were obvious before 
the outbreak of war, the war had done little or nothing to alleviate them. 
However, as the following shows, the vast majority of the proposals failed to 
reach the statute books. 
iv) Legislative Outcomes at the End of World War 1. 
Despite the explosion of concern, the measures affecting lone mother families 
that were taken in the years immediately following the war were very meagre. 
The first piece of legislation to be passed was the Affiliation Orders (Increase of 
Maintenance Payments) Act of 1918. This raised the limit on orders from 5s. to 
lOs. a week. The National Council for the Unmarried Mother and Her Child was 
largely responsible for putting pressure on the government to introduce this Act 
and prided itself on seeing its successful passage through Parliament.6o This 
pride was not misplaced because the Secretary of State for the Home Department 
was very resistant to the proposal. Right up to the last minute, he was arguing 
that: 'I do not see my way to initiate legislation on this subject at the present 
time'.61 However, this reform was not a large concession for it was first time that 
the limit had been raised since the Bastardy Laws Amendment Act of 1872. 
Also, the amount of the increase was insufficient to even cover the rise in prices 
that had occurred since the beginning of the war - between 1914 and 1918 the 
retail price index had risen by 110 percent.62 Only those putative fathers who 
were deemed to be able to afford to pay more would have seen their orders 
58 PRO H045111190, letter to the Home Office, 9 July 1923. 
59 HC, Parliamentary Debates, 1920, 136, col. 980. 
60 Macaskill, 1993, p.12. 
61 Minutes on file dated 6 August 1918, PRO H045111181. 
62 Thane, 1982, p.128. 
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increased and these would not necessarily have been up to the maximum limit of 
lOs. a week. 
However, this measure was symbolic in demonstrating that, despite the war, the 
male breadwinner model remained undiluted. But having said that, soldiers were 
still to be given preferential treatment. Although the amount that could be 
deducted from their pay was increased under the Army and Air Force (Annual) 
Act 1921, the power of the Courts of Summary Jurisdiction to commit to prison 
discharged soldiers who were in arrears under affiliation orders made against 
them while they were still in the army were greatly restricted under Section 
9( 1 )(b) of this Act. 63 This was probably because the government was still 
reluctant to put much pressure on those fathers whose services were then needed 
to fill overseas po stings in the empire. 
This is a telling measure because it shows how Britain's defence policies were 
given priority over others. This always seems to be the one area to which policy 
makers are least prepared to apply cost-cutting measures. In wartime, especially, 
Treasury orthodoxy is abandoned in order to finance the needs of the military. 
Because of this one would expect fathers, because they were probably soldiers, to 
be treated more leniently during a war. This certainly happened in the First 
World War and continued to apply to fathers who were soldiers in the years 
following it. This was not a new phenomenon. Since the mid nineteenth 
century, various Army and Navy Acts had been passed which demonstrated how 
policy makers were prepared to be less punitive to members of the armed forces 
than civilians. Even though they were subject to deductions from their wages for 
the payment of bastardy and maintenance orders, if they fell into arrears they 
were unlikely to be sent to prison.64 Moreover, soldiers and airmen etc. were 
relieved from any liability to punishment for the following offences: deserting or 
neglecting to maintain a wife or family; leaving her or them chargeable to the 
Local Authority.65 Even though the Army and Air Force (Annual) Act of 1921 
63 PRO H045/18992, file of21 November, 1921. 
64 See Lieck, 1928. 
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allowed for a summons to be served upon a soldier or an airman under orders for 
service overseas, the service of the summons was not deemed to be valid 'if the 
defendant's Commanding Office certifies that his appearance in Court will 
prevent him being able to return in time for embarkation'.66 Thus, even in times 
of economic collapse concessions were made to soldiers despite the cost to the 
state. 
Legislation affecting separated and deserted WIves during the early 1920s 
followed a very similar course to measures affecting unmarried mothers. The 
first Act to be passed - the Married Women (Maintenance) Act, 1920 - raised the 
limits on a maintenance order for the mother to 401- a week and, for the first 
time, provided for the inclusion in an order for a sum to be paid for any children 
of the marriage. The amount for each child under the age of 16 years could not 
exceed 101- a week. The latter provision, in contrast to any other passed in the 
immediate post-war era, did reflect the growth of concern for the children of 
adulterous wives.67 If a wife committed adultery, her husband could have her 
maintenance order discharged. Following the passing of this Act, if this 
occurred, then at least the children were protected because he could not discharge 
their part of the order. However, if the Affiliation Orders (Increase of 
Maintenance Payments) Act had not been passed in 1918, this piece of 
legislation may never have come about. It was only because magistrates had to 
face separated women on a daily basis, in the knowledge that unmarried mothers 
had been awarded an increase on bastardy limits, that they decided, successfully, 
to put pressure on the government for this reform. 68 
Another Act introduced in 1920 was also to affect separated and deserted 
women. The Maintenance Orders (Facilities for Enforcement) Act, introduced a 
system of registration for maintenance orders made in parts of His Majesty's 
Dominions and Protectorates. The purpose of this reform was similar to that of 
the 1914 Affiliation Orders Act and the Criminal Justice Administration Act of 
66 Ibid. 
67 PRO H04511 1936. 
68 PRO H045/22823. 
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the same year - any money that was paid by a defendant living overseas was to be 
forwarded to the Clerk of Justices who would then pay it to the person named on 
the order. Various colonial authorities had been campaigning for this measure 
since 1911. Although this statute appeared to be the type of measure that would 
have come about as a result of the war, there is no evidence to suggest that this 
was the case. On the contrary, it seems it would have been passed at an earlier 
date if the war had not interrupted its progress.69 
v) The Government's Failure to 'Reconstruct' the Experience of Lone 
Motherhood at the End of World War I. 
When the American Judge Henry Neil visited Britain to speak about the 
experience of mothers' pensions in the U.S.A., he was convinced that as a result 
of war people's attitudes would change because 
it will compel people to understand that the nation cannot exist when 
it makes its first principle the making of profits. It must make its 
first principle the making of human life safe and sound. 7o 
However, this change did not come about and what the Judge described as the 
earlier principles underpinning policies towards lone mothers remained intact: 
society will generally let you go on with the pensioning of mothers as 
long as you do not touch the profit system, then they call a halt. It is 
quite easy to get the legislatures of civilised nations to give a pension 
to a mother ... when there is no man about at all, but if there is a man 
about, and it is anyway possible for him to produce profits, then the 
needs of the mother and the children are used as pressure upon him 
to produce those profits,?l 
Even before demands were mounting for public expenditure cuts to be made in 
the early months of 1921, the government had already rejected the scheme for 
69 PRO H04SiJ 1082. 
70 Citt::d in National Birth-rate Commission, 1920, p.83. 
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widows' pensions that had been put forward by the Ministry of Reconstruction on 
the grounds of its cost. The Government Actuary estimated that this scheme 
would involve an expenditure of approximately £50,000,000.72 Thane73 has 
argued that this outcome was inevitable because the government was faced with 
more important expenditure increases as a result of the war unexpectedly ending 
in November 1918, which meant that it was in no hurry to consider any 
additional measures that would increase its costs. For example, the 'out-of-work' 
donation to ex-servicemen was to cost the Treasury £62 Million by the time the 
final payments were made in May 1921.74 Moreover, as unemployment became 
a pressing social problem after 1919, its enormous cost meant that their was a 
belief that there was even less money available for other social services. 
The government was not just concerned to stop new schemes being initiated 
however. By the early 1920s, it also became preoccupied with the tightening up 
of the administration of existing schemes which it claimed were subject to 
unnecessary expenditure as a result of overlapping and fraud. Even the Ministry 
of Reconstruction had, by 1918, called for measures to be taken which would 
reduce this phenomenon by the introduction of a common system of registration 
of cases by the several different authorities giving money in the home. 
Even though the Labour party estimated that its scheme for mothers pensions 
would only cost £20 million, because it excluded a large proportion of the 
estimated 270,000 unmarried mothers, and also deserted wives who subsequently 
had illegitimate children, its Bills failed to proceed in Parliament. Davies 
blamed this failure on the fact that 'only the Government in power is entitled by 
the constitution and practice of this country to pass a Bill involving such 
expenditure'.75 (As it happened, by 1925 Labour had already changed its mind 
about including divorced, deserted or separated and unmarried mothers on the 
grounds that they did not want to weaken the fathers responsibility. Moreover, it 
71 Ibid., 1920, p.82. 
72 Davies, 1923, p.20. 
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was In this year that widows penSIOns were finally enacted, and by a 
Conservative government). This indicated that some of changes to the value 
system upon which British society was based which the experience of war had 
brought about were only temporary. 
The possibility that lone mothers might become the responsibility of the state 
was also a non starter because as Thane has shown the influence of Labour 
women in this period only had a limited impact on a male dominated party. 76 
Similarly, Pedersen has claimed that some feminists in Britain, 'by identifying 
family policy with women's emancipation deepened the attachment of other 
groups to the defence of the men's breadwinner status, for example, by 
politicians, civil servants, Trade Unionists and social scientists'.77 She therefore 
claims that, towards the end of the war, family policies became more rigorously 
underpinned by the male breadwinner model. This certainly proved to be the 
case in relation to lone mothers. 
However, while this attachment might have urged the government to act on the 
proposals of individualists, particularly those initiated by or on behalf of the 
NCFUM&HC, as we have seen, this clearly only happened to a limited extent. 
Although this was unsurprising during the war itself, once the war had ended it 
was even stranger given the government's inability to challenge Treasury 
orthodoxy. One might also have expected boards of guardians to have pressed 
the newly created Ministry of Health to have fought for such reforms, especially 
as the numbers of persons in receipt of relief had risen slightly from 554,617 in 
December 1918, to 576, 418 in January 1920.78 Moreover, since 1918 demands 
by some guardians that governments should equalise the burden of rates across 
the country became much more forceful. This led the government, in 1920, to 
allow guardians to arrange Exchequer loans though the Ministry of Health, 
which resulted in several authorities falling into greater debt by the mid 1 920s. 79 
The fact that chasing fathers as a method of clawing back money was not 
76 1991, p.114. 
77 1993, p.422. 
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seriously considered until after the slump of 1921, may well have been because 
the government was frightened of passing any measure that would have added 
fuel to the general unrest among the male population at the time. Moreover, they 
probably did not want to antagonise absent fathers at a time when many men 
were bearing the physical and psychological scars of war and having to face the 
frustratingly slow process of demobilisation. 80 
In addition to this, the government was also reluctant to pass any measures that 
might encourage immorality and thus increase the illegitimate birth rate. 
Because organisations, such as the NCFUM&HC, thought the 1918 increase to 
limits on bastardy orders was not high enough, they continued to pressurise the 
government for further increases. However, the Home Secretary expressed deep 
opposition to this suggestion on the grounds that a further rise 'must be regarded 
much more in the nature of compensation to the woman, and it puts far too great 
a premium upon the birth of illegitimate children'.81 He was also against any 
measure that might expose men to blackmail. 
If this bill is passed, anyone might expect to receive any morning one 
or it might be several letters from the Registrar asking whether or not 
the recipient admitted paternity. The woman would know that she 
was expected to name someone, and if she did not know, or did not 
wish to say, who the father was she could at any rate name a person 
with regard to whom there had at least been opportunity for 
connection which would lend some appearance of credibility to her 
story. If the limit were raised to forty shillings it is probable that she 
would choose someone of means - probably, if a servant, her 
employer - likely, to be adjudged to pay the full amount.82 
Finally, the government was also fearful of having to face any further accusations 
of 'licensing sin'. This had happened after Separation Allowances were 
introduced in 1914 which permitted payments to be paid to the cohabitees of 
soldiers. 83 
79 Crowther, 1988, p.48. 
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However, the government did instruct the Cabinet Committee of Home Affairs 
in May 1920 to consider the Bills that had been presented to Parliament by this 
date. Even though the Committee found that there was a lack of proper 
provision for illegitimate children, it also expressed concerned about the issue of 
blackmail. It also rejected these Bills because of the clause whereby illegitimate 
children would be legitimised by their parents subsequent marriage. Even 
though this provision had the potential to reduce the numbers resorting to the 
Poor Law as it may have encouraged putative fathers to marry, it was anticipated 
that such a proposal would be rejected in the House of Lords because it would be 
in breach of the laws of succession to titles and property. 84 
As blood testing for paternity was not available until the end of the 1940s, the 
government was perhaps not being unreasonable over its fear of blackmail. 
However, in addition to worries about this and other moral issues, it was also not 
ready to implement any measure that would increase the administrative costs of a 
new scheme. In response to calls for family matters to be removed from the 
magistrates courts (also known as 'police courts' because their primary purpose 
was to deal with criminal matters), one civil servant stated that: 
I suppose motorist will want special courts next! There is some 
dissatisfaction, but it is impractical to make every system perfect at 
every point, and special courts would be expensive. 85 
The government was just as wary, as it had been before the war, of passing 
legislation that might increase the numbers of absent fathers being sent to prison. 
Because magistrates had very limited powers to attach wages this was a real 
possibility. Moreover, since 1920, the Police Commission had once again been 
drawing the Home Office's attention to the increase in the number of male 
debtors being sent to prison for wife maintenance and bastardy arrears. 86 This 
84 Minutes of Meeting, PRO CAB/26/56.2. 
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had moved the Home Secretary to send out a circular in 1921 to Chief 
Constables stating that if a man against whom a warrant for commitment had 
been issued 
is found to be bedridden or in such a state of health that he is clearly 
unfit for prison discipline ... in any such case the facts should be 
reported to the Justice by whom the warrant was issued with a view 
to its execution being suspended. 87 
The government's reluctance to ensure that absent fathers paid up at this point in 
time may also have had something to do with the misogynist attitudes held by 
some ministers and civil servants. An inspection of public records provides 
ample evidence of this phenomenon. For example, the following scornful 
comment on Chamberlain's Bastardy Bill, 1920, was not untypical: 
The object of the Bill may be to secure the welfare of the illegitimate 
child, but the principle underlying its provisions is - find a father for 
every bastard - if the true father, so much the better - but in any case 
fix paternity upon someone and make him pay a weekly allowance.88 
Even though the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Mr Shortt, stated 
that he was in favour of saving expenditure on unmarried mothers, he too was 
against any Bill which might have a negative impact on absent fathers: 
to many men a charge of being the father of an illegitimate child is as 
serious a matter as being charged with a criminal offence; it may 
break up his home; if he is a married man, it may ruin him socially 
and in every way that means his happiness in life.89 
The differential treatment of women and men during the war also provides 
e\'idence of the powerful influence of these views.9o While great efforts were 
taken to ensure that women remained 'chaste', men in the armed forces were 
X7 PRO H045 i l1033. 
S8 Minutes on front of file, PRO H045111190. 
89 He. Parliamentary Debates, 1920, 128, col. 2426. 
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encouraged to do just the opposite. Stimulated by the grossly exaggerated scare 
about 'war babies' in 1915, and so-called 'khaki fever', women's behaviour 
became subject to significant controls. Adolescent girls, in particular, became 
the focus of attention, because there was a widespread belief that they were 
asserting their sexuality in such a way as to threaten the moral order. 
These girls have thought it grand to go around with a man in Khaki. 
They regard sexual intercourse as something natural, not merely to 
be obtained by marriage, but as a clever accomplishment.91 
Such women became labelled as 'amateur prostitutes' and their presence around 
army bases led to the formation of the Patrols Committee and the Women's 
Police Service which attempted to stop them from going 'astray'.92 If caught 
soliciting they were treated harshly: 
They are getting immense sentences - anything from six to fifteen 
months. From the time the amateur begins until the time she gets 
into prison, is very often not a fortnight. 93 
The so-called 'amateur prostitutes' were also held responsible for the spread of 
VO among the troops which prompted the government to pass Regulation 40d 
under the Defence of the Realm Act in 1918. This measure made it an offence 
for any women with VD to have sex with, or solicit, a member of the armed 
forces. 
However, it was not just young, single women who were subjected to stricter 
controls. Steps were also taken to ensure that soldiers wives conducted 
themselves 'properly' while there husbands were away fighting. For example, 'in 
the anticipation that soldiers' wives would indulge in excessive drinking, the 
public houses were closed during certain hours open to men'. 94 They also risked 
loosing their allowances for 'unchastity, drunkenness, neglect of children or a 
90 See for example, Woollacott 1994a; Haste 1994; Pankhurst 1987. 
91 Captain A. F. Wright cited in National Birth-rate Commission, 1920, p.17. 
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criminal offence'.95 In October 1914 an Anny Council Memorandum and a 
Home Office letter were issued to Chief Constables giving them instructions to 
place all women in receipt of separation allowances under surveillance. 
Soldiers' wives and relatives were thus to be subject to a penalty in 
excess of that imposed by the ordinary law. They were placed at the 
mercy of secret reports, without any public or private trial or 
opportunity of vindication or reply.96 
If soldiers' wives were subjected to this kind of treatment, this would seem to 
indicate that there was not in fact a wholesale change in attitudes towards 
separated, deserted and unmarried mothers. The double standard in the way men 
and women were treated during the war also helps explain why absent fathers 
were not put under greater pressure at this time. Although historically men have 
not been subjected to many controls on their sexuality, the war acted to relax 
even the basic restraints. According to Pankhurst, not only were soldiers who 
were serving abroad provided with prophylactics, but those in France apparently 
had the services of prostitutes arranged for their use.97 The First World War 
must therefore be seen as a period during which the double-standards of the 
Victorian era were revived with a vengeance. Indeed, it seemed that while men 
were treated leniently in order to keep up their morale, the opposite occurred for 
women, despite the necessity for their labour on the Home Front. 
The government, therefore, clearly felt unable to concede to the demands of 
campaigners following the war, not only because of its worries about the 
financial implications of taking measures to improve the administration of child 
support, but also because they threatened to undennine the dominant ideology 
underpinning this institution. As we shall see in the next section, policy-makers 
may also have been reluctant to take action on behalf on lone mothers for 
eugenic reasons. Although the Eugenics Society was 'moribund' during this 
9~ Ib·d 
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period. its ideas still appeared to have a strong hold over the elite.98 Because of 
this, and various other reasons, the government was not alone in its reluctance to 
share with the campaigners a more humanitarian attitude towards lone mothers 
and their children. Nor were they prepared to see further state intervention which 
might have helped such families secure some form of financial security. 
vi) Other Opposition to Reform 
Fears that class purity was being 'watered down' was not a new phenomenon. 
However, even though in the four years since 1914 there was an estimated short-
fall of 543,087 births in England and Wales,99 'the prevailing ideology of the 
ruling elite felt the imperative of maintaining such class purity .. .'.IOO It was not, 
therefore, more working class children that were wanted by those in power, but 
middle and upper class ones. As a result of this there was a desire to avoid 'race 
suicide' by the middle classes. This led Marie Stopes to campaign for the greater 
use of birth control by the lower social classes. As a member of the Eugenics 
Society since 1912, she explained her position to the National Birth-rate 
Commission as follows: 
I want to eliminate every child born weaker than it need to be, born 
unhealthy, born of a rebellious mother, born to any inherited disease, 
born to a doomed coffin. It would free the community from 
supporting the unfit, and the middle class could then produce more 
children of good quality and support them. 101 
This was somewhat ironic because while it was the increasing use of 
contraception by the middle classes that had caused the birth rate to decline in 
the first place, it was more contraception that was advocated for the working 
class. Stopes was not alone in her belief that measures to improve the birth rate 
98 Searle, 1979, p.160. 
99 Report of National Birth-rate Commision, 1920, p.xxxiii. 
100 Reeves. 1993, p.413. 
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should only be directed at the middle classes. The authors of the Report of the 
National Birth-rate Commission also supported this because the middle class 
have demonstrated superior capacity for the struggle of life in the 
past by rising the social scale, and have, during the recent past, 
ceased to contribute anything like their fair share to the nation's 
capital of men and women. 102 
Despite this rhetoric, however, at the end of the day, these commissioners were 
really far more concerned to increase the birth-rate among any social class so 
long as their offspring did not become a financial burden on the central state or 
the local community. Their objections to birth control, except in exceptional 
circumstances, are very telling: in cases where persons are likely to transmit any 
'serious or mental taint' to their children and 
if conception be prevented with the genuine desire to avoid ill health 
and suffering by the mother, or the children, for whose support and 
decent upbringing no adequate means exist, in short, with a desire on 
the part of both parents to avoid responsibilities which in the 
circumstances are impossible of fulfilment, then such conduct cannot 
be regarded as immoral. 103 
The same authors also condoned abstinence in working class marriages, 
especially where the social and economic circumstances would 'render the proper 
upbringing of children impossible'. 1 04 This attitude was somewhat hypocritical 
for while children were recognised as a collective benefit to the nation, the 
financial responsibility had to remain in the hands of individuals. The 
continuing attachment to the eugenicists creed explains why there was no desire 
to make lone motherhood a more attractive proposition. It also explains why 
there were general fears of taking any measures which might increase the 
illegitimate birth-rate, even though there was no evidence that by improving the 
treatment of unmarried mothers their numbers would increase. Indeed, even the 
Commissioners were aware that the opposite was more likely to happen for they 
knew that in 
102 Ibid., p.xxxix. 
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Norway, where the unmarried mother and her child are treated more 
generously than anywhere else, the percentage of illegitimate births 
has notably declined and in all countries where there has been an 
ameliorati ve legislation. I 05 
Other discourses also explain why most lone mothers continued to be at the 
receiving end of harsh treatment. The notion that destitution was a contagious 
disease still continued to be held by some. The writer Drage, for example, was 
clearly of this opinion which he expressed in a collection of articles he wrote for 
The Times between 1913 and 1919. He also described socialism as a 'gospel of 
despair' and argued for the return of 'the thrift, independence, self-help and self-
reliance of years gone by'. I 06 
This view was further endorsed during the war because of the emerging belief 
that the increase in juvenile delinquency was the result of the breakdown of 
home life and the loss of parental control. I 07 In 1918 the findings of an 
American study which linked illegitimacy to crime was published in Britain, thus 
demonstrating the persistence of this theory which has, and still is, used as an 
excuse for the condemnation of lone mothers by society. Moreover, like current 
works on this subj ect, I 08 the results of this study were very dubious. In order to 
establish the causative factors that led to unmarried motherhood, Kammerer's 
team studied 500 such women. He concluded they were either mentally 
defective or immoral. However, his results were arrived at through the use of 
some highly unscientific methods. For example, even though he used Binet tests 
on mothers, he still managed to label some women as 'defective' even though 
they passed, as case number 63 illustrates: 
she succeed in passing the most difficult Binet tests, and was 
considered not feeble-minded or insane. Her behaviour, therefore, 
1041b'd I' I ., p.X VI. 
10~ [b'd I . 
. I., p, XXI. 
106 1930, p.25, p,43. 
107 Marwick. 1991, p.159. 
108 See, for example, Murray1990 and Dennis and Erdos 1993, 
99 
was such as led us to believe that this girl represents a class, who, 
although passing the ordinary tests easily, are yet unable to adapt 
themselves to life in the community owing to some special defect, 
such as defect in self-control. 109 
While such scare-mongenng may have fuelled the public's imagination and 
reinforced their prejudices against unmarried mothers, this type of study, just like 
those of today, should never have been conducted. After all, Kammerer himself 
admitted that although 
the rate of illegitimacy in a community is based largely upon births 
of a more ignorant group of the population, ... no accurate estimate 
can be secured which would indicate the sexual ethics of those who 
are intelligent enough to rob the sex act of its normal results. ... A 
certain group of the population, furthermore, is possessed of 
sufficient means to enable them to secure abortions which again 
prevents the registration of the illicit sex intercourse from the pages 
of the birth register. I I 0 
This was, therefore, a complex period ideologically. The pre-war idea that some 
lone mothers were redeemable was reinforced as a result of the war. So too was 
the idea that illegitimate children were innocent. However, these beliefs were 
not shared by all, for running in parallel with them, were those which saw 
families without fathers as the cause of crime and delinquency and which held 
these families responsible for their poverty stricken circumstances. As the latter 
belief had a greater tendency to be held by those with the power to alter the 
situation of such families, it was not surprising that little was done to ameliorate 
their circumstances. By 1920, the National Council for the Unmarried Mother 
and Her Child had reached the conclusion that 
It is by no means clear that public opinion has, as a whole, undergone 
any fundamental change of attitude towards the unmarried mother, 
nor are there any signs of such a change coming about in the future ... 
the community did not want the illegitimate child, and was very 
109 Kammerer, 1969, p.245-p.246. 
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jealous of any benevolent action tending to make illegitimate births 
free from disgrace and hardship to both mother and child. I II 
It was also stated that 
Efforts to remove or lessen the various disabilities which illegitimacy 
entails upon both mother and child may be possibly regarded as 
likely to increase the number of births out of wedlock. In fact, it may 
even be argued that such changes would diminish respect for the 
married state and weaken the foundations of public morality. 1 12 
vii) Conclusion 
As a result of the strains of war, there was a groundswell of concern about the 
welfare of women and children in general. As a by-product of this movement 
attention was also drawn to lone mother families. After being exposed to the 
plight of 'war babies' and the difficulties faced, particularly by unmarried 
mothers, some sections of the community began to demand reforms to alleviate 
their situation. Although their needs had been recognised in the years before the 
war broke out, many more people were prompted by revelations of their wartime 
experiences to sign up to their cause. It is not altogether clear if this 
humanitarianism was extended to those lone mothers who were not considered to 
be 'redeemable'. However, it was certainly directed towards all those unmarried 
mothers who had just one illegitimate child and had already been the subject of 
concern before the war. Some deserted wives also aroused sympathy especially 
as many more men abandoned their wives without trace during the war. l13 
Finally, some people may have begun to see separated women from a more 
tolerant perspective. During this period psychological theories began to emerge 
which attempted to explain the causes of marital breakdown. However, few 
people would have been aware of these theories before the 1930s when Havelock 
III Report of National Birth-rate Commission, 1920, p.lx. 
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Ellis'l14 work finally reached bookstands. But having said that, as the typicaL 
patriotic family during the war was female headed, whether or not a man 
belonged to the household, it was perhaps not surprising that more people 
became reluctant to condemn lone mothers and wanted to see them more 
adequately provided for. 
This humanitarianism was just one side of the coin, however. There were still 
many people, perhaps the majority, who did not want to see lone mother families 
at the receiving end of beneficial policies because they feared such measures 
would encourage immorality and, in turn, increase the illegitimate birth rate. In 
common with the present day, many people clearly wanted to avoid increasing 
the number of lone mother families because of the supposed link between them 
and juvenile delinquency. Pseudo-scientific discourses on this subject certainly 
gave credence to the eugenicist claim that it was undesirable to allow the lower 
social classes to 'breed' prolifically, and at the public's expense. 
As policy makers tended to be more representative of those on the side of 
eugenicism, it was not altogether surprising that they conceded to so few of the 
demands for lone mothers that the war inspired. Moreover, in contrast to the 
Conservatives in recent years, the Coalition government under Lloyd-Geoge had 
the foresight to anticipate that any measures would necessarily involve greater 
administrative expense to either the state or the ratepayer. Within the corridors 
of power there was also a certain amount of hostility towards the demands of 
feminists. This, coupled, with a general misogyny, probably made those with the 
ability to bring about change more determined to resist it. The fact that most of 
the campaigners for reform had little political influence no doubt made this 
eaSIer. 
The government's rejection of any collectivist solution to the problem was not as 
surprising as its failure to act on more of the proposals of the NCFUM&HC, for 
example. In common with other radical plans for the reconstruction of society 
114 1937. 
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following World War 1, such as the abolition of the Poor Law, plans for the 
'endowment of motherhood' or widows' pensions were abandoned as soon as the 
war ended and a more orthodox approach to social problems was reinstated. 115 
In any case, there is little evidence that many ordinary people would have found 
this solution acceptable. According to popular opinion, lone mothers needed to 
be 'rescued' or 'reformed', rather than become acceptable to society. As to the 
proposal that they be should be given pensions, one commentator said that they 
would be 
more disastrous to the uplifting of the mother than even the 
workhouse. The thought of giving a young woman as much money 
as she wants to lead an idle life - putting her out on the town to live 
an idle life - is unpromising; I would give the baby five weeks to 
survive it. 116 
Although the individualist solution was not wholeheartedly embraced at this 
time, the delay was only temporary. As will be seen in the following chapter, 
when the government faced huge financial constraints following the slump in 
1921, it became much more willing to adopt more of the suggestions of the 
NCFUM&HC. Just as this same organisation today (now called the National 
Council for One Parent Families), has played a vital part in helping to frame 
policies for lone mother families, it did the same in the interwar years. Its ability 
to be so influential is, and was, because it has never been an entirely independent 
pressure group. The NCFUM&HC originated from the Child Welfare Council of 
the Social Welfare Association 'working with representatives of Central 
government and Local Authorities' .117 It therefore had access to power right 
from the beginning. Because of its composition, it also became heavily involved 
in the mother and child welfare movement generally and it was more successful 
in this capacity in the immediate period after it was founded. Because of its links 
with local authorities, the NCFUM&HC was able to persuade to government to 
11:i For further discussion see, for example, Pedersen, 1993; Crowther, 1988. 
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give these authorities the power, under the Maternity and Child Welfare Act, 
1918, to sanction emergency grants so that they could provide accommodation 
for unmarried mothers and their children on leaving maternity wards. 
Although this measure seems to contradict the argument here - that the 
government did very little for lone mothers during this period - placing such 
women in voluntary homes was probably much cheaper than putting them in the 
workhouse. However, few women benefited from them. This was because those 
running the homes charged fees from between 12s.6d. to 25s. a week, and, as the 
NCFUM&HC soon discovered, this was beyond the means of many mothers and 
their families and friends. I 18 Consequently, many unmarried mothers continued 
to resort to the Poor Law for relief. Moreover, just as before the war, they were 
only likely to be offered the workhouse. In 1920, 79 per cent of lone mothers 
received indoor relief, which clearly demonstrated that the war had done little to 
diminish the powerful social stigma that was attached to their status. I 19 
In summary, the evidence makes it clear that while some people expected the 
strain of war on lone mothers to lead to emergency action being taken, the 
government failed to deliver much. Although it is impossible to prioritise the 
reasons behind its reluctance, if the majority of absent fathers then were anything 
like they are today, it was clearly not an appropriate time to be antagonising 
them. However, this situation was not to last for long because reinforcing the 
fathers financial duty was only temporarily put on hold. So too were other 
suggestions that became more hotly debated during the war, such as adoption, 
divorce and legitimacy. For a number of reasons, interwar governments became 
much more interested in refonning the laws relating to all of these issues, as we 
shall see. 
Perhaps, for lone mother families, the most significant aspect of World War 1 
was that it was a time during which politically instigated, collectivist proposals 
were given serious consideration. It is noteworthy that this has rarely happened 
118 Ibid .. 1921, p.8. 
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in the twentieth century. Only during the 1970s did it again become a matter for 
'high politics', when the Finer Committee put forward its proposals for a 
Guaranteed Maintenance Allowance. This would suggest that an exceptional 
social and economic climate is required before governments will give some 
consideration to recommendations which propose attenuating the principle of the 
father" s duty. 
119 Reeves. 1993, p.414. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE INTERWAR YEARS 
i) Introduction 
Following the lull in attempts to make absent fathers pay during and immediately 
after the World War 1, the efforts of policy-makers in this direction were revived 
during the early 1920s. It was perhaps not surprising that, as in recent years, 
governments attempted to unburden the responsibility of lone mother families 
away from the community and onto individual fathers in a time of economic 
recession, especially as governments then, as now, were essentially conservative, 
and predominantly Conservative anyway. In any case, as we have seen, 
alternative, collectivist approaches to the problem had been buried after the war 
and it was back to business as usual. There was also probably less concern about 
antagonising absent fathers once the urgent need for them to fight in the armed 
forces had diminished. In contrast to this, the impact of the war in intensifying 
the pre-war concern about the treatment of 'respectable' lone mothers and 
illegitimate children lingered. Thus, even though the government may, first and 
foremost, have wanted to make fathers pay in order to lessen the financial burden 
of lone mothers families on ratepayers at a time of economic crisis, their decision 
to implement harsher methods to coerce absent fathers may also have come 
about in order to appease some pressure groups. 
In addition to this, governments, then as now, may also have been reacting to an 
increase in the number of lone mother families. While it was still not possible to 
tell the exact status of women resorting to the Poor Law other evidence shows 
that the number of lone mother families was probably rising. Even though any 
increase in the illegitimate birth rate during and immediately after the war is 
debatable, the commonplace belief that it had risen was widely accepted. l The 
increase in the number of applications for bastardy orders by the end of the war 
certainly seemed to justify this belief. Since the late nineteenth century these had 
I Sec. for c\ample, NCFUM&HC, 1924, p.5. 
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been fairly constant, in 1896 there were 8,405 applications and in 1913 there 
were 8,582. However, by 1920 there were 11,851 applications a year.2 
Applications for maintenance orders also underwent an increase. In 1913 there 
were 11,369 applications a year and in 1920, 16,545.3 Although, of course, these 
statistics do not reflect the total numbers of lone mothers because many were 
reluctant to go to court, they may have been used as evidence that the number of 
lone mother families was increasing. 
Many politicians and civil servants then, unlike now, had all along suspected that 
their efforts to make fathers pay might not be successful; at the same time as 
passing Acts to enforce the father's duty, they enacted other legislation which 
they hoped would diminish the number of such families. For example, because 
marriage has always been regarded as a means by which the state can avoid the 
expense of relieving poverty,4 legislation to make divorce easier was also passed 
in the early 1920s. After the mid 1920s, further measures were enacted. These 
were aimed towards finding other individuals to take on the financial 
responsibility of the children of lone mothers, rather than let them become a 
burden on the community. By 1926, adoption had been legalised and under the 
Legitimacy Act of the same year, illegitimate children could be legitimised by 
their parents subsequent marriage. Although the latter measure was in part a 
reaction to the growing belief that these children should be not punished because 
of their parents' behaviour, its other objective was to encourage putative fathers 
to marry the mothers of their children and, thereby, reduce the community's 
responsibility for their financial support. 
In contrast to the albeit limited success of these measures, by 1930, policy 
makers' suspicions that making fathers pay would not work was confirmed. The 
economy picked-up a little after the mid-1920s, then it was plunged into another 
more severe crisis following the Wall Street Crash in 1929. Interwar 
governments were faced with the irony that their efforts to ensure that absent 




fathers paid had the unintended effect of increasing state expenditure, rather than 
reducing it. This was for the simple reason that more and more men ended up in 
prison for failure to pay. As a result of this, the government then bent over 
backwards to find ways of avoiding the expense of sending absent fathers to 
prison. This was achieved by the Money Payments (Justices Procedure) Act in 
1935 which led to an almost immediate, and drastic reduction of the numbers of 
maintenance and affiliation defaulters being sent to prison. But, because this 
measure did nothing to reduce the number of lone mothers who were, or might 
become, dependent on the Poor Law, other tactics had to be adopted. Under the 
Summary Procedure (Domestic Proceedings) Act, 1937, provision was made for 
courts to appoint probation officers to encourage couples to reconcile. At the 
same time, the Matrimonial Causes Act was passed which again attempted to 
make divorce easier by extending the grounds to include desertion for at least 
three years. 
The reasons behind the failure of measures to enforce the father's financial duty 
in the 1920s were much the same as they always were, and as they are today. 
Obviously the very existence of legislation indicates that men have to be coerced 
into paying. However, as this alone does not ensure that all will do so, additional 
state expenditure is required, either to keep them in prison, or - as today - to 
provide an administrative agency to force them to observe their obligations. As 
the costs involved in this outweigh the benefits (if there are any), governments 
then abandon their efforts in this direction. However, these schemes do not just 
fail because it is difficult to compel absent fathers to pay. In particular, they are 
doomed to failure for one fundamental reason, which a Metropolitan Magistrate 
summed up in the interwar years when he pointed out that: 
Very few men ... will ever be in a position to maintain two women, 
to say nothing of two families; our economic system, like out morals, 
is based on monogamy.s 
-l Gittins. 1993, p.83. 
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This chapter will detail the story of efforts to make the father pay in the interwar 
years, to demonstrate how past precedent could have predicted the failure of the 
Child Support Act, 1991. It will also investigate the experience of lone 
motherhood during the interwar years. It is always necessary to do this because, 
although measures to make fathers pay were not intended to alleviate their 
circumstances, they were much needed by these women. Even though it will be 
concluded that measures to enforce the father's duty were primarily introduced 
because governments sought to find their way out of the depression through the 
application of orthodox economic policies, i.e. by achieving balanced budgets, 
such a mono-causal theory is far too simplistic. After all, the influence of some 
pressure groups in shaping policy cannot be ignored. Indeed, had it not been for 
the decline in the women's movement by the 1930s, and some unfortunate links 
between some feminists and the eugenics movement in the 1930s, the 
government may not have been able to get away with abandoning its efforts to 
make father pay, whatever the economic climate. Changing and diverse 
discourses on lone motherhood were also to playa part in shaping policy. An 
escalating number of studies, claiming to show that there was a link between 
family breakdown and juvenile delinquency, reinforced the widespread belief 
that nothing should be done which might encourage such families to proliferate. 
Even the Children's Branch of the Home Office conducted some research, 
between 1922 and 1924, into this alleged problem by investigating the numbers 
of illegitimate children admitted to Industrial Schools.6 The growing belief that 
a mother and child should be kept together was also influential. Some of the 
organisations concerned with unmarried mothers began to argue, in the early to 
mid 1920s, that if the mother kept her child, she would be less likely to become 
pregnant again with a second illegitimate child. 7 If this became common 
practice, although it may have reduced the number of 'second cases', it clearly 
threatened to make unmarried motherhood more socially acceptable. All of these 
factors, together with an increasing tendency to offer 'redeemable' mothers a 
place in a voluntary home, rather than the workhouse, contributed to the idea that 
5 Mullins, 1935, p.16. 
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it was necessary to reinforce the duty of absent fathers. After all, if lone mothers 
were going to be treated more favourably, making fathers pay could demonstrate 
society's ultimate disapproval of such immorality and the dangerous 
consequences of the breakdown of family life on innocent children. 
ii) The Experience of Lone Motherhood in the 1920s 
Even though the maximum limits on affiliation and maintenance orders had been 
raised in 1918 and 1920, the majority of lone mothers were still unable to be self-
supporting with the result that many must have resorted to the Poor Law. This 
was why the NCFUM&HC and other organisations continued with their 
campaigns after these reforms had been passed. They also continued to put 
pressure on the government because the experience of lone motherhood, which 
had been bad enough during the War, worsened during the following years. This 
was primarily because there were far fewer opportunities for those women who 
could work to do so during the 1920s. They were also less likely to be able to 
get help from friends, families and neighbours once the depression set in. 
Beginning with the unmarried mother, although the limits on bastardy orders 
were increased to 10/- a week in 1918, this amount had already depreciated by 
1919 after another sudden rise in prices.8 Although no statistics are available to 
show the value of the orders granted, it has to be remembered that just because 
limits were raised, it did not mean that the majority of unmarried mothers were 
getting anything like this amount. Therefore, in order to avoid the workhouse 
unmarried mothers would have needed to work and if this was not possible they 
may have turned to a voluntary organisation for help. However, more often than 
not. neither of these were an option. Paid employment was almost impossible 
because of the difficulty in finding a foster-mother or a hostel who were prepared 
to take care of a child for anything less than 15/- a week. Even voluntary homes 
7 See. for example, NCFUM&HC, 1924b; Report of First General Congress on Child Welfare. 
Gene\a, 1925, in PRO EDII21/53. 
x For a discussion of the cost ofliving see, for example, Graves and Alan, 1940. p.67. 
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which were in receipt of state subsidies could not help the majority of mothers 
who could not afford to pay fees varying from 12/- to 25/- a week.9 
Coupled with these difficulties, there were fewer jobs available as there was not 
the same demand for women workers as there had been during the war. Even 
though some - or at least those described as having a 'good character' - may have 
gained employment as domestic servants in those areas which experienced 
difficulties in finding maids, their chances of being employed depended largely 
on the age of their child: 
The mother with the very young baby is the most easy to place; next 
to her comes the girl with the two year old who is able to run about; 
but there is a difficult time when the child is about a year and crawls 
about and breaks things and requires a good deal of attention and 
care. IO 
But that was not the only disadvantage. Those lucky enough to find this type of 
work usually found they were at the mercy of employers who endeavoured 
to save their own pockets by penalising the employee on the grounds 
of her previous moral lapse, so as to secure an experienced first-class 
maid at the wage of an untrained domestic servant. I I 
As a result of these difficulties, and the stigma still attached to unmarried 
motherhood which all too often led to the refusal of parental support, most 
unmarried mothers were unable to find any refuge other than the workhouse. 12 
As time wore on, they were even less likely to enter a voluntary home or a hostel. 
These became even less affordable as the charities running them found it 
increasingly difficult to secure donations and subscriptions to subsidise fees. 
Moreover, as single girls were expected to contribute to the family coffers: 
9 NCFUM&HC, 192 L p.5-p.8. 
10 Ibid .. 1921, p.8. 
II Ibid .. 1922, p.9. 
12 Ibid .. 1921. p.8-p.1 O. 
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The wise rule prevailing in many hostels that an inmate should 
undertake to stay at least six months, is now a serious deterrent, not 
because the girl would wish to refuse the chance of such a haven, but 
because her earnings cannot be spared for so long a period from the 
family exchequer. 13 
Although adoption was not legalised until 1926, the old tradition of making 
informal adoption arrangements continued. However, this alternative was not 
available to many mothers with illegitimate children. It was a public myth 'that 
there were numberless would-be-adopters pining to adopt other people's children 
free of charge'. 14 
Compounding all the above difficulties, the problem of getting a bastardy order 
in the first place was just as difficult as it had always been. The factors which 
deterred women from applying in the first place remained the same as in the era 
before World War 1. These included, for example, the fear of publicity and the 
lack of stringent proof needed to establish the paternity of the child. The latter 
led one magistrate to wish that he could 
punish the men who get girls into trouble but who take deliberate 
pains to avoid writing to them or giving them presents or committing 
themselves in the presence of third persons. When charged with the 
paternity of a child they perjure themselves deliberately in denying 
that they have had any improper intercourse, and the case has to be 
dismissed for want of sufficient corroboration. IS 
Even if an unmarried mother was successful in getting a bastardy order, this did 
not mean that she necessarily managed to make the father pay it. Men 
'disappearing' or making themselves unemployed rather than pay remained a 
common phenomenon. 16 Nor at any point during the interwar years was any 
legislation introduced which would have enabled a bastardy summons issued in 
England or Wales to be served in Scotland or Ireland or vice-versa. Although the 
13 Ibid .. 1922. p.6-p. 7. 
14 Ibid .. 1925. p.2. 
I:; Chapman. 1925. p.116. 
16 Mullins, 193.2. p.250. 
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1914 Affiliation Orders Act had been implemented in the attempt to ensure that 
mothers more readily received the money due to them, not all magistrates courts 
had appointed collecting officers, even by the 1930s. This was to remain a bone 
of contention throughout the period and those fighting for lone mother families 
did not cease to demand that they should be installed in all courts. The fact that 
they were not demonstrates that while governments were concerned to reduce 
local expenditure, they were not prepared to fund the cost of administering the 
legislation they had enacted. This was probably because many civil servants and 
politicians never totally believed that any measure to enforce the payment of 
maintenance and affiliation orders would be effective. They may, therefore, have 
only half-heartedly given in to demands of the organisations who wanted to 
enforce the father's duty. After all, there was no harm in passing legislation to 
make fathers pay if there was a chance that it might be successful, but 
governments were certainly not prepared to pump extra money into, for example, 
making administrative changes, if they were not entirely convinced that they 
would work. 
Finally, the threat of imprisonment did little to force men to pay. Organisations 
which campaigned on behalf of lone mother families, such as the NCFUM&HC, 
the National Union of Societies for Equal Citizenship, the National Council of 
Women, the Standing Joint Committee of Industrial Women's Organisations, and 
the Six Point Group, were unsuccessful throughout the entire period III 
persuading governments to reform the law which allowed a period of 
imprisonment to have the advantage of wiping out all arrears. Moreover, 
magistrates could order the sentence to be served for just one day. As Mullins, 
the Chief Magistrate, confirmed: 
In proper cases, even the one day need not be enforced, and in fact I 
usually instruct the gaoler not to enforce it ... It is regrettable that we 
have to resort to these tricks to ensure justice, but until we are given 
power to reduce arrears, we must choose the lesser evil to avoid the 
greater. 17 
17 MlIllins. 1935, p.119. 
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Perhaps if free legal aid had been available to lone mothers their attempts may 
have been more successful. However, this was not introduced until 1949. 
although a government committee reporting in 1926 recognised it was a 
necessity in maintenance and bastardy cases. This committee decided that it 
would be too expensive to provide for cases heard in Courts of Summary 
Jurisdiction. 18 In contrast to this, since 1914, poor divorce petitioners had been 
able to obtain the services of volunteer solicitors and barristers free of charge if 
they had property worth less than £ 100 a week. This had come about in response 
to the demands of the Commissioners on the Royal Commission on Divorce in 
1912. Although slightly more people were able to get divorced as a result, the 
very poor still had to use the magistrates courts until the divorce courts were 
decentralized. After the passing of the Administration of Justice Act, 1920, the 
numbers able to get free legal advice was, however, reduced. Under this Act a 
petitioner also had to be earning less than £4 a week. Consequently, divorce was 
not an option available to the vast majority of ordinary people at this time, 
especially as the cost of attending court in London was extremely prohibitive. 19 
Separated and deserted mothers faced many of the same problems as unmarried 
mothers. This was because maintenance legislation was very similar to bastardy 
legislation with the consequence that the obtaining of an order, and enforcing it, 
was just as difficult. Moreover, although the female participation rate in the 
labour market did not decline in the interwar years to the same extent as the male 
participation rate, this probably did not mean that separated or deserted mothers 
found it any easier than unmarried mothers to gain employment.2o Thane21 and 
Lewis22 have also noted that opportunities for poorer mothers to supplement their 
incomes though casual and part-time work diminished in this period. For 
example, because of the growth of commercial laundries, the age-old method of 
18 Committee on Legal Aid for the Poor, 1926, p.8. 
19 Rowntree and Carrier, 1958, p.193-p.194. 
20 For a discussion of women's declining opportunities to work in the interwar years see, 
Brookes. 1988. 
21 198~. p. 166. 
11 
-- 1984. p.61-p.62. 
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earning extra money by taking in other people's washing gradually disappeared. 
If they took on some form of homework, which was still available despite the 
passing of the Trade Boards Acts in 1909 and 1918, the most usual minimum 
rates on the basis of a 48 hour week even by the late 1930s were only 28/- to 30/-
for a woman (as compared to 48/- to 52/- for men). As Cole23 pointed out, 'these 
rates are still very low in relation to any tolerable standard of human needs'. In 
1923. Rathbone had translated Rowntree's 1914 estimate for the maintenance of 
the standard family at 'a modest level of comfort' as being 61 s. 8 V4d. 24 Even 
though this estimate has been contested by other authors, the differential between 
this and the average wage of female homeworkers is sufficiently wide enough to 
justify Cole's claim. 
Undertaking any form of employment that necessitated child-care also became 
more difficult to contemplate as the day nurseries which were opened in the war 
shut once it had ended.25 Moreover, after the war, women were once again 
forced back into their more traditional forms of occupation which was to have an 
effect on the wages they received.26 Even though there were to be new openings 
later for women to work, for example, in the civil service and within light 
engineering companies, this would not have benefited many women except for 
those who were single and living in the South or the Midlands. 
Evidence of the deteriorating circumstances of lone mother families was 
confirmed in a poverty survey by Bowley and Hogg in the mid 1920s when they 
discovered alarming numbers of children in poverty. They found that one of the 
main causes of poverty, apart from insufficient wages, was the absence of a male 
head of household.27 But having said that, it has to be remembered that then, as 
now. the recession did not affect the country evenly. It was the old, traditional 
industrial areas which were most severely hit. Thus, where a woman lived also 
atfected her chances of finding work and escaping poverty. 
23 1939, p.3. 
2-i 1986 edition, p.372. 
25 Lc\\ is, 1984, p.35. 
26 See. for example, Lewis in Gloversmith, 1980, p.212. 
27 Cited in Thane, 1982, p.167. 
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National insurance schemes at the beginning of this period were based on the 
assumption that women were dependent on a male breadwinner. However, as 
the interwar years progressed and governments tinkered with these schemes, in 
order to reduce expenditure by making access to them more difficult,28 women 
were badly affected. Although governments were able to get away with this 
because the ideology that women should be full-time housewives underwent a 
revival during the interwar years,29 many of the reforms to insurance based 
schemes must have had dire consequences on those lone mothers who had been 
lucky enough to have paid contributions. This, clearly, did little to help them 
become self-supporting. For example, the not genuinely seeking work test, 
which was intentionally aimed at female claimants,30 must have had a 
particularly severe impact on some lone mother families. The introduction of the 
means test in 1922 must also have been extremely detrimental to their efforts to 
maintain themselves and their children, especially as such women had 
traditionally taken in lodgers to supplement their income. But having said that, 
the number of women affected by these measures was probably fairly small as 
many would have still been excluded from insurance schemes. 
All these difficulties probably meant that many lone mothers had little choice but 
to resort to the Poor Law. Although outdoor relief became more common during 
the 1920s, because it was cheaper and there were more Labour controlled 
guardians, many lone mothers were still only offered the workhouse. Those 
fortunate enough to have been spared this had to manage on reduced levels of 
outrelief as the 1920s wore on. The responsibility for poor relief was taken over 
by the Ministry of Health in 1918~ by the late 1920s, central government exerted 
its powers to reduce local expenditure. Indeed, then as now, governments were 
anxious to reduce the powers of local boards of guardians, and later local 
authorities. especially after the massive increase in expenditure on poor relief. 
2R Deacon. 1976. p.54. 
~l) For a more detailed discussion see Giles, 1995, p.4-p.5. 
30 Deacon. 1976. p.24. 
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which soared from £173 million in 1919 to £332 million in 1921.31 They also 
wanted to keep a tighter hold on local finances during the remainder of the 
period because grants from central government grew from 30% in 1920 to 40% 
by 1939.32 
iii) Making the Father Pay After 1921 
The above has shown that there was a demonstrable need to do something, if not 
on behalf of lone mother families, then to prevent them from becoming a burden 
on the community. Therefore, the NCFUM&HC, some women's organisations, 
and societies such as the Salvation Army, continued to draft Bills in the early 
1920s. Their initial efforts failed when Bills presented to Parliament by Neville 
Chamberlain and Captain Bowyer were rejected. By 1923, however, the 
stalemate had ended. After that date the government was quite prepared to pass 
legislation that attempted to ensure that lone mothers received maintenance or 
affiliation payments. After all, as table 4.1 shows, there had been huge increase 
in the numbers receiving relief: 
Table 4.1: The numbers in receipt of Poor Law relief on the last week of 
March from 1919-1923. 
1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 
465,378 494,322 653,517 1,465,599 1,345,634 
Source: Ministry of Health, 1930, p.161. 
This change of heart also followed an increase in the numbers being taken to 
court by the Poor Law guardians for neglecting to maintain their families. 
Although it is not known how many were separated or putative fathers, there had 
been an increase from an annual average of 1,095 between 1915 and 1919. to 
2.125 between 1920 and 1924.33 
31 Drage. 1930. 
32 Crowther. 1988. p.4 7. 
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Following a change of government, which brought in the Conservatives with 
Chamberlain as Minister of Health, the first Act to reinforce the duty of putative 
fathers was introduced in 1923. By this time, the government was more 
amenable to increasing the maximum limit than the Liberal's had been in 1918. 
However. they continued to resist the idea that children should be legitimised by 
their parents subsequent marriage until 1926, by which time the most significant 
remnants of the system of feudal land tenure had been removed by the Law of 
Property Acts in 1922-1925. Even though Bowyer had dropped many of the 
most contentious clauses in his earlier Bills, others remained which the 
government could still not accept. For example, it still would not accept the 
clause which would make the Clerk to the Justices the collecting officer. This 
may well have been because of the higher cost of employing highly trained 
officers. The government therefore temporarily blocked the Bill, until Bowyer 
agreed to drop this particular clause.34 The Bastardy Act of 1923 was, therefore, 
a much more diluted piece of legislation than its instigators had intended: the 
limits on orders were only raised to 20/- a week; a slight improvement was made 
in regard to the issue summonses; and orders secured by boards of guardians 
became transferable, for the first time, to the mother when the child ceased to be 
chargeable. Finally, the Act also extended the provision under the Affiliation 
Orders Act of 1914, whereby fathers had to inform the collecting officer of any 
change of address. Under the new Act, putative fathers also had inform the 
mother, or anyone to whom the order was payable, of any change in his address. 
Legislation affecting separated and deserted WIves during the early 1920s 
followed a very similar course. However, changes to reinforce the financial duty 
of fathers who were separated from their wives took longer to come about. The 
tirst Bill to be presented in parliament in 1922 by Robert Newman, (the 
Separation and Maintenance Orders Bill), failed because many of the clauses 
were too controversial. For example, there were particular objections to the 
provision which would have enabled a court to grant a maintenance order while 
the couple were still living together. So, while governments were by then 
.1-' Home Office, 1947. 
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prepared to accept any legislation that might possibly make more fathers pay. 
they were not prepared to consider any reform which would have unbalanced the 
relationship between men and women within marriage. With reference to this 
particular clause, Hugh Godely at the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel wrote 
that it was a 
preposterous Bill which, like many other Bills promoted by the 
women's societies, under the pretence of removing slight inequalities 
between the sexes, strike at the very foundations of domestic 
felicity.35 
Another clause, which would have given magistrates the power to attach wages, 
also aroused controversy. However, as Baldwin's Conservative government was 
now in power and was anxious to make fathers pay, they drafted their own Bill 
leaving out the contentious clauses. Although they also supported the attachment 
of wages and pensions, they were reluctant to provide for this because of the fear 
of opposition from the Labour Party,36 and the Treasury's objection to any 
proposal that crown pensions and salaries may become attachable.37 Although 
this Bill was passed by both Houses of Parliament, it initially failed to receive 
royal assent because of the sudden dissolution of Parliament in 1924. By 1925, 
when the Conservatives were back in power again, the Summary Jurisdiction 
(Separation and Maintenance) Act was finally passed. 
It is interesting to note that most of the clauses in the Act were potentially money 
saving devices. The first of these provided for the partial continuance of an order 
for the benefit of children if the original order was discharged on the grounds of 
the wife's subsequent adultery. Up until this point in time if the separated wife 
committed adultery, the husband had been able to discharge the whole of the 
order. The new Act also stipulated that a husband could not discharge an order if 
he had conduced his wife to commit adultery through failing to pay her 
-'" Justice althe Peace, 13 January, 1923. 
-,:, Letter to Sir Emley Blackwell, 27 June, 1922, PRO H0451I 1936. 
-'h See Letter trom Blackwell of the Home Office to the Chief Magistrate, 21 July 1922, PRO 
H045/11936. 
37 Letter trom the Treasury to the Home Office, 22 September, 1922, PRO H045111936. 
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maintenance. Finally, the Act empowered courts to enforce orders through the 
application of the relevant bastardy legislation. This meant that, for example, 
fathers were obliged to inform the collecting officer and the person to whom the 
order was payable of any change in his address. The collecting officer also now 
had the power to inform the wife if payments had fallen into arrears. Moreover, 
if orders continued to be unpaid, magistrates could resort to the strict measures of 
distress and/or imprisonment under bastardy legislation. 
In summary, it seems that although the impact of World War 1 was largely 
responsible for intensifying demands to make better provision for the 
enforcement of maintenance and affiliation orders, these reforms may not have 
come about if economic recession had not set in. The attempt to make fathers 
pay in the early to mid 1920s reflected other legislation which was designed to 
save either local or national expenditure. As Crowther has pointed out: 
The one factor that unites historians in explaining the events of these 
years is the growth of the Treasury's control and the strength of the 
Treasury's view on economical government.38 
iv) The Economic, Social and Political Motivations for Reform 
Clearly, the measures that were eventually passed to reform affiliation and 
maintenance laws did not go any where near as far as the Child Support Act in 
1991. Although, if the campaigners had got their way, they would have done. 
This was partly because the Conservative Party in the interwar years was quite 
'macho'. Jarvis has argued that 'the contrast between Conservative Party 
institutions and the stereotype of macho, union-dominated Labour organisations 
may have been less stark than previously implied'.39 The Conservatives were 
also as reluctant as the Liberals had been to pass any measure that would increase 
state expenditure, particularly if this meant more men being sent to prison. This 
worry \vas confirmed by the Secretary of State for the Home Office. When he 
3X Crowther, 1988, p.38. 
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v.as under intense pressure to reform the bastardy laws In 1920, he said he 
wanted to ensure 
that an intolerable burden is not placed upon the putative father 
which will only make him a gaol bird.4o 
However, the Acts passed in 1923 and 1925 did demonstrate that, when faced 
with the economic crisis, the government was prepared to go further to make 
fathers pay than perhaps they would have done in different circumstances. By 
this time, most of the organisations lobbying for change sought to bring about 
reform by approaching the problem from an individualist perspective. The 
guiding principle of the NUFUM&HC was 'to inculcate a higher standard of 
morality by making the father of an illegitimate child feel his responsibility'.41 
This meant that in most respects the NCFUM&HC were on the same side as the 
majority of politicians and civil servants who, after their initial reluctance in the 
years immediately after the ending of the war, were happy to find ways of hiving 
the responsibility of lone mothers onto individual fathers. This also probably 
explains why this particular organisation was able to gain the support of Neville 
Chamberlain and, thus, a foothold in the corridors of power. Moreover, their 
long-term policy, which aimed to solve the 'problem' of illegitimacy by educating 
the young 'of the laws of health, of cleanliness of body and mind, of self-control 
and of one's duty towards one's neighbour',42 also reflected the dominant 
ideology of the time. As did their insistence 'not to give doles, but to assist the 
unmarried mother in meeting her difficulties and to support herself and her 
child':u 
The government may also have felt that it needed to be seen to be taking action 
that would reinforce the duty of fathers. The measures introduced in 1914 had 
partly come about to counter-act claims that some of the Liberal welfare reforms, 
39 Jarvis, 1996, p. I 88. 
·w Minutes on file dated 27 April 1920,PRO H045/11540. 
41 NCFUM&HC, 192 I, p.4. 
4~ Ibid. 
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such as the introduction of schools meals in 1908, would diminish paternal 
responsibility. By 1918, following the introduction of the Maternity and Child 
Welfare Act, there was a danger of re-igniting this fear. Under this Act, local 
authorities were given the power to provide, among other things, maternity 
homes, medical and nursing assistance, and food for expectant mothers and 
young children in general. In relation to lone mothers, it also extended the scope 
of grant earning expenditure for homes for unmarried mothers, and homes for 
'the children of widowed and deserted mothers and for illegitimate children.'44 
Because this may have been interpreted as the state taking over the duty of 
fathers, reforms to bastardy and maintenance laws may also have served to 
emphasise that: 
Governments did not want to interfere with prevailing patterns of 
responsibility thus reducing the dependency of wives on husbands 
and children on parents.45 
Finally, the government's implementation of stricter measures to make fathers 
pay may have also been a response to the growing sympathy that some felt 
towards the illegitimate child and those unmarried mothers who were seen as 
'respectable'. By the early 1920s, even the media seemed to have softened its 
approach, at least towards illegitimate children: 
Whether we like it or not, illegitimate children are in the aggregate a 
numerous class; and whatever we think of the conduct of the parents, 
we have no right to visit it on the offspring.46 
This change of heart probably reflected the long-term impact of the infant 
welfare movement. The concern to improve the lot of illegitimate children had 
also become an international phenomenon. At the first General Congress on 
Child Welfare, held in Geneva in 1925, of which Neville Chamberlain was a 
patron, ways of protecting illegitimate children were considered. Delegates 
-13 Ibid., 1923, p.8-p.9. 
-1-1 Clarke, 1935, p.398-p.399. 
-I~ Land, 1975, p.2n. 
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decided that 'as a rule mothers should themselves have charge of their children. 
and that the tie between mother and child should be preserved'. 47 To achieve 
this end they recommended that 
steps should be taken to establish paternity and to compel the father 
to pay towards the support of the child.48 
The change in attitude towards some unmarried mothers, which had begun in the 
first decade in the century, was also to reach new heights in the interwar years. 
As a result, they became more rigorously 'graded'. 'Dangerous' mothers, that is, 
those with more than one illegitimate child, were confined to the workhouse 
where they were separated from their 'dangerous' children. 'Retrievable'mothers 
were placed in charitable institutions, where they were allowed to keep their 
children, and where they were taught a trade.49 
Therefore, many factors played a part in bringing about the policies that were 
adopted to make fathers pay. Indeed, the measures passed were well suited to the 
financial and ideological climate in the early 1920s, even though many 
politicians and civil servants may have had little faith in their ability to achieve 
the primary goal of reducing central and local expenditure on lone mother 
families. After all, before the reforms were introduced in 1923 and 1925, the 
Home Office had been warned by numerous authorities of the 'wasted 
expenditure of money and time in enforcing affiliation and maintenance orders 
, :;() 
\') The Beginning of the End 
Between 1925 and 1930, there was a shift away from policies to make fathers 
pay. Instead, alternative solutions were sought which aimed to prevent lone 
~6 D(/i~l' Chronicle, 8 May 1920. 
47 ED1I21t53. 
~s Ibid. 
~l) Reeves. 1993, pA18. 
123 
mothers from becoming a charge on the community. Having met some of the 
demands of those campaigning on their behalf, it was now the tum of the 
Conservative Government to implement those measures which it believed would 
be far more effective. 
Governments had been expending greater efforts into devising what they 
believed would be more practical, and cheaper, ways out of the problem since 
1920. This became reflected in the legislation passed from the mid 1920s: a 
mother could appoint a guardian in the event of her death from 1925; adoption 
was legalised in 1926; and, illegitimate children could be legitimised by their 
parents subsequent marriage after 1926. 
Legalising adoption was clearly seen by many policy makers as having the 
potential to reduce drastically the numbers of illegitimate children being 
maintained by the parish. The following comment to the Adoption Committee in 
1921 was typical of those who supported this action: 
Any measure which will induce people of a suitable type to offer to 
adopt children would be .,. a relief to the ratepayers.51 
The authors of the report said that 
it is worth mentioning that the cost of bringing up and suitably 
maintaining a child at home may be very much less than the sum 
required for its maintenance in an institution. 52 
Once the legislation was enacted, it soon proved itself to be a far more effective 
solution to the problem than making the father pay - after 1926 the numbers of 
children adopted 'increased without interruption'. In the 1930s between two and 
three thousand adoptions were taking place each year. 53 Moreover, the majority 
50 PRO H045117927. 
5 I Clerk to the Guardians of Southwark, cited in Report of the Committee of Child Adoption, 
19~ I, p.48. 
~2 Report of the Committee on Child Adoption, 1921, p.5. 
\1 Humphries and Gordon, 1994, p.170. 
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of children being adopted were illegitimate.54 This was despite the earlier 
warning. made by the Associated Societies for the Care and Maintenance of 
Chi Id. who claimed that: 
No system of adoption can, to any appreciable degree, help the 
number of illegitimate children to be dealt with, because only a 
negligible proportion of these children are suitable for 'adopters' who 
naturally only wish to adopt the healthy child, with, as far as 
possible, a good family record. 55 
This was the organisation which had drafted the Adoption Bill in the first place. 
Although its aim had been to prevent the abuse of children who were being 
unofficially adopted, the government hijacked this reform for other purposes. 
Had the latter wanted to safeguard children it would also have included a clause 
banning 'irregular' adoptions, which it did not. And, had legal adoption not been 
introduced for financial reasons, the Government would surely have wanted to 
ensure that illegitimate children were only adopted in cases of extreme necessity, 
but this also did not happen. Indeed, few women's groups wanted to see 
adoption encouraged because of their belief that mother and child should be kept 
together. The NCFUM&HC also refused to support this legislation for the same 
reason. They were only prepared to see illegitimate children adopted in very rare 
instances, such as in cases where a husband would be willing to take his wife 
back if she had given birth to an illegitimate child. 56 
In contrast to the government's eagerness to implement this reform, by the later 
years of the 1920s it was steadfastly refusing to consider any new measures to 
make fathers pay. Hence, Viscount Astor's Bastardy Bill, drafted by the 
NCFUM&HC, met a cold reception in Parliament in 1927. The main clauses 
\\ere as follows: fathers should pay towards the support of the mother during the 
later months of pregnancy; orders should be allowed against a father for 
pregnancy and confinement expenses if the child is born dead; and, that power 
should be given to the child's guardian or a board of guardians to secure an 
~..j Repol1 of the Departmental Committee on Adoption Societies and Agencies, 1937, p.3-p.4. 
55 Letter from the Association to the Home Office, 13 July 1921, PRO H045 / 11540. 
'h NCFlJM&HC, 1921. p.7. 
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affiliation order in spite of the fact that the insanity or death of the mother made 
it impossible for her evidence to be heard in court proceedings. Although the 
government argued that its main objection to the Bill was that it introduced a 
new principle - if the father was to pay for the mother's pregnancy expenses, he 
would be paying maintenance for a woman who was neither his wife nor a 
relativeS? - it does seem more likely that it rejected the Bill because it no longer 
had any faith in this approach. 
This was despite the fact that the financial burden on ratepayers looked set to 
increase following the passing of the Mental Deficiency Act of the same year.58 
Under this legislation, women 'in receipt of poor relief at the time of giving birth 
to an illegitimate child or pregnant with such child' could be referred to local 
Mental Deficiency Committees. As members of these committees could then 
order such women to be sent to an institution for 'defectives', where they would 
be provided with special accommodation,59 ratepayers were faced with the 
prospect of having to find further money because this would cost more than 
keeping them in the workhouse or providing outdoor relief. Moreover, the 
expense of such women would have increased because once detained in one of 
these institutions, they would have been unable to contribute towards their child's 
maintenance through paid employment. 
During the deepening financial crisis after 1929, the government continued to 
find alternative methods to deal with lone mothers. By this time, it was even 
prepared to overlook one of the most basic principles that had always 
underpi nned the provision of poor relief to lone mothers, that is, that they should 
only be offered the workhouse. In 1930 the Ministry of Health issued a Circular 
stating that it 
does not contemplate that the grant of unconditional outdoor relief in 
I ieu of institutional or conditional outdoor relief shall involve a 
57 NCFUM&HC, 1928, p.1 O. 
58 See Lewis. 1984, p.65 for more details on the Mental Deficiency Act. 
:ill NCFUM&HC, 1933. p.22-p.23. 
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report ... of the Order to the Minister where the relief is given to an 
able-bodied women.60 
Even though many lone mothers probably welcomed this change, the government 
was criticised for allowing it. Despite the authors of the Report on Local 
Expenditure forecasting a budget deficit of £120m and insisting on reductions in 
local expenditure in particular, they firmly believed that the responsibility of 
liable relatives should be more strictly enforced and that those seeking relief 
should at least enter the workhouse for a specified period.61 However, this 
argument was rejected for the simple reason that permitting lone mothers out-
relief was one of the few measures that could be successfully employed to cut 
this cost. This was because outdoor relief was much cheaper than institutional 
relief, despite the widespread fear, in common with the present day, that: 
There is a grave danger of a permanent pauper class growing up, ... 
and rearing families at the expense of ratepayers, and whilst the 
difficulties of finding employment at the present time must always be 
remembered it certainly seems that this problem should be carefully 
examined from all aspects.62 
In view of the heavy financial constraints that the government was under, it may 
seem somewhat surprising that under the Poor Law Act of 1930, and the Public 
Health Act of 1936, both the Labour and National governments continued to pay 
grants for the maintenance of 'needy and destitute pregnant mothers', in 'suitable 
cases' in voluntary homes. However, as even the NCFUM&HC noted, this was 
probably an economic rather than a humanitarian gesture.63 It was obviously 
more cost effective for the government to subsidise charitable organisations, 
rather than burden ratepayers with the entire cost by keeping these women in the 
workhouse. Moreover, unmarried mothers provided these homes with cheap 
domestic labour.64 They may even have helped them to run at a profit by, for 
()(l Ministry of Health, 1930, Statutory Rules and Orders, No. 185. 
61 Committee on Local Expenditure, 1932. p.118. 
f>2 Ibid .. p.116-p.117. 
63 NCIUM&HC, 1935, p.30-p.3l. 
6-1 Middleton, 1971, p.280. 
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example, growing flowers and vegetables which could be sold at local markets. 
Howe\er, the government did refuse to continue contributing to capital 
expenditure on voluntary homes.65 
To conclude this section, it can be argued that the period from 1925 to 1930 was 
marked by government attempts to seek other solutions to the problem of 
maintaining lone mother families. Having reluctantly conceded to pressure 
groups in the first place, governments then took the opportunity to save 
expenditure by finding other individuals to take on the responsibility of these 
families. As part of a much larger process to de-institutionalise welfare, 
adoption and legitimacy legislation, was driven by the determination to cut costs. 
So too were the provisions under which lone mothers were permitted to receive 
outrelief even though this meant abandoning some basic Poor Law principles. 
vi) The Failure of Attempts to Make Fathers Pay 
As the following table shows, the numbers of men going to prison for non-
payment of maintenance and affiliation orders increased dramatically in the 
interwar years. The fact that the numbers of imprisonments almost doubled 
those for the years from 1910 to 1914 was quite remarkable, given that the prison 
population as a whole had diminished since the beginning of the century - the 
daily average of prisoners had fallen from 14,352 in 1913 to 7,938 in 1929.66 
This decline was not, however, due to a decrease in crime but instead was largely 
due to the use of other methods of punishment such as fines and probation, for 
example.67 
65 NCFUM&HC, 1936, p.17. 
06 Mullins. 1932. April 23, p.268. 
()7 Ib 'd 168 I .• p._ . 
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Table 4.2: Imprisonments during the years 1910-1932 
Total Non-payments Non-payments 
Year Imprisonments due to Affiliation due to Wife 
Apart from Orders Maintenance 
Remand and Orders 
Trial Prisoners 
1910 187,008 1,851 2,294 
1911 177,116 1,737 2,176 
1912 172,237 1,639 2,177 
1913 154,157 1,378 2,176 
1914 131,187 1,285 2,323 
1915 71,353 468 1,199 
1916 54,516 308 1,073 
1917 43,040 269 926 
1918 33,155 159 772 
1919 37,152 435 1,268 
1920 49,505 862 2,290 
1921 55,848 1,761 3,622 
1922 61,033 Figures not available 
1923 59,573 3,049 3,998 
1924 55,723 2,636 3,545 
1925 54,451 2,508 3,631 
1926 56,439 2,380, 3,655 
1927 56,208 2,761 3,998 
1928 54,146 2,908 4,148 
1929 50,043 2,691 4,188 
1930 52,432 2,540 4,238 
1931 50,598 2,474 4,089 
1932 53,150 2,435 3,648 
Source: Report of the Departmental Committee on the Imprisonment by Courts 
of Summary Jurisdiction in Default of Payment of Fines and other Sums of 
Money, 1934, Appendix 2, (Compiled by the authors from the Annual Volumes 
of Criminal Statistics and the Prison Commissioners Annual Reports). 
The increase in the numbers sent to prison from the early 1920s, for defaulting 
on maintenance orders, can also not be explained by the increase in the numbers 
of orders granted: immediately before the War, about 7000-8000 new orders 
\\cre made each year: since the War, the number was in no year less that 8,700 
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and in some years exceeded 11,000.68 Obviously, the increase in the numbers 
being sent to prison proportionately outstripped the increase in the number of 
orders granted This situation also applied to affiliation orders. Although yearly 
figures for the number of affiliation orders granted before the War are not 
available, Table 4.3 shows that in 1913, 6,914 bastardy orders were made in 
courts of summary jurisdiction, and as this was similar to the figure for 1906 it is 
probably safe to assume that 1913 was fairly representative year for the pre-war 
figures. As the numbers imprisoned in 1913 were 1,378, while 2,636 were 
imprisoned in 1924 - a year in which the number of orders made was almost 
exactly the same as in 1913 - it is reasonable to assume that the ratio of putative 
fathers being sent to prison also far exceeded the increase in the numbers of 
orders made. Commentators at the time also reached this conc1usion.69 
Table 4.3: Bastardy and maintenance applications and orders granted, 
1906-1933 
Year Bastardy Maintenance 
A1!.PJications * Orders Applications* Orders 
1906 8,270 6,523 10,972 7,268 
1913 8,582 6,914 11,369 7,959 
1920 11,851 9,801 16,545 11,602 
1921 10,992 9,065 13,244 9,469 
1922 9,975 8,056 12,751 8,831 
1923 8,849 7,075 12,738 8,740 
1924 8,646 6,919 12,738 8,910 
1925 8,044 6,543 13,353 9,566 
1926 7,995 6,558 13,966 9,941 
1927 7,988 6,570 14,263 10,389 
1928 7,800 6,395 15,210 11,197 
1929 7,790 6,289 15,584 11,244 
1930 7,758 6,164 15,991 11,296 
1931 7,438 6,001 14,916 10.705 
1932 7,046 5,716 13,616 9,719 
1933 6,527 5,353 13,603 9.718 
Source: Report of the Departmental CommIttee on the Social ServIces In the 
Courts of Summary Jurisdiction (1936), Appendix II, p.152. 
*'Applications' meant 'summonses heard'. 
68 linwin, 1935, p.1. 
69 See. for example. Unwin, 1935. p.2-p.3: Mullins, 1932. p.268. 
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These statistics had already aroused the concern of the government by the early 
1930s and not least because of the expenditure required to keep men in prison. 
Viscount Sankey, the Lord Chancellor in 1932, told members of the House of 
Lords 
The estimated annual cost of a prisoner - that is, the amount 
expended on staff and maintenance charges, less the estimated value 
of prison labour - is £44 8s. 9d., and therefore the ... aggregate cost 
of 1,350 persons [is] about £60,000. 70 
In a similar statement made on 10 September 1932, the Under Secretary of State 
for the Home Office called for a reduction in the number of imprisonments 
because it 'would be valuable on the grounds of economy'. He therefore set up a 
committee, with Fischer Williams K.C. as it chairman, to investigate this issue 
and make recommendations that would reduce the numbers of men being sent to 
pnson. 
The main conclusion of the Committee was that in the majority of cases men 
were being unfairly sent to prison: 
Amongst the men sent to prison for default under affiliation or 
maintenance orders are some whose failure to make any payment is 
wilful and deliberate. Some men ordered to pay under affiliation 
orders deny responsibility and go to prison as a protest. Some men 
ordered to pay under affiliation and maintenance orders leave the 
district and may for some time evade detection by the police. These 
defaulters, however, account for only a small number of the men sent 
to prison. The majority are not unwilling to pay something, but fail 
to pay regularly the amount ordered by the court. At the time when 
they are sent to prison, they are unable to pay the arrears which have 
accumulated, but they might have paid the sum due, or at any rate a 
part of it, if they had made more effort in the past.7) 
While the authors of the Report partly blamed the men themselves for letting 
arrears accumulate - 'of most of the defaulters it may be assumed that their will to 
70 HOllse of Lords, 6 December 1932, co1.219. 
71 Fischer Williams Committee, 1934, p.12. 
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meet their obligations and to economIse for the purpose is weaker than the 
average' - they largely blamed the 'system' for not taking 'sufficient account of 
human weakness and human habits'.72 Although this would suggest that they 
needed to find ways of making these men pay, the Committee focused its 
attention instead on finding weaknesses in the administration of the existing 
maintenance and bastardy legislation. This was, after all, what the government 
had instructed them to do, for the Committee had been told to: 
Review the eXIstlng law relating to the enforcement ... of wife 
maintenance and affiliation orders ... and to consider whether any 
changes in the law or in the methods of administration it is possible 
to reduce the number of imprisonments in default of payment, due 
regard being given to the importance of securing compliance with 
orders made by the CourtS.73 
Taking this as their remit, the Committee claimed that Courts of Summary 
Jurisdiction were making decisions without taking all the circumstances of the 
parties into account. 74 They were also critical of those courts which had failed to 
appoint collecting officers, and of those that had, they were accused of not doing 
enough to ensure that orders did not fall into arrears. 75. Collecting officers were 
also blamed for failing to keep men informed of their right to apply to have an 
order varied if they had 'fresh evidence' to show that their circumstances had 
changed. 76 Finally, the authors of the Report objected to the tendency of 
magistrates to prescribe a definite scale of payments. Apparently, many 
magistrates had adopted the practice of the Divorce Court by which, in the case 
of maintenance orders, they were granting women one-third of their husbands 
income with some addition for the children. They therefore wanted Courts to 
exercise far more discretion when assessing the amount to paid. 77 (This is a 
pertinent example of history repeating itself - the strict formula for assessing 
72 Ibid., p.13. 
73 Ibid., p.1. 
74 Ibid., p.IS. 
7~ Ib'd '"' . I., p .... t.). 
7(-' Ibid., p.-+5. 
77 Ibid., p.40. 
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payments under the current Child Support Act has already had to be modified to 
take into account the needs of men, on an individual basis, in order to increase 
the chances of them paying). 
As a result of their condemnation of the 'system' the main recommendations of 
the Fischer Williams Committee were as follows: 
I. the weekly amount payable shall be fixed at a proper sum 
having regard to the means, age and circumstances of the 
parties concerned; 
11. the amount shall be adjusted from time to time and with as 
little delay as possible to the variations in the means and 
circumstances of the parties; 
111. proceedings for the enforcement shall be taken promptly with a 
view to preventing the accumulation of large arrears; 
IV. when nevertheless arrears have accumulated the Court shall 
have full discretion to excuse the whole or part of them for 
sufficient cause and that not more that two years arrears shall 
in any case be recoverable; 
v. commitments to prison for failure to pay the sums ordered shall 
only be permissible if the Court after consideration and enquiry 
is satisfied that the failure is due to wilful default or culpable 
neglect; and 
VI. if a man wilfully defaults the Court shall have power in proper 
cases to order that the amount payable shall be deductible from 
his income at source.78 
In order to achieve the above the Committee insisted that Investigating Officers 
should be appointed by the Courts. Although they recognised that this would 
incur extra expenditure by the government, whose priority was to save money, 
the authors insisted that as such expenditure would result in a more efficient 
administration and, thus, a reduction in the numbers imprisoned. It would. 
therefore, have the long-term effect of saving public moneyJ9 
n Ibid., p.64. 
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Members of the Fischer Williams Committee were not the only commentators to 
argue that men were being unjustly sent to prison, In 1935 Unwin, for example. 
conducted his own research to find out why such large numbers of non-resident 
fathers were being sent to prison and reached the same conclusion, After 
interviewing 498 such prisoners he concluded that only one-sixth of men 
imprisoned for failing to pay wife maintenance had intentionally defaulted,80 Of 
the remaining men, he stated that they 
were not the creators but the victims of their circumstances ' .. their 
imprisonment was due to the fact that the prevailing legal process is 
defective. 81 
Of the 57 men that Unwin interviewed who were imprisoned under the bastardy 
laws, he found that only 9 of them were guilty of intentionally not paying.82 
The findings of the Fischer Williams Committee provided the government with 
the ammunition it needed to prevent magistrates sending so many men to prison. 
This led to the passing of the Money Payments (Justices Procedure) Act in 1935. 
Although the Act dealt mainly with those failing to pay fines and rates - the 
numbers of such cases had also increased in the interwar years - as far as 
maintenance and affiliation proceedings were concerned, the main change was to 
give the court the power to excuse part of any arrears. Courts were also 
empowered to vary orders without 'fresh evidence' and were obliged to make 
enquiries in the defendant's presence as to whether his failure to pay was due to 
wilful refusal. If it was not, courts were no longer allowed to send such men to 
prison. 83 The Act came into operation on 1st January 1936 and, as the following 
table shows, there was a substantial decrease in the numbers of non-resident 
fathers being sent to prison after that date. 
79 Ib'd 87 I '. p. _. 
80 Unwin, 1935. p.57. 
81 Ibid .. p.60. 
82 Ibid .. 1.t6. 
8.1 For a more detailed account see, Home Office Memorandum on the Provisions of the ~toney 
Payments (J liSt ices Procedure) Act, PRO LC02111.f 7. 
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Table 4.4 : Numbers of imprisonments for failure to pay affiliation and 
maintenance orders between 1935-1938. 
Year For Failure to Pay under Wife For Failure to Pay under 
Maintenance Orders Affiliation Orders 
1935 2,271 1,284 
1936 1,828 850 
1937 1,993 835 
1938 2,094 833 
Source: Home Office, 1938, p.XIX. 
It has already been suggested that the primary aim of the government was to 
reduce the burden on tax-payers of sending these men to prison. This was a fact 
that was never denied. However, the argument that too many men were being 
sent to prison unjustly because of inadequacies in the legislation and 
administration of orders is a little dubious. The fact that many of the clauses in 
the Act had already been implemented in earlier legislation suggests that it is 
better interpreted as the government's abandonment of its efforts to make fathers 
pay. After all, politicians and civil servants had never had much faith in this 
approach as a solution to the problem and had predicted that more men would be 
imprisoned as a result of the legislation passed in the early 1920s. By blaming 
the administration and legislation, the government was able to avoid having to 
openly admit that making fathers pay is doomed to failure. Even if they had been 
prepared to finance the huge administrative costs involved the exercise would 
have been self-defeating given that absent fathers then, as now, were by and large 
unable to fully support the families they had created. 
Writing in the same year that the Act was passed, the Chief Magistrate, Claud 
Mullins denied that courts were sentencing men to prison whether or not their 
failure to pay was wilful. He argued that it was important to realise that before 
1935 courts were not bound to enforce arrears: 
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The idea exists in some places that when arrears have reached a 
certain amount, courts have no alternative but to order the 
imprisonment of the defaulter. This is utterly wrong. Even with our 
present law there is nothing to prevent courts from making it a 
general rule that they will only order husbands to prison if they are 
convinced that their failure to pay has been wilful. 84 
The clause by which magistrates were to conduct an inquiry into the means of the 
parties was also not new. Under Section 5 of the Criminal Justice 
Administration Act, 1914, provision had been made that Courts of Summary 
Jurisdiction 'in fixing the amount of any fine ... shall take into consideration, 
amongst other things, the means of the offender so far as they appear or are 
known to the court'. 85 This was precisely why the number of such 
imprisonments went down after 1914. As far as affiliation orders are concerned, 
magistrates had already been empowered to use their discretion: since 1872, 
under Section 4 of the Bastardy Laws Amendment Act they were instructed to 
send men to prison only 'if they see fit'. Under Section 1 of the 1914 Affiliation 
Orders Act, collecting officers were required to give notice in writing to the 
person who had been granted an order if payments were in arrears after seven 
days. Although some courts had failed to appoint collecting officers by the mid-
1930s, and the Fischer Williams Committee had recommended that the 1935 Act 
should provide for the appointment of investigating officers in all courts, the fact 
that no such provision was made, also points to the governments lack of will to 
see that justice was being done. Nor did the government accept the 
recommendation that wages should be attached. This is interesting to note, for it 
was argued at the time that far fewer Scottish men were imprisoned for failure to 
pay because under Scottish law a man's wages could be attached. 86 
I f the imprisonment in Scotland were in the same proportion to the 
number of orders made as in England, the actual number would be 
rather over 500 instead of 15.87 
84 Mullins, 1935, p.116-p.117. 
85 PRO LC02/11~7. 
86 This argument is somewhat dubious because research has never indicated this to be a vel") 
effective means of making fathers pay. For its effectiveness in the 1990s see chapter five. 
87 Report of Fischer Williams Committee, 1934, p. 37. 
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However, in a secret memo, written by the Home Secretary to the Cabinet. he 
claimed that: 
To this proposal the Labour Party would, I understand, feel bound to 
object because it involves the principle of attachment of wages. 88 
However. as the Labour Party was split and very weak by 1935, this excuse is not 
particularly convincing. In contrast, the Home Office's desire to protect fathers 
remained as strong as ever because of the belief that: 
There is a tendency for the Courts; having regard to the hardship of 
the woman's position, to take insufficient account of the man's 
means. 89 
As the media was also extremely hostile to lone mothers by this point in time, the 
government could not have contemplated the introduction of attachments to 
wages anyway. The following extract from The News of the World, illustrated 
this clearly: 
Those intimately associated with the working of the legal machine in 
the police courts are satisfied that the application immediately of the 
principles embodied in the Money Payments Act ... will substantially 
reduce the scandals connected with separation orders ... It is certain 
that many - if not most - of those imprisonments have been secured 
by what a well-known magistrate has described as "malicious spite 
on the part of the wives" ... In the vast majority of cases of default 
brought before the courts the defaulters have been harried and hunted 
by disgruntled or jealous wives ... 90 
It would therefore seem that the Money Payments (Justices Procedure) Act was 
largely about tinkering with existing measures for the sole purpose of getting 
men out of prison. However, although the Act was principally a cost cutting 
de\ise it was also shaped by political and ideological considerations. At the end 
88 Memo dated 27 February, 1935, PRO H045117094. 
89 H.O. memo, 8 November 1935. PRO H045117094. 
90 \ell's o{the lIorld, 17 November 1935. 
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of the day, the Act was constructed to conceal the fact that it was more difficult 
for men to pay in times of high unemployment. It was also designed to avoid any 
further state expenditure on the administration of orders, and, finally, it was 
crafted in such a way so as to avoid controversy by upsetting other political 
parties or the press. 
Some commentators at the time were argumg that there was a correlation 
between unemployment and imprisonment. As Mullins pointed out: 
in 1915 (when trade was good and the unemployment percentage 
was 1.1), 1,119 husbands were committed to prison; in 1918 (when 
the unemployment percentage was 0.8) the committals were 772; in 
1923 (when the unemployment percentage was 11.7) the number was 
3,998, and in 1931 (unemployment 21.3) it was 4,089.91 
Even though it could be argued that the 'system' was responsible for these 
statistics, this seems a little far-fetched. While many absent fathers may have 
failed to have their orders varied when they became unemployed, this does not 
entirely explain why more should have been sentenced to prison. As previously 
noted, prior to the 1935 Act, magistrates already had the power to use their 
discretion and only send men to prison if they thought that they were deliberately 
refusing to pay. It would, therefore, seem that some alternative explanation is 
needed to explain this phenomenon. Perhaps it can be hypothesized that even if 
an order was adjusted in accordance with a man's diminished income, the fact 
that his income is reduced is enough to make him less inclined to pay. After all, 
life in the 1930s could be soul destroying not only for the unemployed but also 
for those who found themselves having to take on work that was less secure or 
less highly paid than their previous employment. The latter phenomenon was all 
too common at the time. When Walter Greenwood's fictional character, Larry 
Meath. found himself, again and again, repeating the following he came to the 
conclusion that 'poverty crushed his heart': 
91 Mullins, 1935,p.116-p.117. 
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Forty-five bob a week: ten shillings rent, twenty-five shillings food, 
five shillings coal, gas and insurance; five bob left for clothes , 
recreation, little luxuries such as smokes and holidays. You gave a 
week of your life, every week, so that you might have a hovel for 
shelter, an insufficiency of food and five bob left over for to clothe 
yourself and the missis in shoddy. 'Aye, and what of the other 
things?' he asked himself. Books, music, brief holidays by seas that 
made the heart ache with their beauty, whose very memory sickened 
one with nostalgia of the soul. His brain refused further 
contemplation.92 
Several surveys at the time also showed how unemployment led to depression 
and 'emotional instability'.93 
Whatever the reason for men being less likely to pay when unemployment rates 
increased, the official explanation was not very plausible. It can, therefore, be 
concluded that policy makers blamed the 'system' merely to provide themselves 
with the excuse to empty the prisons of defaulters. They were probably able to 
get away with doing this because the power of women's organisations to apply 
pressure on the government had diminished by the early 1930s. This was partly 
because feminists had become more divided in their aims as the interwar years 
wore on.94 This was to diminish their political power, a factor which the 
government was well aware of: 
We have not quite got clear of a period during which feminism had 
an undue ascendancy and during which the men in question were 
undoubtedly treated rather harshly... We are emerging from this 
period: women on the bench at any rate are sobering down.95 
The resurgence of eugenics in the 1930s could also have been partly responsible 
for enabling the government to retract its efforts to make fathers pay. In the mid 
-1930s George Orwell was lamenting the decline in the quality of the population 
and asking: 
92 Greenwood, 1984 edition, p.150. 
93 For t'\amp1e, Carnegie United Kingdom Trust, 1943, p.69. 
94 See for e\amp1e, Keen, 1994, p.57-p.80; Smith, 1990, p.47-p.48; Pugh. 1992. p.119-p.I27. 
95 Minutes on file dated 18 December 1931, PRO H0451l7927. 
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where are the monstrous men with chests like barrels and 
moustaches like the wings of eagles who strode across my 
childhood's gaze twenty or thirty years ago?96 
By this time, however, as compared with the war years, there was a more general 
consensus that the quality of the 'human stock' could only be improved by 
encouraging the 'better classes' to reproduce. Even though class differentials in 
the fertility rate were not nearly as stark as they had been, Lewis has argued that 
many contemporaries were unaware ofthis.97 Thus, 
Conservative members of professional classes felt justified in urging 
the attempt to reduce the fertility of the unemployed by popularising 
birth control techniques and voluntary sterilization to prevent the 
propagation of defectives from the so-called "Social Problem 
Group".98 
The increasing prevalence of these ideas meant that the earlier concern to 
preserve the lives of even those children from lone mother families no longer 
existed. Perhaps Havelock Ellis was speaking for the majority when he wrote: 
... while it is true that the increase of the best types of citizens can 
only enrich a state, it is now becoming intolerable that a nation 
should increase by the mere dumping down of procreative refuse in 
its midst. It is beginning to be realized that this process not only 
depreciates the quality of the people but imposes on a state an 
inordinate financial burden.99 
Because of the perceived financial and social burden of 'mental defectives', the 
government set up the Departmental Committee on Sterilisation, which reported 
in 1933. 'to consider the value of sterilisation'. 100 The Committee's own inquiry 
found high illegitimacy rates: out of 3,247 mentally defective women known to 
local authorities to have children, 66% were unmarried'. 101 Clearly, if such 
96 Orwell. 1989 edition, p.90. 
97 Le\\is in Gloversmith, 1980, p.216. 
98 Searle.l979, p.159. 
99 Ha\'elock Ellis, 1937, p.464. 
100 Departmental Committee on Sterilisation, 1933, p.3. 
101 Ibid., p.32. 
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women were sterilised, they could be let out of institutions and released into the 
community to support themselves. Although the Committee came out in favour 
of voluntary sterilisation no legislation followed. However, the very existence of 
this Committee was symbolic of the turning tide of public opinion which became 
even less tolerant of 'repeaters'. 
Coupled with this growing distaste, the proliferation of arguments claiming that 
there was a correlation between juvenile delinquency and husbandless families 
also acted to increase society's intolerance of having to support lone mother 
families. The Director of the Institute of the Scientific Treatment of Delinquency 
stated that' ... it is made clear by social studies of families that criminal behaviour 
in the young is apt to occur where a family is broken by orphaning, separation 
and divorce'. 1 02 This belief was also to influence the next phase of the 
government's treatment of lone mother families. 
Having shown that they were not prepared to let these families become a greater 
burden on the community, and having failed to make fathers pay, the 
Conservatives, and then the National Government under Chamberlain's 
leadership from 1937, turned their attention to finding ways of preventing such 
families being formed in the first place. As will be shown in the next section of 
this chapter, they intended to achieve this by implementing policies that would 
encourage couples to reconcile. It was certainly no coincidence that, in the late 
1930s. some organisations began espousing the idea of marriage guidance. 103 In 
the meantime, however, the action of governments in the years from 1930-1935 
clearly led to a depreciation in the standard of living experienced by lone mother 
families. As orders became more difficult to enforce more of these families must 
have been forced to seek poor relief. Indeed, the NCFUM&HC claimed that as a 
result of the 1935 Act 
102 Institute for the Scientific Treatment of Delinquency, 1938, p.170-p.171. 
103 See, Le\\ is, Clark and Morgan, 1992. 
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some courts now forgive debt of this kind too easily and refuse to 
imprison even the most persistent offender '" the fact that prisons are 
less full of debtors than formerly is of no comfort to such mothers. 104 
HO\ve\er. even though this was to add to the ratepayer's expense, the government 
probably accepted that this was a small price to pay compared with the cost of 
imprisoning so many fathers. (As a result of the depression the ratepayer's 
expense had increased anyway. It had 'laid an additional burden on the shoulders 
of many unmarried mothers ... Many putative fathers are out of work when their 
children are born or may lose their work later'). 105 However, the government was 
also probably aware that such women would continue to do their utmost to avoid 
resorting to the Poor Law. Indeed, its deterrent effect was as strong as ever for 
lone mothers would go to extreme lengths to avoid it. The NCFUM&HC 
claimed that it was not uncommon for mothers to stay in night shelters in order 
to avoid the workhouse despite the hardship it involved: 
if the children are debarred from shelter during the day, they must 
necessarily suffer from exposure and lack of proper attention, 
especially if the mother is occupied in begging the price of the next 
night's lodging, with the child in her arms or dragging at her skirt.106 
vii) Further Attempts to Prevent the Creation of Lone Mother Families 
Having given up its attempts to make fathers pay in the years from 1930-1935, 
the government largely devoted the following five years to either preventing 
couples from separating, or if they did, to enabling them to get a divorce. As far 
as unmarried mothers were concerned, their expense had already been reduced by 
putting 'first offenders' in the hands of charitable organisations. By 1939 there 
were nearly one hundred voluntary homes in England and Wales for unmarried 
mothers which were approved for maternity and child welfare grants by the 
104 NCFUM&HC, 1939, p.14. 
10~ Ibid .. 1935, p.17. 
106 Ibid .. 1932. p.30. 
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state. 107 After giving birth they may have had their children adopted and at no 
cost to adoption societies. As Middleton has stated, such girls 'accepted a period 
of work in return for the association disposing of the child'.108 Many adoption 
societies also made unmarried mothers pay a fee for the services they rendered 
when arranging the adoption, and some even required mothers to pay up to 101- a 
week for the first three months after the adoption had taken place. 109 
In order to achieve its new plan for dealing with separated and deserted mothers, 
the government had set up a committee before the 1935 Money Payments 
(Justices Procedure) Act was passed, which was instructed, among other things, 
to 
enquire into the social services connected with the administration of 
justice in the courts of summary jurisdiction, including ... the 
application of conciliation methods to matrimonial disputes. I 10 
When the members of the Committee conducted their enquiry they found that 
many magistrates were already taking steps to encourage couples to reconcile 
and that 'no fewer than two-thirds of the attempts to effect a reconciliation were 
successful'. They also found that in most courts probation officers were 
employed as conciliators. I I I However, despite this very high percentage of 
reconciliations, the Committee wanted to see it increased and believed this could 
be achieved by deterring the parties as follows: 
The wife should understand that the regularity of any weekly 
payment must depend on her husbands capacity to pay, and the 
husband should realise the economic difficulties of supporting his 
wife as well as himself when they are not living together. The 
recognition of these facts may well induce them rather to bear the ills 
they have than to fly to others they know not of. 112 
1071b'd I .. 1940, p.15. 
l(l~ 1971. p.280. 
109 Report of the Departmental Committee on Adoption Societies and Agencies, 1937, p.23. 
110 Report of the Departmental Committee on the Social Services in Courts of Summaf) 
Jurisdiction, 1934, p. vi. 
Illlb'd I ., p.6-p.1 O. 
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They also wanted greater use to be made of interim orders which would give 
probation officers time to make home visits in order to persuade couples to 
change their minds about separating. A provision for such orders, which could 
be enforced for a period not exceeding three months, had been made under 
Section 6 of the Summary Jurisdiction (Separation and Maintenance) in 1925 but 
it seems that they had not been widely used. I 13 
Needless to say, the Committee's proposals would have necessitated an increase 
in the numbers of probation officers employed by courts. They estimated that the 
extra expense of carrying out their recommendations would be about £80,000 per 
annum. I 14 Although their enquiry led to the Summary Procedure (Domestic 
Proceedings) Act in 1937, which imposed on the courts the requirement to 
appoint probation officers to attempt to make couples reconcile, it did not 
necessarily mean that the government were authorising the extra administrative 
costs. After all, under the Affiliation Orders Act, 1914, courts were required to 
appoint collecting officers and the failure of governments to finance this meant 
that many courts were still not employing them even by the end of the 1930s. 
viii) Conclusion 
The above has shown that in order to avoid the expense to the community of 
supporting lone mother families during the interwar years, three distinct 
approaches were tried. Firstly, under pressure from women's organisations, 
governments implemented measures which were intended to ensure that fathers 
no longer evaded paying maintenance or affiliation orders. However, as many 
policy makers were never fully convinced that this approach would be 
successfuL they more eagerly supported alternative schemes whereby other 
individuals could be found to take on the financial responsibility of the children 
of mothers unable to support themselves. After 1925, by which time the 
112 Ibid .. p.11. 
113 Ibid .. p.17. 
11.t Ibid .. p.13\. 
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Conservative Government was aware that the numbers of men being imprisoned 
for non-payment was increasing, it decided to respond to the situation by passing 
legislation which it hoped would provide a more successful alternative to the 
problem of lone mother families. Even though the 1926 Adoption Act proved to 
be a success in that the majority of children being adopted were illegitimate, after 
the crisis in 1929, even more drastic measures were needed to curtail Poor Law 
expenditure. Hence, some unmarried mothers were even allowed to claim out-
door relief. However, although this measure was implemented by a Labour 
Government, it has to be interpreted as an ad hoc response to the emergency 
rather than as the acceptance of the community's responsibility to support such 
families. In any case, it was cheaper to keep them out of the workhouse rather 
than in it and the Labour Party, under MacDonald's leadership, was not in the 
business of challenging conservative economic policies. 
Following this period of reform, and the worsening state of the economy, the 
National Government abandoned any further attempts to make absent fathers pay 
because it was more concerned to cut the expense of having to maintain such 
men in prison. Once this had been achieved, it then turned its attention, once 
again, to finding ways to reduce the numbers of lone mother families. It 
therefore continued the process of making divorce easier and passed legislation 
that provided courts with the machinery to encourage couples to reconcile. 
Although the latter would have necessitated the injection of money from the 
central state, by the time it was passed the worst of the depression was over. 
This is interesting to note because, up until this point, governments during the 
interwar years had steadfastly refused to implement any reforms which would 
have involved extra state expenditure. The passing of the Summary Proceedings 
(Domestic Procedure) Act, therefore, marked the ending of the period during 
which governments dealt with the problem of lone mother families in an 
unplanned fashion in response to economic cnSIS. Indeed, the similarities 
between this act and the Affiliation Orders Act of 1914, by which courts were 
required to employ collecting officers, demonstrates how once the Great 
Depression was over, official policy towards lone mothers returned to the status 
quo. 
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Although governments in the interwar years were primarily motivated by the 
desire to reduce expenditure when they implemented these reforms, as it has 
been argued above, other factors also shaped policy. To begin with, the impact 
of World War 1 cannot be ignored, especially as the infant welfare movement 
encouraged more people to change their attitudes towards some lone mothers and 
their children. The war also brought the plight of these families to more people's 
attention especially as their numbers were believed to be increasing. This was to 
lead to the establishment of the NCFUM&HC, which was just as influential in 
bringing about the reforms to make fathers pay as it has been in more recent 
years. There can also be no doubting the impact of feminism during the early 
1920s. Other historians have charted their instrumental role to effect greater 
equality between in the sexes through the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1923, and the 
Guardianship of Infants Act in 1923. Pugh has also attributed the reforms to 
maintenance and affiliation legislation to the women's movement, including 
those which were taken over by the government. I IS However, in common with 
today, as making the father pay failed to benefit lone mothers, it mattered little 
that the influence of feminism in this area of social policy declined during the 
interwar years. However, it was less fortunate that those feminists who did not 
side with eugenicism, in contrast to Rathbone and Stopes for example, were less 
vocal during the 1930s. If they had been, they may have tempered the loud 
voices of eugenicists in general who expressed a complete intolerance of lone 
mother families. 
Despite the part played by other factors in determining policy the impact of the 
depression was undoubtedly the most crucial. The fact that the two most 
significant steps for dealing with the problem of lone mother families - that is, 
making the father pay in the early 1920s and emptying them from prisons in the 
mid 1930s - were taken at times when unemployment rates peaked and 
government calls for retrenchment were loudest, speaks for itself. However. 
although this is interesting because it points to some similarities with the passage 
115 Pugh, 1992. p. 1 08-p.109. 
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of reform to child support in the 1980s and 1990s, the most important legacy of 
the interwar years, in this respect, was to demonstrate why this type of solution 
simply did not work. 
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CHAPTER 5: EPILOGUE - THE CHILD SUPPORT ACT 1991 
i) Introduction 
This chapter explores the Conservative Party's attempt to make fathers pay 
maintenance from the late 1980s to the mid 1990s, firstly under the leadership of 
Margaret Thatcher and then John Major. The proposal to reverse the apparent 
decline in financial support from fathers in the postwar decades became 
enshrined in the Child Support Act 1991. The following discussion will outline 
the provenance and objectives of this radical piece of legislation, and its rapid 
demise. 
Even though the Child Support Act has only been in operation for approximately 
six years, it has failed to achieve any of original aims: it has not benefited the 
children in lone mother families, either emotionally or financially; it has not 
succeeded it making more fathers comply with their maintenance orders; and 
most crucially, at least from the original policy-makers perspective, it has not 
succeeded in securing public expenditure savings on benefits paid to one parent 
families. As well as failing to achieve its aims, the implementation of the Act 
has also caused damage to partners and children in the second families of absent 
fathers. This was an inevitable consequence, for in diverting more of the father's 
money towards the first family, the second family was bound to lose out. 
Clearly. the Act's failure to improve the lot of lone mothers and their children is 
of the greatest concern. However, this aspect will not be central to this 
discussion. l The main focus here will be on administrative factors, to show how 
and \\hy the Conservatives failed to reduce benefit expenditure on lone mother 
families by pursing absent fathers, and, in the process, repeated the mistakes of 
interwar governments. Indeed, it is quite remarkable that the ConserYatiYes 
I For in-depth discussions of the implications of the Act on lone mother famil~es. see, for 
e\alllple, Abbott 1996: Daniel and Burgess 1994; Garnham and Knights 1994; GlendInnIng et 31. 
199) and 1997. 
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should have chosen this approach gIven that, ever Since Fischer Williams 
reported in the 1930s, numerous committees have reached the same, age-old 
conclusion that making the father pay cannot solve the problem of supporting 
lone mother families because 
the boundaries ... are set by the size of liable relatives' incomes and 
the cost to the public of collections from liable relatives, and of legal 
services deployed in obtaining thousands of abortive or near abortive 
maintenance orders.2 
However, the Tories chose, for one reason or another, to ignore this. Under the 
1991 Child Support Act, absent parents became obliged to provide for the 
financial support of their children where they 'could afford to do so'. In defining 
the 'absent parent' responsible, the Act adopted a biological or adoptive 
definition of parenthood. The amount of child support to be paid was to be 
determined by the application of a strict, benefit style formula which prioritised 
responsibility towards biological and adoptive children over other financial 
responsibilities, including any step-children and children with whom the absent 
parent is currently living.3 
The Act removed the responsibility for assessing the amounts to be paid, the 
collection of the money and most enforcement procedures from the courts. The 
administration of maintenance was put into the hands of a newly created 'Next 
Steps' Agency, the Child Support Agency, employing over 7,000 full-time staff:~ 
Thus, for the first time, such family matters became 'delegalised'.5 The 
Conservatives did not want to delegate the administration of the new scheme to a 
gO\'ernment department: the rationale behind all 'Next Steps' Agencies was to 
imprO\e the standard of service and to improve efficiency through improved 
management. 6 The aims of the Agency were 
) F' 
- ~lI1er, 197-1-, Vol. I, p.148-pI49. 
3 For a more detailed discussion see Boden and Childs, 1996, p, 131. 
~ Thl' Child Support Agency, 1997, p.46. 
~ r-..laciean, 1 99-l, p.505. 
6 For tlmher discussion see: Self, 1994, p.175-180; Rhodes, 1997. 
149 
to deliver a consistent, accurate and timely and cost effective service 
for the assessment, collection and payment of child maintenance 
ensuring parents maintain their children where they can afford to do 
so and that the burden to the taxpayer is kept at a minimum. 7 
Parents with care (largely lone mothers) are placed under an obligation to co-
operate with this Agency in assessing the absent father's liability to pay. If they 
refuse to do so without 'good cause' their benefits are reduced. Even unemployed 
absent fathers have to make contributions to their child's support as the Agency 
deducts an amount from their benefits. 
Methods of enforcement are much the same as they have always been. If a father 
fails to payor gets into arrears, the Child Support Agency can take the following 
action. Firstly, it makes enquiries into the reasons for the non-payment of 
maintenance and if it fails to persuade the absent father to pay the monies due it 
can consider alternative methods of payment. This may involve setting up a 
standing order but if this is unsuccessful, then payment by deduction from 
earnings may be attempted. If this action also fails, or is not applicable because 
the absent father is self-employed for example, then the Agency can apply to the 
courts for a distraint on goods. If this does not have the desired result then the 
final method of recovery is for the Agency to apply to the courts again. 
Magistrates may then impose a deferred prison sentence which gives the father 
more time to pay, or else, it may impose an immediate prison sentence.8 
ii) The Background to the Child Support Act 
When the Conservative government came into power in 1979, it perceived 
British society as being in a state of deep-seated crisis, economically and 
morally. The Conservatives intended to reverse this decline by applying a strict 
form of economic liberalism combined with a radical moral philosophy aimed at 
reducing the 'nanny state' by increasing individual effort and thus reducing public 
Child Support Agency, 1997, p.2. 
R J)SS. I 990a, para. S.20-papa.S.24. 
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expenditure.9 As far as lone mother families were concerned, the Conservatives 
argued that the escalating cost to the state of such families was unacceptable. In 
the years immediately preceding the implementation of the Child Support Act, 
total henetit expenditure had increased from £27,698 million in 1981/82 to 
f66JX2 million and benefit expenditure on lone mothers families had risen from 
£ 1,079 million to £5,728 million.lo Alistair Burt, the Parliamentary Under-
Secretary for Social Security explained the government's objection to this when 
he stated that: 
The truth is that the Treasury represents the taxpayer in the United 
Kingdom and the taxpayers are men and women all over the country, 
sometimes on low income, often with families of their own to 
support, to whom we owe an obligation. I always feel quite strongly 
as a Minister in the Department of Social Security that I have a 
responsibility both to those who provide the resources that I then 
need to use to spend on those who need them [sic]. I have a 
responsibility to both, but we take the responsibility to those men 
and women very seriously and we have a duty to relieve them of 
responsibilities which should rightly be on somebody else's 
shoulders, and this is one of the basic principles of the Child Support 
Act. I 1 
The huge increase in the numbers of lone mother families in the preceding 
decades contributed to the burden on the taxpayer. In 1994, lone parents headed 
almost 23 per cent of all families with dependent children, which was nearly 
three times the proportion found in 1971. Until the mid 1980s, the increase in 
the numbers of these families had been gradual and was mainly due to the rising 
rate of divorce following the 1969 Divorce Reform Act, which had made divorce 
easier. After that date, there was a more rapid rise in the number of lone mothers 
giving birth to children outside marriage. By 1995 over one third of all live 
births in England and Wales took place outside marriage, which was four times 
the proportion found in 1971. Even though four fifths of such births occurred in 
a stable relationship, the number of never married lone mothers stood at 35 per 
9 Weeks. 1989; Maclean. 1994. 
III \)SS 1997. p.3. 
II Quoted in Boden and Childs, 1996, p.142-143. 
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cent of all lone parent families in 1991. 12 Just as they have always been, the vast 
m~iority of lone parent families now are headed by women. In 1996, 
approximately 95 per cent of one parent families were female headed. 13 
The alarming growth in public expenditure did not just occur, however, because 
of the growth in the number of lone parent families. This was also due to a 
dramatic increase in the number of lone parent families dependent on means-
tested benefits. Because of falling wages and a tighter labour market, the number 
of lone mothers working full-time had fallen from 23 per cent in 1979, to 17 per 
cent in 1989. Whereas 48 per cent of lone parents were receiving either 
Supplementary Benefit or Family Income Supplement in 1976, by 1989 this has 
risen to 77 per cent receiving either Income Support or Family Credit. In 1980, 
there were 330,000 single parent families on social security and by 1989, 
770,000. 14 
Although the government used these statistics to argue its case for placing the 
responsibility of lone mother families in the hands of absent fathers,15 it knew 
that the public at large would find this an acceptable way of reducing public 
expenditure. In contrast to a government proposal suggesting the privatisation of 
the National Health Service, for example, the Conservative Party was aware that 
votes might even be attached to its proposals for child support. 16 
It should be noted though that the Child Support Act was not the first measure 
passed by the Conservatives which aimed to cut the expense to the state of 
supporting lone mother families. The Social Security Act 1986, for example, 
reduced the income of these families by replacing special grants with Social 
Fund loans. 17 However, lone mothers were not the only recipients of benefits to 
be penalised by this piece of legislation. The restructuring of social security 
I~ OtTice for National Statistics, 1997, p.39-p.52. 
1\ DSS, 1997, p.245. 
14 Boden and Childs, 1996, p.140-p.141. 
1 ~ S t' 
. ee. or example, HC DSS, I 990a. 
16 Maclean, 1994, p.512. 
17 Glendinning and Millar, 1992, p.213. 
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benefits under the 1986 Act also reduced the cost to the state of the unemployed, 
partly by restricting access to benefits, just as governments had done in the 
interwar years. The government argued that such measures were necessary in 
order to provide the unemployed with the incentive to find work. According to 
Conservative economic philosophy, Britain's economic decline could only be 
halted by increasing efficiency and competitiveness, by eliminating the 
'dependency culture' and by deregulating the labour market. Policies were 
introduced which, for example, undermined the powers of trade unions, 
diminished wage regulation and reduced employment rights. 18 The free market, 
however. did not provide more full-time jobs which was why more lone mothers 
were forced onto benefits. The numbers of secure full-time jobs declined, while 
part-time, casual and low-paid work increased. This meant that even on the 
governments much manipulated figures, unemployment by 1995 still needed to 
be reduced by almost a million before it could return to the 1,184,600 
unemployment figure inherited by Thatcher's government in 1979. 19 
The Tories were particularly critical of the court-based system for making fathers 
pay that was in existence in 1979. Legislation which aimed at making fathers 
fulfil their financial duties towards their children and/or cutting the cost of such 
families to the state had been implemented in the decades after 1940. Such 
measures included: the Affiliation Proceedings Act, 1957, which increased the 
limit on affiliation orders to 50/- a week; the Maintenance Orders Act, 1958, 
which gave the courts the power to order the employer of an absent father who 
was in arrears to pay part of his earnings direct to the court; the Maintenance 
Orders Act, 1968, which abolished the maximum limit on affiliation orders; the 
Affiliation Proceedings (Amendment) Act, 1972, which extended to three years 
from birth the period during which a mother could take out affiliation 
proceedings; and, the Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates' Courts Act, 1978, 
\\ hich changed the grounds for obtaining a maintenance order and enabled 
maintenance to be registered and enforced even where it was being paid 
\oluntarily. The Conservatives also put in place some legislation themselves 
I X He, 1994, memorandum submitted to the Social Security Committee, p.2. 
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shortly after coming into power. In 1980 the Magistrates Courts Act was passed 
which finally removed the anomaly by which imprisonment wiped out arrears. 
However. despite all these changes, more lone mothers had become dependent 
on the state for their support and had become less likely to receive 
maintenance.2o Since the mid-twentieth century, the legal system had 'begun to 
attenuate the extent of the obligation of a fonner main breadwinner towards the 
family from which he was separated, out of concern for the interests of his later-
acquired dependants'.21 The Supplementary Benefit Commission also did not 
pursue a rigorous enforcement policy.22 
However. reducing the cost of lone mother families to the Treasury was not the 
only motivation behind the government's desire to enforce the financial 
responsibility of non-resident fathers. Some members of the Conservative Party, 
particularly Margaret Thatcher and others on the so-called New Right, were 
eager to strengthen the responsibility of the father on moral grounds. At the 
heart of their moral politics lay the idea that declining sexual standards had 
weakened the family.23 This belief had been heavily influenced by right-wing 
American authors, such as Charles Murray. Murray argued that a growing 
'underclass' was emerging in Britain which had rejected the values of society. 
Single women who had babies without marrying fonned part of this 'underclass'; 
'they live in a different world from other Britons, and their values are now 
contaminating the life of entire neighbourhoods'.24 
This sort of commentary fuelled a moral panic and although the Conservatives, 
\\ere cautious not to overstate their fears in the early years of their 
administration, from 1987 onwards such moralising opinions were always at the 
19 The Guardian, 23 December 1996. 
20 DSS. 1990b. 
'1 
- Ee~elaar and Maclean, 1986, p.1 09. 
" 
-- Eekelaar. 1984. p.131. 
'1 ~. Weeks. 1989, p.294. 
24 Murray, 1990, pA. 
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forefront of debates on this subject.25 Arguing for a return to 'Victorian values' , 
lone mother families came under considerable attack as illustrated by the 
following quotes from politicians: 
'I've got a little list ... [of] young ladies who get pregnant just to 
jump the housing list' (Peter Lilley, Social Security Secretary).26 
'Without [families] individuals are like a frantic whirl of atoms, 
attached to no-one, responsible to nothing, creating a vaporous 
society, not a solid one' (Virginia Bottomly, Health Secretary).27 
'We must emphasis our belief that the traditional two-parent family 
is best. Best for the parents, best for society and above all best for 
the children', (Michael Howard, Home Secretary).28 
'We must not be afraid of stating that it is better if at all possible for 
children to be brought up by both parents' (Norman Fowler, 
Conservative Party Chairman).29 
Clearly the media also fed these fears by citing such comments and added fuel to 
the fire by endlessly discussing the implications of the breakdown of family life 
in this country. A great deal of newspaper space was devoted to the perceived 
link between lone parenthood and juvenile delinquency. The following headline 
was by no means untypical: 
The underclass spawns illegitimate children without a care for 
tomorrow and feeds the crime rate which rivals the United States in 
property offences.3o 
As part of the return to 'Victorian values' involved the restoration of the absent 
father's financial responsibility towards his children, the Conservative 
~~ \\eeks. 1989, p.293. 
16 Q d' 
- uote In The Guardian, 7 October, 1992. 
27 Ibid" 17 March, 1993. 
2X Ibid .. ) October, 1993. 
1l) II .. 
- Old" 6 November, 1993. 
,II 
. The Sunday Times. 26 November 1989. 
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Government announced that it was going to ensure that no father escaped this 
duty. When Margaret Thatcher outlined her plans for reform at an inaugural 
lecture at the National Children's Homes' George Thomas Society, she said: 
No father should be able to escape from his responsibility. That is 
why the government is looking at ways of strengthening the system 
for tracing an absent father and making the arrangement for 
recovering maintenance more effective} I 
Although this was to be achieved by making all absent fathers pay, or pay more 
in the case of those who were already complying with maintenance orders, the 
understanding of the media was that the government primarily intended to crack-
down on those 'errant' or 'feckless' fathers who had evaded payment in the past. 
Within months of Margaret Thatcher's announcement of her intentions there 
seemed to be an unquestioned acceptance that the reform was simply about 
chasing 'errant' fathers. Thus, the title of a leading article in a national 
newspaper was 'Errant and Harried'.32 By 1992 another article in the same paper 
stated that the government was 'busy launching the Child Support Agency - the 
outfit which will, from next April, pursue errant fathers who are failing to pay 
child maintenance'.33 
Fuelled by such propaganda, there was widespread public acceptance of the 
principle that fathers, rather than the state, should be providing for their former 
families. This was confirmed by the 1990 British Social Attitudes Survey which 
revealed that 90 per cent of men and 95 per cent of women agreed that absent 
fathers should be making child support payments.34 
In addition to the economic and ideological impetus for change, the government 
also argued that the interests of children should be at the forefront of such a 
policy. The White Paper outlining the government's proposals for the new 
31 Ibid .. 21 January 1990. 
11 
. - The Guardian, 30 October 1990. 
JJ Ibid .. 10 November 1992. 
qC' d' 
- Ite In Burgoyne and Millar, 1994, p.18. 
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scheme was entitled Children Come First. 35 The belief that children had rights 
had already taken centre stage during the 1980s when research began to emerge 
showing that the adverse, long-term impact of divorce on children had been 
underestimated,36 Moreover, the 1989 Children Act had already emphasised that 
the responsibility for children rested on their parents and not with the state. 
However. although the title of the 1990 White Paper implied that children were 
to be in some sense better off after the introduction of the Child Support Act this 
was, as will be shown below, another widespread misconception of the 
Conservative Government's aims. On the contrary, the interests of the Treasury 
were to come first. This is certainly the line taken by Garnham and Knights37 
and one that the Social Security Secretary, Tony Newton, confirmed when the 
Bill was being debated. In a briefing to journalists, he stated that the 'point is to 
, 
recover these massive amounts of taxpayers' money'.38 
iii) The Beginning of the End 
Within a very short time of beginning its operations in 1993, the Child Support 
Agency came under attack from just about every group which had initially 
welcomed it. Even those organisations such as, for example, the National 
Council for One Parent Families, which had helped the government to formulate 
the legislation to begin with, became critical. MPs from all parties also 
expressed their hostility, even though there had initially been all-party support 
for the Act. However, the angriest and most vociferous group to attack the 
Agency were absent fathers themselves. 
In order to make their objections heard, protest groups, such as the Network 
Against the Child Support Agency, were formed. Existing groups, such as 
Families Need Fathers, also took up the cause. This revolt probably stemmed 
3~ DSS, 1990a and b. 
36 Maclean. 1994, p.511. 
37 1994. 
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from the realisation that under the formula many men were expected to pay more 
than they had in the past. There was also a huge amount of dissatisfaction with 
other aspects of the formula. In particular, its lack of flexibility caused the 
greatest concern. Absent fathers soon realised that it took no account of, for 
example, travel to work costs, the costs of making access visits to their children 
or the support of step-children. Divorced men were also enraged when they 
realised that the formula ignored 'clean break' settlements. These were 
agreements that many men had made under the previous court-based scheme 
whereby, for example, former partners had given up the right to any maintenance 
for themselves in exchange for the equity in the home, or its contents. Some 
fathers were also aggrieved because the formula did not take into account the 
expense of supporting elderly dependants. Others simply objected to the 
principle that they should have to pay maintenance to the child of a former 
partner or lover who had become pregnant without either their knowledge or 
consent. 
In addition to these and numerous other objections to the formula, there was also 
a general outcry when it became apparent that the Child Support Agency was not 
in fact chasing 'errant' fathers. Instead, the Agency was largely relying on 
extracting money from those who were already paying maintenance. Moreover, 
it could not deny that it was prioritising these 'easy' cases, which would make the 
biggest contribution to the £530 million savings target that had been set for 
1993/94. This became very apparent when the following memorandum written 
by a divisional manager of the Agency to his area managers was leaked to the 
press: 
This is not the time for the cases we know should get early attention, 
but which will need a lot of effort to extract money. The name of the 
game is maximising the maintenance yield - don't waste a lot of time 
on non-profitable stuff139 
38 Quoted in The Sunday Times, 21 January 1990 . 
. \l) Memo dated 25 August 1993, quoted in Gamham and Knights, 1994. p.70. 
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When this type of targeting came to the attention of the Social Security 
Committee, which had been set up to investigate the operation of the Child 
Support Agency, its members called for tougher action against fathers who were 
not paying any maintenance for their children: 
It is not action against parents paying some maintenance which is 
most demanded. It is rather, action against those allowed to cock a 
snook at the agency, and taxpayers, by refusing to fill in and return 
the first communication sent to them by the CSA.4o 
Research at the time also testified that the Agency was using this tactic in the 
attempt to meet its financial targets. This 'was perceived to be in direct 
contradiction to the basic moral objective of the Act - the enforcement of 
parental responsibilities on the part of men who had hitherto evaded them'.41 
However, it was not just the Agency which was accused of acting immorally. 
Both before and after the Child Support Act had come into being, stories in the 
press revealed that the Conservative Party itself was quite prepared to indulge in 
moral hypocrisy despite its rhetoric espousing a return to 'Victorian values' - or 
its 'back to basics' campaign as it became known under the leadership of John 
Major. (This should not have come as a surprise for double standards were as 
much of feature of the Victorian era).42 The first case to hit the headlines was 
that of Cecil Parkinson, a Cabinet Minister in Margaret Thatcher's government. 
Parkinson became the father of a child as a result of an adulterous relationship 
with his secretary. He was not alone, however, for over the years the public's 
attention was drawn to numerous other cases of 'sleaze' in the Tory ranks.-t3 
Although the public and the media may have tolerated such indiscretions in 
different circumstances, these double standards were unacceptable in the face of 
the Party's moral philosophy. Moreover, the habit of both Margaret Thatcher and 
John Major to stand publicly by these men when their stories first came to light 
further exasperated people in general. Sedgemore has concluded that: 
-I(lQ d' 6 uole In The Daily Telegraph, 2 February 199 . 
-II GI d' . en IIlnll1g et ai, 1996, p.280. 
-I~ See Walkowitz, 1992. 
-11 Fora full account, see Sedgemore, 1995, p.lI1-p.116. 
159 
Whilst their indiscretions were certainly not the underlying cause of 
the government's deep and worsening unpopularity, their nakedness 
made it that much more difficult for the government to be taken 
seriously by a derisive public.44 
As a result of all these factors the government decided to make some concessions 
to absent fathers, which had the ultimate effect of reducing the amount of money 
that could be recouped by the state. However, had not the press taking the side 
of absent fathers these concessions may have been less generous. In stark 
contrast to the support the media had given the Agency prior to its establishment, 
by 1994 its attitude was extremely hostile. The tabloid press in particular was 
outraged at the government's failure to fulfil its promise to chase 'errant' fathers. 
It also held the government responsible for the suicides of some men allegedly 
driven to despair by the Agency's demands. In the Daily Mirror, for example, 
photographs of such men appeared alongside a picture of the Grim Reaper, while 
the headline screamed 'Agency get Blood Money'. The article then went on to 
say that the Agency 'hounds not the feckless fathers who abandon their children 
without contributing a penny to their upkeep but the conscientious dads who 
have been faithfully paying up regularly'.45 
Wall bank has argued that 
The media frequently expressed sympathetic unquestioning support 
for the middle-class fathers and their new partners. . .. Middle-class 
fathers sought to construct themselves as non-residential fathers who 
remained responsible for and responsive to their children's needs. 
They then wanted to distinguish their constructed subject position 
from that of the demonized feckless father who is represented in 
contemporary debates on child support as lacking in all the aspects of 
paternal responsibility' .46 
~~ Ibid .. 1995, p.116. 
~.; The Dat'/r Mirror, 18 March 1994. 
46 Wallbank, 1997, p.192. 
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The press also undennined the Agency's credibility by revealing that its staff was 
on perfonnance-related pay. Furthennore, public indignation was stimulated 
when it announced that the 'CSA blows £5,000 on a staff knees-up' with money 
that came from the public purse.47 A spokesman for the Agency was reported to 
have said that the money had been spent at the request of the management in 
recognition of the Agency's hard work at the end of its first year and to help to 
'build up staff morale and motivation'.48 
The Agency had needed to boost staff morale; later the Social Security Select 
Committee was to describe its administrative perfonnance after its first year as 
'dire'.49 It had been expected to deal with one million cases in its first year. 
However, by December 1993 only 200,000 cases had been cleared of which only 
120,000 resulted in maintenance assessments. 50 Although the Agency was partly 
responsible for this failure, largely through its incompetence to deal with the task 
it had been given, the refusal of many absent fathers to either co-operate or 
comply with its demands did not help. 
The following list outlines some of the strategies employed by absent fathers to 
delay or avoid payment: 
Denying paternity: this proved to be very disruptive to the system for it 
forced the Agency into undertaking DNA testing, which was both time 
consuming and costly.51 This tactic, however, was not just used by men 
in cases where paternity might be in doubt. On the contrary, the Agency 
was 'surprised to find cases of men with long marriages' who were 
attempting to deny that they were the fathers of their children'. 52 
47 See, for example, Today, 20 March 1994. 
48 Ihid. 
4l) He Social Security Committee, 1997, p.x. 
:in DSS. 1994, p.l. 
:' I Boden and Ch i Ids, 1996, p. 151. 
~1 
.- The Times. 29 November 1994. 
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Giving up work. 53 
Giving false information about their employment or earnings, especially 
hy the self-employed. 
Collusion between parents: Abbott's study of parents with care III 
Liverpool found that some absent fathers and their former partners 
entered into agreements whereby the parent with care would not disclose 
the ex-partners name to the Agency on condition that the absent father 
would cover the financial cost of the benefit penalty if it was 
subsequently imposed. 54 
Delaying the return of Maintenance Enquiry Forms issued to absent 
fathers by the Agency,55 
Going abroad or disappearing. 56 
As earlier chapters have shown, many of these tactics are exactly the same ones 
that absent fathers have employed ever since legislation to force them to pay 
began in the last century. The Child Support Agency has not, therefore, been any 
more successful in this respect, despite the government's confidence that it could 
achieve what no other administrative scheme had managed to achieve before. 
i\') The Government's Climb-down 
Faced with this kind of pressure from individuals and organisations, together 
with the failure of the Agency to meet its financial or administrative targets, the 
gO\ernment was forced to retreat. As early as December 1993 the Secretary of 
State for Social Security, Peter Lilley, announced that the Child Support Act was 
:13 Set' Glendinning et al, 1995 p.23. 
:I.J Abbott. 1996, p.28. 
:I' He Social Security Committee, 1997, Minutes of Evidence, p.9. 
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gOlllg to be amended. New measures were outlined in the \Vhite Paper. 
Imprm'ing Child Support, in 1995. 57 While some of the amendments took effect 
from April 1995, others were phased in during 1996 and 1997. 
Absent fathers are the beneficiaries of changes to the fonnula. This now takes 
'clean break' settlements into account; allows for travel to work costs \vhere the 
absent parent travels more than 150 miles a week; ensures that no absent parent 
pays more than 33 per cent of his net income; allows for the housing costs of a 
new partner or step-children; and halves the original maximum level paid by 
wealthy absent parents who are obliged to pay an 'additional element'. Absent 
fathers also benefit from the new regulation which allows for an amount of 
discretion to be introduced when applying the fonnula. In particular, they now 
have the right to appeal to a newly established Child Support Appeal Tribunal 
for a departure from the fonnula. This was certainly a 'climb-down' by the 
government, for not only have these changes resulted in fathers being required to 
pay less, but they have also undennined one of the fundamental principles of the 
1991 Act - that there should be no discretion. 
In order to tackle the administrative problems of the Agency, the government 
also decided that it would have to defer indefinitely those cases which the 
Agency had been due to take on in 1996. These were the cases where the 
mothers were not on means-tested benefits and had maintenance agreements 
already in force. However, prior to this, the government had already given the 
Agency the go-ahead to shelve indefinitely the pursuit of some 350,000 fathers 
so that it could concentrate on its growing backlog of cases. These were cases 
imohing lone mothers who were receiving income support before April 1993 
\\hen the Agency started its work. Pursuit of cases where mothers had not co-
operated in assessing the absent father's liability had also been suspended. 58 
~h HC Social Security Committee, 1997, p.vi. 
)7 DSS, 1995, 
50!! HC, Parliamentary Debates, 1994, Vol. 251, col. 1026. 
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Faced with the growing realisation that making fathers pay was not going to 
solve the problem of lone parent families, the government then proceeded to 
make greater attempts to encourage lone mothers to work. As from April 1997. 
the Benefits Agency have been instructed to set aside £5 a week of any child 
maintenance received by a lone parent on Income Support or income-based 
Jobseeker's Allowance. This money is to be used towards a bonus if the claimant 
or her partner returns to work within 14 days of leaving either of these benefits. 
The amount payable by way of reward is the lowest of: the amount set aside 
during the bonus period; the amount of child maintenance paid during the bonus 
period; or £1,000.59 
Clearly these and the various other changes which were introduced lessened the 
amount of money that could be saved in benefit payments to lone mother 
families. The cost to the Treasury in lost income for the package as a whole was 
estimated to be £50 million during the first year and £ 110 million in each 
subsequent year, once all the measures had been implemented.6o 
In order to mitigate these costs, however, the Conservatives devised other more 
covert ways to extract money from absent parents, or at least from those who 
were paying. In the 1995 budget it reduced the tax allowance on maintenance 
payments to 15p and more than doubled the minimum amount of maintenance 
payable by the very poorest absent parents. From April 1996 the maintenance 
paid by absent parents who are themselves on benefits (apart from limited 
exemptions) increased from £2.35 to £4.80 a week. At approximately the same 
time the Secretary of State for Social Security also proposed an increase in the 
benefit 'penalty' from the benefits of lone mothers who refused to co-operate with 
the Agency without 'good cause'. Doubling the penalty to £18.60 of a lone 
mother's £46.50 a week personal was estimated to save an additional £40 million 
a year. 61 
59 Knights, 1997, p.345. 
h() The Daizl' Telegraph, 24 January 1995. 
61 Glendinning et aL 1996, p. 285. 
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v) The Failure of the Child Support Act 
The government was forced to revise its expectations of the Child Support Act as 
a method of reducing public expenditure on lone mother families. However. this 
in itself does not mean that the Act failed. Despite these revisions, the new 
system may still have been an improvement on the old one. It is therefore 
necessary to look at the extent to which the Agency has been able to make 
improvements on the performance of the previous court-based system. 
The following table shows the compliance rates of absent fathers who were on 
the CSA's books in 1996. These are given in two rows. The first, relates to 
cases where maintenance payments are made via the Agency and, the second, 
includes these cases and those where the payment is made direct to the parent 
with care. 
Table 5.1: Compliance rates by absent parents on the records of the Child 
Support Agency 
Full Partial Non-
compliance compliance compliance 
0/0 0/0 0/0 
Paying via the collection 31.6 31.5 36.9 
service only 
Paying via the collection 56.9 19.8 23.3 
service and by direct payment 
Source: adapted from Child Support Agency, 1997, p.30. 
The second row's first column is higher than the first as one would expect that 
fathers allowed to make payments directly to lone mothers would be more 
\\"illing to pay. What is surprising, however, is the low rate of full compliance 
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overal L especially for payments made VIa the Agency's collection service. 
Considering the Conservatives had pledged to 'ensure that parents honour their 
legal and moral responsibility to maintain their own children whenever they can 
afford to do SO',62 these figures are very disappointing. 
It is also somewhat shocking to note that in 1981/82 the percentage of lone 
mothers on benefit receiving maintenance was 50 per cent. 63 There are 
obviously difficulties in directly comparing these figures because some of the 
lone mother families on the Agency's books would not be in receipt of benefits 
whereas all the cases for the 1981/82 figure were. In addition, we do not know 
what proportion of cases were paying both fully or partially under the previous 
system. On the basis of these figures it is, therefore, only possible to speculate. 
However, it would appear that there has only been a negligible improvement in 
compliance rates under the Child Support Agency. But, as the Agency's figures 
only include 'live' cases, which presumably means that all the cases which were 
indefinitely 'shelved' are not included, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the 
court based system did better than the Agency at making fathers pay. 
The Agency's failure to make the majority of men comply in full with their 
maintenance assessments may reflect its reluctance to use the ultimate deterrent 
of imprisonment. Although it has increasingly been issuing Deductions from 
Earnings Orders (now at the rate of 4,500 a month), and, in the case of the self-
employed, liability orders (County Court Judgements which make borrowing 
money difficult for these men), it is very rare for the Agency to see that men who 
fail to comply get sent to prison. In the Agency's annual report there is an 
admission that they suspend recovery action in cases where 'it would be difficult, 
insensitive, or impossible to enforce recovery'.64 Only 134 men were committed 
to prison in 1995 and the average time they spent in custody was 27 days.65 This 
stands in stark contrast to the numbers of men imprisoned for non-payment of 
maintenance in the early 1980s when more than 2,000 men were committed each 
61 
- DSS I 990a, para. 2.1. 
6' JOSS. I 990b, para. 1.4.1. 
M CSA. 1997, p.78. 
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vear. 66 Moreover. liability orders are not always a successful method of 
enforcement. Evidence shows that the 'CSA is encountering some difficulty in 
assessing the level of maintenance payable by self-employed absent parents. and 
in the subsequent enforcement of their liability'.67 
The decline in the numbers of men being sent to prison does not coincide with 
the creation of the Child Support Agency, however. By 1985 the figure had 
fallen to 759 per annum and by 1990 it had fallen again to 243 per annum.68 
More research is needed to understand why this occurred. Perhaps the 
Conservative Government, unlike interwar governments, had decided that 
sending such men to prison was not worth the cost even before the CSA began 
its operations. However, in the 1980s and 1990s, there seems to be a correlation 
between the use of this deterrent and compliance rates. As the rate of 
imprisonment fell during the 1980s so did the compliance rate. Whereas 50 per 
cent of lone parent families on benefits were in receipt of maintenance in 
1981182. less than 25 per cent were in 1989.69 This suggests that policies to 
enforce child support cannot operate successfully without imprisoning defaulters 
- which, of course, increases public expenditure. This was a lesson that the 
governments learnt in the 1930s. The Conservatives seem to have pre-empted 
this situation from arising, but perhaps this action has contributed to the failure 
of their policy. 
In addition to the overall compliance rates, more than 90 per cent of absent 
fathers refuse to comply with interim maintenance assessments. 70 Interim 
maintenance assessments are imposed when an absent parent does not provide 
the Agency with all the infonnation requested. In order to encourage full 
disclosure these assessments are set at punitive rates averaging £90 a week.?l By 
6:i Home Office, 1995, p. 96. 
66 Hayes, 1983, p.243, 
67 Social Security Committee, 1997, p.3. 
hX Home Office, 1995, p.99. 
69 DSS 1990b . 
. , p.1. 
70 The Ohsl:'I'ver, 15 June 1997. 
71 The Dai~)' Telegraph, 17 July, 1996. 
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31 March 1997, £613.8 million was outstanding under these assessments.72 
Moreover, the Agency has admitted that '[ e ]xperience to date has shown that 
most of the amounts outstanding under this type of assessment are unlikely to be 
collectable'J3 Because of this, the Agency does not even include this amount in 
its total figure for outstanding debt in its annual report, much to the disapproval 
of the Comptroller and Auditor GeneralJ4 In the words of the Agency's last 
Chief Executive, its policy towards absent fathers who fail to pay interim 
assessment orders has been 'to say words to the effect, "What a pity you took it 
this far ... let's wipe the slate clean and start again"'J5 
In addition to this shortfall of £613.8 million, there is the Agency's recorded 
debt. By the 31 March 1997 this stood at £513 million. This means that, in the 
four years since it was established, the Agency has accumulated shortfalls and 
debts of £ 1,126.8 million. If the estimated losses to the Treasury from the 
amendments phased in since 1995 (£50 million for 1995/96 and £110 million for 
1996/97) are added to this sum, we are left with a figure of £ 1,286.8 million that 
the Agency has been unable to recoup on behalf of taxpayers. Whether the 
Agency will manage to recoup any of the officially recorded debt is debatable. 
The Agency has estimated that 'less than half of the £513 million maintenance 
debt owed by parents ... may be collectable'.76 
In a few of the cases where the Agency has deferred absent fathers' debts 
indefinitely, on condition that they pay their maintenance regularly, it has had to 
settle the deferred debts with the parent with care out of money provided by the 
Exchequer. In 199617 this amounted to £0.095 millionJ7 This brings the total 
loss in maintenance payments by absent fathers to just under £1,287 million. In 
fact, this is not much less that the £1,740 million78 that has been saved in social 
72 Comptroller and Auditor General's Report in CSA, 1997, p.78. 
73 CSA. 1997, p.61. 
74 Report of, in CSA, 1997. 
75 Ann Cant in Minutes of Evidence, Social Security Committee, 1997, p.9. 
76 CSA. 1997, p.71. 
77 Ibid .. p.63. 
7X HC Social Security Committee, 1997, p.vii-p.viii. 
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security expenditure since the Agency took over the responsibility of collecting 
child support. 
For the year 1996/97, the Child Support Agency claimed to have produced 
savings in benefit expenditure of over £468 million. 79 However, not all this 
amount came from maintenance payments by absent fathers. Some of these 
savings were due to the detection of 'fraud'. Any lone mother who ceased to 
claim benefits within a month of coming into contact with the Agency was 
judged by the Agency to have done so because she was defrauding the Benefit 
Agency. Between April and December 1996 over 33,500 lone mothers withdrew 
their benefit claims. The Agency therefore decided that the £115 million that 
would have been paid to them by the Department of Social Security in benefits 
could be included in the £468 million they claimed to have saved the Treasury.8o 
In 1991-92 benefit savings attributable to 'liable relatives' action amounted to 
£447 million at 1995-96 prices.8l Although it is not clear if this figure also 
included an amount for so-called 'fraud', the minimal difference between this 
figure and the Agency's is quite astonishing given that compliance rates in 1991-
92 were even lower than they are now. As mentioned earlier, figures show that 
in the late 1980s only 23 per of lone parent families on benefit were receiving 
maintenance which was considerably less than 50 per cent receiving them in 
1981182.82 This would suggest that the 'liable relatives' section of the 
Department of Health and Social Security in the early 1980s was probably more 
successful in saving public money than the current Child Support Agency. There 
is even reason to suspect that in reality the sums saved in 1991-92 were greater 
than those saved by the Agency 1996/97. In addition to 'fraud' savings having 
been included in the Agency's reported savings figure of £468 million, it also 
included a sum of £184 million. This is the amount that the Agency claimed was 
79 CSA. 1997, pA. 
80 HC Social Security Committee, 1997, p.xi. 
81 Ibid .. p.vii-p.viii. Because this figure was provided by the Committee looking into the. 
operation of Child Support under the CSA, it has to be assumed that they were only refernng to 
the 'liable relatives' of lone mother families. 
X) (- DSS. I 990b. para. 104.1. 
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paid by absent fathers who had an arrangement to make payments direct to the 
parent with care. However, this figure is calculated on the assumption that all 
these absent parents complied fully with their assessments. As this was highly 
unlikely, the Audit Office, therefore, considered this sum to be 'overstated' and 
argued that 'focusing the Agency's collection target on the amount they collect 
themselves would provide a more reliable and relevant indicator of their 
performance'.83 
The picture painted by these statistics is bleak. It becomes even bleaker when 
account is also taken of the running costs of the Agency. The Agency's net 
operating cost for 1996/97 was approximately £224.5 million. 84 In 1989/90 the 
administrative cost of the maintenance system which fell on the Department of 
Social Security and the Magistrates Courts was £44.4 million. 85 This represents 
a five fold increase in a matter of seven years. Even if we take into account price 
increases during this period, which were minimal anyway, we are still left with 
the fact that the old system was much cheaper to run. Moreover, under the old 
scheme the yield in terms of benefit savings compared with the administrative 
cost was greater than under the new scheme. In 1989/90 benefit savings arising 
from 'liable relative' action was £207 million and the running cost £44.4 
million. 86 This meant that for every one million pounds spent on the scheme, 
£4.7 million was saved by the Exchequer. In contrast to this, the Child Support 
scheme in 1996/97 only saved the Exchequer £2.1 million for every one million 
pounds spent on its administration (this has been calculated on its 'overstated' 
benetit savings figure of £468 million). 
This is not the end however because the calculation so far has not included all , , 
the other indirect costs which have arisen as a result of the Agency's work. 
These fall into three broad categories. The first category includes all the 
expenses involved in keeping the work of the Agency under constant 
surveillance. The second type of indirect costs relate to compensation payments 
8., Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General in CSA, 1997, p.87. 
84 CSA 1997 to 
. , p."t . 
s~ 
. DSS. 1990b, para. 6.5. 
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that the Agency has had to meet, and the third set of costs anse from the 
technical demands of running the Agency. 
Surveillance costs have largely come about as a result of the Agency's catalogue 
of errors and deep unpopularity since it began its operations. Although it is not 
possible to give figures for the amounts involved, they must be quite 
considerable; the Government had to set up a Select Committee to investigate the 
Agency's performance which has now produced six reports. In April 1997, an 
Independent Case Examiner was appointed to deal with complaints about 
maladministration from clients who are dissatisfied with the Agency's handling 
of their cases. 87 Extra public expense has been incurred by the National Audit 
Office which has had an unusually high level of involvement with the Agency. 
For example, because it was unhappy with the Agency's annual report in 1997, 
the Auditor General decided to produce his own report, which was also 
reproduced in the same publication.88 Finally, the Agency's maladministration of 
child support has also placed extra demands on the Office of the Parliamentary 
Ombudsman. The Ombudsman has produced two reports on the Child Support 
Agency as a result of its administrative problems. In them the list of faults cited 
cover just about every aspect of the Agency's operations: confusion over 
procedures; breaches of confidentiality; delays in maintenance requests; 
problems with interim maintenance assessments and failure to take prompt 
action to enforce payment. 89 
Compensation costs have arisen because of the Agency's incompetence. As from 
April 1996, the Child Support Agency, under the order the Minister of Social 
Security, has had to pay automatic compensation of £100 to people wrongly sent 
assessment forms.90 In addition, more serious cases, which have ended up in 
court or in the hands of the ombudsman, have necessitated greater payouts. For 
example, in one case the wife of a man wrongly accused by the Agency of 
Nil He Social Security Committee, 1997, p.vii. 
87 Ibid. 1997, p.x. 
88 See, CSA, 1997. 
89 The Dui!r Telegraph, 14 March 1996. 
l)() Ibid .. 26 March 1996. 
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fathering a child received £2,000 in damages for the 'distress caused'.9J In 
another case, this time of a mother, £ 1,500 was awarded for caused by the 
Agency's failure to deal with her case properly.92 Once again, it is not possible to 
put a figure of the amount of taxpayers money consumed by compensation and 
legal claims as there is a limit to the information disclosed by the Agency at 
present. 
Although it is also not possible to arrive at a definitive sum for the technical 
costs of running the Agency, they have been just as visible. A new unit to deal 
with Deductions of Earnings Orders has been set up. Known as the Attachment 
of Earnings Payment System, the unit began its work in December 1996.93 
Although not intended just to collect maintenance payments, its existence 
demonstrates how enforcement necessitates huge administrative investments 
which are often overlooked when polices like the Child Support Act are 
introduced, or when the costs of running them are discussed. Moreover, if this 
unit is as inefficient as the Child Support Agency, then the implications for the 
taxpayer are surely very serious. There is a great need for further research into 
the costs incurred by administrative processes. 
When the Child Support Agency was first established, a completely new 
computer system was purchased to handle its workload at a cost of £600 million. 
However, it has just been reported that: 
The £600 million computer commissioned from the US firm EDS is 
to be scrapped only four years after it has been installed. It has been 
estimated that the total social security savings made by the agency to 
date may be wiped out by the new computer system.94 [My 
emphasis]. 
Clearly. there is no further need to demonstrate the failure of the Child Support 
Agency. This is not something that the present Chief Executive of the Agency, 
91 The Guardian, 3 July 1996. 
92 Ibid .. I-l March 1996. 
9' 
.' Lord Chancellor's Office, 1997, p.29. 
94 The Ohsen'l!!'. 13 April 1997. 
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Faith Boardman, would dispute either. In the Agency's latest report she says 
herself 
... I am well aware that much work needs to be done to improve our 
quality of service and increase our effectiveness and value for 
money.95 
As far as improving value for money is concerned, it would be cheaper to scrap 
the whole system and return to the status quo. This is not only because of the 
need for a new computer system, however. The cost of running the Agency 
seems to be out of control and there is no indication that it will be trimmed down 
in the future, although the Minister at the Department of Social Security intends 
to do just this. Between 1996 and 1997 the net running cost of the Agency had 
risen by approximately £25 million.96 Although the Agency has been instructed 
to reduce this figure by 25 per cent over the next three years, in line with the rest 
of the social security machine, it still plans to employ another 900 staff from 
April 1998 at the cost of £15 million.97 More staff but with less money to run 
the operation does not bode well. In his 1996 report the Ombudsman said he 
feared a slower service in the future. He also predicts that the Agency will make 
more mistakes and foresees greater maladministration generally when these cuts 
are introduced.98 
There is little prospect of reversing the Agency's steady decline. Moreover, 
absent fathers are showing no signs of becoming more compliant. Their 
campaign against the Agency continues unabated. The Network Against the 
Child Support Agency now has its own website on the Internet: 
There you will find, flamboyance exposed, just what the Government 
is up against in trying to break the fathers' conspiracy to defraud the 
CSA. The website heading proudly says: "Colluding to Defraud the 
State". No holds barred, it tells fathers how to cheat. It suggests 
l)~ CSA. 1997. pA. 
% Ibid .. p.-lO. 
(): 
. The Dai~l' Telegraph, 9 July 1997. 
98 The uuardian 14 March 1996. 
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fathers write semi-literate letters: "People are more likely to succeed 
if they come over as not very bright". It explains how the threat of 
violence to their ex-partner is nearly always accepted as a reason for 
the CSA to withdraw. "Showing CSA officials evidence of damage 
done to a house by an ex-partner (such as broken windows) will 
usually have an effect". They know the CSA's weak points. "'The 
('SA does not have the ability to investigate the evidence you give 
them". They know officials work to targets based on cases cleared 
rather than success in delivering money to mothers.99 
The size of this pressure group should also be noted. By 1994 it had 212 local 
groups and 200,000 members. Many other similar organisations have also 
sprung up since 1993. (There is even a railway workers' group and a gas 
workers' group campaigning against the Agency).loo The Agency, therefore, has 
a formidable task ahead of it. 
vi) Lone Mother Families After the Introduction of the Child Support 
Act 
Despite the rhetoric about 'putting children first', in financial terms, there was 
never any possibility that the majority of lone mothers would be better off. Only 
one-tenth of the money the Agency collects goes to their families. 101 Lone 
mothers on Income Support (and these are the majority) have every pound in 
maintenance collected by the Agency deducted from their benefit, and mothers 
on Family Credit or disability working allowance are only allowed to keep up to 
£ 15 of any maintenance paid. That is, of course, in those cases where the 
Agency has succeeded in making the father pay. Abbott's study of lone mothers 
in Liverpool found 'low contact' between the Agency and the mothers and 
concluded that this was probably because the CSA could see little point in 
intervening in an area of 'high unemployment, where absent parents may be 
ditlicult to trace, where little money may be available and where there is general 
l)l) . 
Poll) foynbee, The Guardian, 26 June 1997. 
11111 7'1 
I ,1i! Independent 20 June 1994. 
101 HC 199-+. col. 969. 
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hostility towards both the Act and the Agency'.102 In another study of a more 
representative sample of lone mothers, the Agency had decided not to seek 
maintenance from fathers in a quarter of the cases. 103 
The latter study also found that as a result of the Child Support Act many lone 
mother families had become worse off materially. It found that under the old 
scheme. one-third of absent fathers had made informal contributions to their 
former families, for example, by giving the lone mothers some money towards 
household bills, children's clothes and outings, or by providing towards the cost 
of large Christmas and birthday presents for their children. In a number of cases 
the fathers withdrew this help as soon as the Act came into effect because they 
assumed that their maintenance payments would be considerably higher under it . 
Of the mothers fortunate enough to be able to keep the £ 15 disregard, the 
researchers discovered that in many cases the mothers had considerable difficulty 
in getting hold of the money as a consequence of the Agency's inefficiency.104 
The authors of this study therefore concluded that 
as a consequence of the Child Support Act, some children had 
already experienced a net reduction in the material quality of their 
lives; others were facing such reductions in the near future, as their 
fathers became unable to pay for the treats, shoes, clothes and 
outings which afforded a temporary escape from the deprivations and 
monotony of life on the poverty line. lOS 
As Boden and Childs have put it: 'This sits uncomfortably with the dominant 
principle of child law, which posits that the welfare of the child is the 
"paramount consideration"'.106 
Losing out on the extras that absent fathers used to provide is undoubtedly a 
great loss to those lone mother families who benefited from this kind of support. 
Recent statistics show that 50 per cent of lone mothers live on less that £ 100 a 
I(I~ Abbott, 1996, p.30. 
103 Glendinning et aI., 1995, p.20. 
104 Ibid .. p.20-p.24. 
I()~ Ibid .. p.2 .. J.. 
10(' Roden and Childs, 1996, p.156. 
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week compared with only 4 per cent of married couples. At the other end of the 
income scale this pattern is reversed. While 60 per cent of all married couples 
have an income of more than £350 a week, only 8 per cent of lone mothers do 
SO.107 Under the Conservative Government the gap between the rich and the 
poor generally has widened. After deducting housing costs, the real income of 
the poorest 10 per cent of the population fell by 14 per cent between 1979 and 
1991.108 In fact, this was the opposite of what was supposed to happen. 
According to Tory economic philosophy, 'rolling back the state' and leaving the 
market free from such interference was supposed to result in a 'trickle down' of 
wealth. Like the Child Support Act, this policy also clearly failed. If further 
policies promised by the Conservatives (before the election of the Labour 
Government in May 1997), still get the go-ahead lone mother families will 
become even poorer. In November 1996, Peter Lilley, the Social Security 
Secretary at the time, announced that as from April 1998 lone parents will no-
longer be eligible for one-parent benefit (worth £6.30 a week). He also stated 
that lone parents on Income Support will lose their lone-parent premium (£5.20 a 
week) and that the cash value of their benefits will be frozen. 109 
These cuts are to form part of an overall package of social security savings. If 
the present government continues the process of whittling away the benefits of 
lone mother families, whether through increasing the penalty they have to face if 
they do not co-operate with the Child Support Agency or by directly cutting 
benefits to them then it will be lone mothers rather than absent fathers who are , 
the real 'soft targets' at the end of the day. Unlike absent fathers, lone mothers 
have not been able to launch a campaign against the Child Support Agency, let 
alone win any concessions from the government. As the first Chief Executive of 
the CSA pointed out: 'Whilst the men's campaigning is well organised, women 
living on social security often can't even afford stamps to write to their MPs'.llo 
107 The Guardian, 2 June 1997. 
108 Boden and Childs, 1996, p.141. 
109 The Guardian, 27 November 1996. 
110 Ros Hepplewhite, quoted in Abbott, 1996, p.29. 
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However. just because there is no record of lone mothers complaining, this does 
not mean that they welcomed the Act or the Agency. Abbott's study (1996), for 
example, refutes this common assumption. This author also found out why lone 
mothers did not want to be heard expressing negative feelings towards the new 
scheme: 
All the parents had great concerns about this: that they would be seen 
or heard by people who had to make decisions about their cases and 
that they would consequently be regarded as problematic or 
troublesome; and publicly presenting painful, difficult, or previously 
secret accounts of past relationships would be a potential source of 
embarrassment and upset to their children ... 111 
The only voices to be heard, supposedly representing the views of lone mothers, 
were those of certain organisations, such as, the National Council for One Parent 
Families which wholeheartedly supported the Child Support Act. This 
organisation supported the scheme from its inception and also helped frame the 
Act. I 12 It may only have done so because it felt that the new scheme was the 
only politically feasible alternative to the old system at the time. However, as the 
Council depends on regular grants from the government, this may have biased its 
views about what is in the best interests of lone mother families. After the Child 
Support Act was implemented the Council was awarded £1 million by the 
government to set up a training scheme for lone mothers. I 13 . 
Undoubtedly, it has also been hard for lone mothers to challenge any government 
policies because of their negative image. This is not anything new, as earlier 
chapters have testified. The depth of hostility towards lone mothers may have 
shifted slightly in different eras, I 14 but 'Conservative opinion in the 1990s is as 
hostile towards unmarried mothers as was the poor law opinion in the nineteenth 
century'. I I :' A British Social Attitudes Survey in 1995, carried out by Social and 
III Abbott, 1996, p.29. 
112 Maclean, 1994, p.517. 
113 Letter from a member of the Campaign against the Child Support Act in The Guardian 17 
December, 1991. 
11-1 For a detailed discussion see Lewis, 1995a. 
II:' Ibid .. p.47. 
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Community Planning Research, confirmed this. Only 26 per cent of the 
respondents agreed with the statement that 'unmarried mothers get too little 
sympathy from society'.116 Moreover, the chances of these attitudes being 
reversed is extremely unlikely as the influence of right-wing authors on the 
subject continue to hit the headlines. For example, Dennis, a researcher at the 
right-wing think-tank, the Institute of Economic Affairs, has again reiterated his 
claim that lone mothers and the unemployed are responsible for the rising crime 
rate. Dennis also believes that lone mothers should partly take the blame for 
their low incomes because of their lifestyles. In common with those who 
expressed deep concerns about 'pauperisation' in the first half of this century, 
Dennis concludes that 
the lifestyles of those on the poverty line are linked to the breakdown 
of cultural mechanisms which once transmitted 'messages of 
responsibility, striving, self-help and self-improvement'.!!7 
Faced with this kind of hostility, lone mothers remain mute when new policies 
atTecting them are introduced - in contrast to absent fathers or, for example, the 
protesters against the Poll Tax. Policies in the near future aimed at reducing the 
burden of lone mother families on the state are, however, unlikely to involve the 
pursuit of absent fathers. Even though there has been no admission from the 
Government that the Child Support Act is a complete fiscal and administrative 
failure, the emphasis on making the father pay is declining and alternative 
suggestions to the problem of lone mother families have begun to be heard - as in 
the interwar years. Some of the proposals now being suggested are exactly the 
same ones that followed the failure of legislation to enforce the father's duty in 
the earlier period. In the mid 1990s two Bills appeared before Parliament, one to 
reform adoption law and one to reform the law on divorce. 
At the heart of the Adoption Bill lies the proposal to make the welfare of 
children in such proceedings paramount and to make adoption easier. This is 
116 Otlice for National Statistics, 1997, p.44. 
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partly to be achieved by reducing the rights of natural parents to block an 
adoption and by eroding the 'politically correct' barriers to adoption. The Bill is 
also clearly designed to reduce government expenditure. In recent decades, 
while there has been a significant decline in the number of adoptions there has 
been a growth in fostering, the cost of which has caused 'dismay' in the 
Department of Health. I 18 Although it is not obvious how this may effect lone 
mothers if such legislation is passed, one commentator has argued that another 
aim of the proposal is 'to put pressure on inadequate single mothers to let go, 
when the struggle and the cost to the state get too great' .119 
The Family Law Bill is the work of the Lord Chancellor, Lord Mackay. In a 
White Paper that was published in April 1995 he stated that his intention was to 
shore up and reinforce the institution of marriage. However, some of his 
proposals seemed to contradict this, such as, for example, the removal of fault. 
The Bill received a rocky passage through Parliament. Even though there is as 
yet no Act, the Tories have managed to force other amendments into the Bill 
which would make it harder for couples to break-up. These include, for 
example, an amendment to make couples fully aware of the financial 
ramifications of divorce, and measures to ensure that couples go through a three 
month period of reconciliation before they can begin divorce proceedings.12o As 
we have seen, this is exactly the same remedy that was proposed in the late 
1930s after the government at that time realised that making fathers pay was a 
futile exercise and that it might be better to prevent marriage breakdown in the 
first place. 
Even if the new government endorses these proposals, they are not intended to 
provide the main solution to the problem of lone mother families. The White 
Paper that outlined the proposals for the Child Support Act also stated that in 
addition to making fathers pay, the government intended to 'enable caring parents 
117 The Guardian, :2 January 1997. 
II R Ibid .. 22 August 1996. 
III) Katharine Whitehorn in The Observer, 31 March 1996. 
120 The Dai~l' Telegraph, 17 June 1996. 
179 
who wish to work to do so ... '.121 Initially, this proposal was not at the forefront 
of policy. Now that the Act has failed, this situation has been reversed. 
Discussions about making fathers pay have faded into the background, and the 
whole debate about lone mothers is centred on 'helping' them get into the labour 
market. This has been especially obvious since New Labour took office in May 
1997. under the leadership of Tony Blair. While it has been reported that Labour 
may abolish the Child Support Agency,l22 its plans for a replacement system to 
make fathers pay have yet to be heard of. In contrast to this, a considerable 
amount of media space has been devoted to relating New Labour's proposals to 
make lone mothers work. 
One commentator has pointed out that: 'Not so long ago any minister questioning 
the level of state support to lone parents provoked howls of outrage from the 
Opposition ... '.I23 This is certainly not the case under New Labour especially with 
Frank Field and Harriet Harman in charge of the Department of Social Security. 
On workfare and lone mothers, Field 
has a strict Catholic view of the fallibility of fallen humanity that 
colour his thinking. He believes that the selfishness of human 
nature, combined with means-tested benefits, encourages fraud, and 
that until the Left abandons its faith in the perfectibility of Man it 
will never bring social security spending under control ... In a frank 
speech ... Field argued that all single mothers with children aged over 
four should look for work or undertake training. If they refuse, they 
should be denied benefit. .... Field called for more child care, adding 
that student grants should be privatised, freeing £ 1.2 billion to fund 
it, thus developing peer-group pressure on single mothers to work.124 
Although Labour has not said if this scheme is to be compulsory, it has stated 
that it will provide improved childcare under its 'welfare to work' plan. It plans 
to encourage more after-school clubs funded by the private sector and the 
lottery. 1 ~:i The main criticism of this scheme is as follows: 
111 DSS ~ . 1990a, Vol. I, p.5. 
111 
-- Tl1t! Ohserver, 27 November 1996. 
11 ' 
-' The Guardian, 25 January 1997. 
12-1 Patrick Wintour in The Observer, II May 1997. 
12:i The Guardian, 7 June 1997. 
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Promising to diver: a few mil~ion pounds from the lottery for 
homework centres ~s no~ a pohcy. Worse still, pretending this 
welfare-to-work polIcy wIll save money is dishonest. None of the 
successful programmes, such as Australia's JET Gobs, education and 
training) scheme which Labour has endorsed, have saved money. 
Cash is required to back up commitment [just as it was under the 
Child Support Act].126 
There are also more fundamental objections to Labour's 'welfare to work' 
proposal, as Hilary Land has pointed out: 
Apparently, looking after children does not count as 'work' unless it 
takes place in the labour market. It is insulting to describe mothers 
on benefit as 'passive' and 'dependent' just because their main source 
of income is the state. Mothers' inability to take paid employment 
stems not only for concern that with the low wages on offer they 
would be not better off, but also that adequate childcare is costly and 
consists of more than after-school clubs ... 127 
In recognition that after-school clubs would not in themselves provide an 
adequate answer to the problem of childcare, the Chancellor, Gordon Brown, 
announced in his summer Budget in 1997 that lone mothers on Family Credit 
could keep an extra £40 a week for such costs before deductions from their 
benefit. This disregard raised the threshold for childcare costs for those on 
Family Credit from £60 to £100 a week. However, following this announcement 
new figures released by Department of Social Security showed that only 2,000 
out of the 500,000 families claiming the benefit would gain from the 
disregard. 128 
It will be interesting to see how this plan proceeds. While it may well force lone 
mothers into the workplace - for the simple reason that they will be powerless to 
object - they will only be in low paid work because the majority of them are 
126 Ibid., 2 June 1997. 
127 Ibid., 3 June 1997. 
128 Ibid., 16 August 1997. 
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unqualified. 129 Field's suggestion that the scheme could be subsidised bv 
students is unlikely to happen, however. When students begin paying for tuition 
fees in 1998 these resources will be needed to keep the underfunded educational 
establishments afloat. It therefore seems that once again the cost will fall on the 
taxpayer. for - even if they do work - lone mothers will still need to top up their 
wages with benefits. The cost of administering the scheme will also need to be 
found and. if it is anything like the Child Support Agency, the money involved 
will he enonnous. 
Many lone mothers at present save the taxpayer money though their unpaid work 
in the community. If they are 'helped' to enter the paid work force and are no 
longer able to help out in schools, or look after elderly or disabled dependants 
etc .. then this cost will fall on the taxpayer as well. 
vii) Conclusion 
Clearly. the Child Support Act has been a failure, just as similar attempts to 
make fathers pay were in the interwar years. It is difficult to understand why the 
Conservative Party failed to foresee this. After all, the reports of the various 
Committees which had investigated the issue of child support following Fischer 
Williams, had demonstrated the futility of this approach.130 Obviously, it will 
not be possible to answer this question until historians in the future have access 
to the records of the Conservative Party. Under Margaret Thatcher the 
Conservatives demonstrated an overwhelming degree of self assurance over their 
ahility to force unpopular and ill thought out measures to a successful 
conclusion. In this at least, the fate of the CSA paralleled that of the Poll Tax. 
Clearly. the Conservatives were wrong to assume that they could coerce the 
majority of absent fathers into paying. The government was also wrong to over-
1'0 . 
- Ford and MIllar, 1997, pA. 
DO The Committee on Statutory Maintenance Limits, 1968; the Payne Committee on the 
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look the fact that making fathers pay will always be a counter-productiye 
measure, in financial terms, as long as two households cost more than one. Most 
men simply do not have the resources to pay much in the way of maintenance to 
their former families. This was noted by the Fischer Williams Committee in 
1935, and was again emphasised by a similar Committee in 1968: 
All the evidence available suggests that the parties in the great 
majority of broken marriages have very limited financial resources 
and that those who become defendants to proceedings in magistrates 
courts have earnings or salaries well below the national average.!3! 
Following the 1968 Committee, the Finer Committee, which reported in 1974, 
concluded, for the same reason, that 'a more rigorous enforcement of 
maintenance orders would achieve very little'.!32 Indeed, this was why the 
authors of the Finer Report recommended that the state should provide lone 
mother families with a Guaranteed Maintenance Allowance. Needless to say, 
this proposal was rejected by the government at the time. Some commentators 
have argued this was because by the time the government got around to 
considering it, the economy was in a deep recession.!33 However, even if the 
economy had been healthy, the government would not have seriously considered 
improving the material circumstances of lone mother families. This was because 
there is a reluctance to improve the provision for the fatherless in 
case marriage is eroded .. , and that common-law marriage or extra-
marital relations shall not be economically preferable to legal 
marriage. 134 
This remains as true today as it has always been. It also remains true that 
Marital breakdown occurs disproportionately among less well-off 
parents, whose wages pre-split, let alone post-split, may not be 
adequate to support a family. Even those who do have a reasonable 
131 Committee on Statutory Maintenance Limits, 1968, para. 103. 
1~1F' 11 
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lJJ Eekelaar and Maclean, 1986, p.lIO. 
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income cannot usually support two households at an adequate level 
at the same time. 135 
As Lord Russell pointed out in the House of Lords on the subject of child 
support: 
It strikes me as one of the curious aspects of the modern 
Conservative Party that while it underrates the amount that people 
can pay in the form of taxation, it tends to overrate with equal 
consistency the amount of money which people can payout of the 
other pocket which is labelled private. 136 
Although the new Labour Government is also committed to a policy of low 
taxation, its apparent abandonment of the Child Support Act may stem from a 
recognition of the inability of fathers to pay, and/or a recognition of the costs 
involved in making them. However, instead of addressing the structural 
problems that underlie the issue of child support, it has simply proposed yet 
another scheme that it hopes will lessen the state's financial burden. However, 
Labour's plan to make lone mothers undertake paid work is not going to succeed 
without extra expense to the taxpayer - through the provision of childcare. It will 
be interesting to see if these running costs are any less, or more, than those of the 
CSA. Labour's 'welfare to work' scheme is fundamentally different from the 
Conservative's child support scheme, however. Labour's proposal threatens to 
seriously erode the male-breadwinner model to the point where perhaps absent 
fathers will have no role to play at all. Not only will there be little expectation 
for them to provide financially for their former families, many will also 
undoubtedly be forced out of the labour market as jobs have to be found for lone 
mothers. 
In conclusion, the operation of the Child Support Act has been no more 
successful than similar attempts made by governments in the first half of the 
century. It is ironic that in both periods, attempts to make fathers pay and reduce 
the cost to the community of lone mother families, had the effect of increasing 
13:' Ford and Millar, 1997, p.5. 
136 HL I 99-t. Parliamentary Debates, co1.l658. 
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either local or national expenditure. In the earlier period this was because stricter 
measures to make fathers pay resulted in an increase in imprisonments. Under 
the Child Support Act, while this has been avoided, extra expense has been 
incurred because of the huge administrative costs, which, at the present time, 
threaten to wipe-out all the negligible gains that have so far been made in public 
expenditure savings. This was inevitable because the majority of absent fathers 
need to be coerced into paying. As we have seen, then as now, many fathers will 
try and avoid making payments to their former families. This is not, however, 
always due to wilful neglect. Under the Child Support Act, the Conservatives 
tried to redress the previous system by attempting to equalise the distribution of a 
man's resources between his first and second family. As the majority of such 
men have limited finances anyway, it was not surprising to find that Treasury 
savings were negligible as compared to the previous system. 
Even though it can be argued that the Act also partly failed because of Margaret 
Thatcher's administrative style, which meant that it was passed quickly and 
without much consultation, the incremental approach taken by the governments 
in the first decades of the century fared no better. In both of these periods, 
making the father pay was a reaction to severe public expenditure constraints by 
governments whose philosophies were underpinned by the desire to 'roll back the 
state'. It is, therefore, also paradoxical, that in both these periods, governments 
sought a solution that required greater bureaucracy. The Conservatives thought 
that in setting up a 'Next Steps' Agency a more efficient service would be 
provided than if the scheme had been run by a government department. The 
Child Support Agency has certainly not come up to expectations in this respect. 
It stands accused of providing a 'dire' service, and of being incompetent because 
of the catalogue of errors and mistakes it has made. It has also failed to meet 
many of its financial and administrative targets. It is not surprising that it has 
earned itself the nick-name of the 'Child Shambles Agency'. Moreover. the Child 
Support Agency has been a particularly invasive machine in some peoples' lives, 
which also casts doubt on the Conservatives stated attachment to the notion of 
indi\idual liberty. 
185 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
Throughout the twentieth century lone mother families have been seen as a 
problem. This has primarily been because of their inability to be self-supporting 
financially. As we live in a society where individuals are supposed to provide 
for themselves through their paid labour, or be provided for as dependants of 
those who are employed, lone mothers have not, and do not, fit easily into this 
framework. However, rather than question this value system, governments have 
repeatedly tried to make them fit, by attempting to ensure that individual fathers 
do not abandon their financial responsibility towards their former families once 
relationships have broken down. The findings of this study have shown that this 
is not a fruitful exercise for the simple reason that forcing absent fathers to fulfil 
their obligation often costs the community more money than it is able to recoup 
from these men. Perhaps if there was a greater recognition of this outcome 
different ways of approaching the problem would be explored which might, for 
once, be of benefit to lone mothers and their children who, on moral grounds, 
should not remain relegated to the margins of society because of the poverty they 
have to endure. 
Even though the history of attempts to make fathers pay in the first half of the 
twentieth century and in the 1980s and 1990s, shows that governments were 
more likely to take a harsher line in times of economic decline and/or when faced 
with an escalation in local or public expenditure, such policies were also the 
outcome of other factors. In both of these periods the dominant ideology 
reinforced the notion that lone motherhood was a social ill. Even though sexual 
mores have undergone considerable changes since the tum of the century,
l 
the 
belief that 'intact' families are better for children and men remains. Because of 
this governments then, and now, have been determined to discourage the 
formation of lone mother families. This was partly why, when policies to make 
father pay failed, governments turned to other methods which they hoped would 
I See, for example, Weeks 1989: Haste 1992. 
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prevent the creation of such families. Adoption and divorce legislation, in 
particular, have been used for this purpose. As neither of these measures 
threatens to undermine the male breadwinner model, the resort to this tactic is. 
and was, unsurprising. 
This final chapter will review the findings of this study in order to explore the 
contention that the failure of the Child Support Act could have been predicted. 
Although, obviously, each of the periods investigated had their own unique 
characteristics, there were also some striking similarities, at least in relation to 
why measures to make fathers came about and why they failed. This discussion 
will be followed by a brief look at the implications of such policies on lone 
mothers in order to demonstrate that this approach needs replacing once and for 
all. 
This study has show that in the first decade of the twentieth century, the Liberal 
Government began a process to ensure that fathers paid either affiliation or 
maintenance. Faced with ever increasing Poor Law expenditure and unable to 
put up rates, it was hoped that such measures would prevent lone mother families 
resorting to the guardians for support. In passing the legislation of 1914, the 
Liberals were also able to demonstrate that despite greater state interference into 
the family to ensure that children grew up to be fit and healthy, they had no 
desire to undermine the responsibility of fathers. In any case, they were also 
under considerable pressure to reform the system of wife and child support 
because various commissions and committees had forced the subject on to 
political agenda. However, in common with governments in the interwar years, 
the Liberals were well aware that the Affiliations Orders Act and the Criminal 
Justice Administration Act might result in more men being sent to prison for 
arrears. As this would lead to an increase in expenditure, they were not prepared 
to act on all the recommendations that had been proposed. 
Although the war intensified demands for even stricter measures to make fathers 
pay, as governments were anxious not to antagonise absent fathers they managed 
to delay reform. Even though the war had highlighted the plight of lone mother 
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families and aroused concern about the well-being of their children to a greater 
degree than in the prewar years, the need to keep up the morale of men, firstly. 
when fighting and then during the slow process of demobilisation, meant that 
this was not a period for taking steps to ensure that they met their financial duty 
to their former families. However, in response to pressure from various 
organisations. such as the newly established National Council for the Unmarried 
Mother and Her Child, the Coalition Government did agree to raise the 
maximum limits, although the amounts did not reflect the huge war time price 
increases. 
Following the economic collapse in 1921, policy makers became less hesitant 
about compelling fathers to pay. Even though there was still an awareness that 
this approach would probably not work, growing Poor Law expenditure and 
Treasury orthodoxy, made the government far more willing to give into the 
demands of those who wanted to see lone mothers better provided for by absent 
fathers. As many of the campaigners for these reforms were feminists, and as the 
women's movement could not so easily be ignored by policy makers in the early 
1920s, the legislation that was eventually passed in 1923 and 1925 did meet 
more of the demands of such women. They also seemed to suit the needs of the 
then Conservative Government which was determined to achieve balanced 
budgets. However, as this government also had doubts about the ability of these 
measures to make fathers pay and therefore reduce the cost of lone mother 
families on the community, it also instigated other measures in the 1920s which 
were intended to ensure that if fathers could not, or would not, pay, then other 
individuals would take on the responsibility by, for example, adopting the 
children of lone mothers. 
By the 1930s. the suspicion that attempts to make fathers pay might fail, was 
confirmed when prisons became silted up with debtors. This outcome \\as 
inevitable, because as we have seen, no amount of legislation to coerce men into 
paying. or pay more, could make them do so if they were unwilling or could not 
afford to (which was frequently the case). Because many of them were. as they 
are today, more likely to be in low paid employment, this outcome had little tl) 
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do with the Depression, even though there was some correlation between the 
numbers imprisoned and unemployment rates. Interwar governments were 
therefore forced to abandon this policy. 
In repeating the same mistake in the 1990s, it would appear that the Conservative 
Government was unaware of this lesson that was learnt the hard way in the 1920s 
and 1930s. Or, if they were aware of the inevitability of this outcome, which had 
after all been the subject of discussion by various government committees on 
numerous occasions over the years, they perhaps believed that they could 
succeed where others had failed. The Tories, under Margaret Thatcher, certainly 
went to more extreme measures to ensure that fathers paid than their counter 
parts had in the interwar years. Although governments then were presented with 
proposals very similar to the Child Support Act of 1991, the misogyny of many 
politicians and civil servants had also made them more reluctant to place too 
great a burden on men. Thus, even though the need for some kind of measure to 
prevent lone mothers from burdening ratepayers or taxpayers was common to 
both periods, attempts to make fathers pay in the later years of the twentieth 
century were far more radical. 
There were also many similarities between these periods ideologically. Although 
lone motherhood had to an extent become more acceptable in the years 
immediately before the Conservative Party came to office, this trend was 
reversed by right-wing moral crusaders. In particular, they were responsible for 
reinforcing the notion that lone mothers were 'feckless' and the producers of 
criminal children. This, coupled with the widely held belief that absent fathers 
were also 'errant' and 'feckless' meant that the new scheme for child support met 
with overwhelming approval. In 1983 a leaked government paper referred to 
state support of lone parent families as 'subsidising illegitimacy and immorality,.2 
At the same time the government began espousing the notion that in view of the 
supposed moral collapse of society, there was a need to return to Victorian 
values. The belief that the solution to this crisis could be found by turning the 
, 
~ Macaskil, 1993, p.44. 
189 
clock back had also been prevalent in the first half of the century.3 Thus, in both 
of these periods the purpose of legislation to make fathers pay was not onl \ 
economic but also disciplinary - although the latter may spring from the fonner. 
In so far as measures were designed to inculcate a sense of responsibility in 
absent fathers, it was hoped that the institution of the family would not be 
undermined and social stability threatened. The supposition that there had once 
been a golden age of the family, and the desire to return to this age, was 
therefore, a dominant feature in both of these eras. As a consequence of this, 
attitudes towards lone mothers, then as now, were not dissimilar, nor were the 
solutions that were sought to the problem. Lone mothers were not unique in 
being the subject of discourses. Then, as now, the doctrine that it was necessary 
to return to 'the thrift, independence, self-help and self-reliance of years gone 
by',4 applied to all members of society, even though it was not a philosophy that 
most poor people could aspire to. As this included absent fathers who, as we 
have seen, were and remain over-represented in the poorer sections of society, 
the fundamental reason for the failure of schemes to make them pay rested on the 
fact that the majority of them were unable to support their former families. even 
though in many cases they were also unwilling. 
The discussion of the Child Support Act in chapter 5 of this thesis, has 
demonstrated that within just a few years of beginning its operations, the Child 
Support Agency has failed. It has not only failed to recoup more money for the 
Treasury, but it has also been unable to make more absent fathers comply with 
their orders than they were under the previous system. It has also cost more to 
administer than both the courts and the liable relative section of the Department 
of Social Security that preceded it cost together. Moreover. although the 
Conservatives had great faith in the ability of 'Next Steps' agencies to provide 
more efficient services, the incompetence of the Child Support Agency has 
proved them wrong in this respect. 
, See, for example. Haste, 1994, p.74; Thane, 1978, p.16. 
4 Drage, 1930, p.43. 
190 
However, the failure of the Child Support Act cannot simply be blamed on the 
Agency. As we have also seen from this study, it set out to achieve the 
impossible. The new scheme to make fathers pay ultimately failed for the same 
reason that measures failed in the interwar years. In addition to absent fathers 
lack of resources to spread between two households, in the 1920s, Eleanor 
Rathbone summed-up the other reason for the failure of such schemes when she 
said 'that if the burden on the man is made too heavy he will evade payment,.5 In 
the 1980s, Eekelaar reiterated this when he said that if 'the state is coercive it can 
be a deterrent to the debtor to make payments,.6 (He also wrote that an 
'enforcement system is likely to cost more than it would yield in increased debtor 
contributions,). 7 
Diduck has tried to explain men's reluctance to provide for their former families 
in greater depth. In particular, she has concluded that when men repartner: 
It is almost as though by taking on new responsibilities they have 
made a choice to found a new family, and concurrently to relinquish 
control over the old one. The old one is no longer their 
responsibility: it becomes no one's responsibility and thereby loses 
its status as family. Thus, in the context of the CSA, absent fathers' 
frequent references to the welfare of their second families makes 
sense. ... The others are their former families, who, in partnership 
with ... the CSA, prevent men from 'improving their own lifestyle' or 
'supporting a family'. 8 
However, as this study has revealed, it was not necessary to wait until to 1990s to 
find this out. The reluctance of many men to pay in the first decades of the 
century was also noted by contemporaries. Judging by the number of letters in 
Home Office files of the time, absent fathers were also just as vociferous in their 
protests against measures to compel them to pay. The following example, 
presumably written by such a man in the mid 1930s, was not untypical: 
5 Rathbone, 1949, p.76. 
6 Eekelaar. 1984, p.133. 
7 Ibid .. p. 13 1. 
8 1995. 
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The~e are ma?y wom~n who simply marry and then separate just to 
obtam a penSIOn for lIfe. ... Far too much consideration is gi\'en to 
women today, men realize the inj ustice they have to suffer at th 
f . e hands 0 magIstrates and resent it and so refuse to pay, the women of 
today are of an entirely different temperament and outlook to the 
women ~f years ago, most of the women today are after something 
for nothmg and they are encouraged in this by the attitude of 
magistrates, men can see the unfairness and resent it, to my mind 
there are very few men who would refuse to meet their obligations if 
they had a fairer deal ... I think if women were made to realize they 
were separated, they were not entitled to a pension for life, but they 
had to work, it would go a long way to prevent this continued 
increase in separation orders.9 
This letter is also indicative of the resentment many absent fathers felt towards 
their duty to provide for their former wives in the 1930s. In order to lessen this 
hostility, this obligation was gradually eroded in later years when 'clean break' 
settlements were introduced. However, the Conservatives also ignored this 
lesson when they introduced a carer's element in the formula. Although they 
insisted that this was not spousal maintenance, it was widely interpreted as such 
by absent fathers. 
Although, the Liberal and Conservative Governments between 1900 and 1940 
were more inclined to protect absent fathers because they did not wish to 
undermine their work incentives or see them subjected to blackmail by women -
let alone be exposed as putative fathers - the Conservatives, under Margaret 
Thatcher, have had fewer reservations. This probably explains why protests by 
absent fathers in the 1990s were more immediate. Indeed, the ability of men to 
organise themselves into successful pressure groups against the Child Support 
Agency enabled them to win many concessions from the government. As a 
result of this, the government had little choice but to back down and, III 
conceding to many of the demands of these men, began the process of 
undermining the promises they had made to taxpayers when the Child Support 
Act was first launched. 
9 Letter to the Home Secretary, 24 July 1934, PRO H045117927. 
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By constructing themselves as the victims of the Child Support A h gency, t e 
concessions made to absent fathers meant that the majority saw reductions in the 
amounts they had to pay to their former families. Although this made little 
difference to the vast majority of lone mothers, because those on income support 
had any maintenance paid deducted from their benefits pound for pound, the 
government's recent attempt to recoup some its losses by doubling the benefit 
penalty will make a large dent in the incomes of such women if they feel unable 
to co-operate with the Agency. In contrast to absent fathers, the inability of lone 
mothers to influence the government was also noted in chapter 5. In common 
with such women in the earlier period, they are politically impotent. 
Consequently, policy makers have only been informed of what is in their best 
interests as it has been constructed by the organisations who have claimed to 
represent them. In the early years of the century, various organisations, such as 
the National Council for the Unmarried Mother and Her Child and the National 
Union of Equal Citizenship, were influential in persuading governments that the 
solution to their plight would be to enforce the private obligations of fathers. 
This was perhaps not surprising for, at the time, most women's organisations 
were more concerned to improve the conditions of motherhood, rather than 
wanting to see women aspire to independence though the labour market on the 
same terms as men. As Pugh has argued, reforms affecting women in the 1920s 
were 'calculated to assist and strengthen the mother's role in raising children'. \0 
That is why legislation was not passed to address, for example, women's unequal 
pay, the bar on married women's employment in certain professions, birth control 
and family allowances. 11 The greater influence of equalitarian feminism in the 
later decades of the century has had serious repercussions for lone mothers. 
Some of the most influential organisations which helped shape the Child Support 
Act were dominated by feminists, such as Sue Slipman, the director of the 
National Council for One Parent Families, who believed that a twin approach of 
making fathers pay and a Back to Work Strategy were in the best interests of lon~ 
mothers. 
10 Pugh, 1992,p.114-p.1 15. 
II Ibid. 
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Speaking of women in general, Catherine Hakim has accused thes C' •• f 
e lemllllsts 0 
slanting their data to support their own political agenda: 
They are committed to getting equal rights legislation through 
because it suits their interests as career women. It doesn't concern 
them that this might not be in the best interests of homemakers. 12 
Indeed, Hakim conducted her own research and found that only a quarter of all 
women want careers: 
There are just as many of us who want to devote our lives to our 
homes, children and husbands. Academic feminists ... cannot 
believe that other women don't want careers as much as they do. So 
when a woman talks about wanting to be a dependent wife, they 
jump to the condescending conclusion that there's a man pulling her 
• 13 
strIngs. 
Although research evidence suggests that lone mothers want to work,I4 there is 
no reason to suggest that the type of work they want is any different from that 
which the vast majority of mothers want. In a recent British Social Attitudes 
Survey, mothers said that they wanted to spend more time looking after their 
children themselves. 
They do not want universal full-time day care but for the large 
majority the ideal seems to be part-time work until the child goes to 
school, then work term-time only.IS 
New Labour's proposal to encourage lone mothers back into the workplace does 
not, therefore, seem very appropriate in view of the above. Not only will this be 
another failure in terms of saving taxpayers money on such families because of 
the cost of providing child care, training and administering the scheme, but it 
will also put lone mothers in the unenviable position of having to work twice as 
12 Quoted in The Guardian, 2 April 1996. 
13 Ibid. 
14 See, for example, McKay and Marsh, 1993. 
15 Cited in New Statesman and Society, 28 January 1994. 
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hard as most people tor little remuneration. More lone mothers will then find 
themselves in a similar position to Venessa, a mother of two who 
has two part-time jobs - as a shop assistant and a cleaner. Topped up 
by family credit, her income is £ 13 7 a week. After rent, fuel, school 
dinners, council tax and water rates, she is left with about £50 - just 
enough for food. She buys clothes at car boot sales and her last 
holiday was a weekend's camping some years ago. 16 
This way of life is remarkably reminiscent of the experiences of lone mothers in 
the first half of the century when the willingness of the community to support 
them, as now, was minimal. Although this improved as the twentieth century 
wore on, but was then reversed by the Thatcher Government, New Labour's 
proposals for lone mothers shows that they have no intention of undermining 
their predecessor's principle that such families should not rely on the state for 
support. This is not altogether surprising for the Labour Government under Tony 
Blair is also deeply conservative. Having decided that most voters do not want 
taxes increased, many Labour politicians have now adopted the principle that the 
poor should be placed under a moral obligation to help themselves. Thus, in 
common with their Conservative predecessors, and governments in the early 
years of this century, Labour are also committed to the philosophy that financial 
responsibility lies with the individual and that the state should only guarantee to 
offer a safety net when this fails. However, in the case of lone mothers, the 
Labour Government appears to have decided that they should provide for 
themselves through paid employment rather than attempting to make them 
primarily the financial responsibility of the fathers of their children. 
Looking back over the twentieth century, it appears that the benefits gained by 
lone mothers in the decades after the Second W orId War up and until the early 
1980s, were exceptional. Although this period was not covered by this study, it 
is interesting to note that it was far better to be a lone mother during these 
decades than it was at the beginning or at the end of the century. As Weeks has 
16 
The Observer, 8 June 1997. 
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pointed out, the welfare state in the 1940s was based on the idea of 
reconciliation. 17 The belief that citizens had a right to claim benefits was even 
extended to lone mothers and, during the 1970s, benefit increases outstripped 
rises in wages, and legislation passed in 1977 gave lone mothers access to 
council accommodation. 18 Although the male breadwinner model was not 
completely abandoned, nor were attempts to make fathers pay,19 in comparison 
to the remainder of the twentieth century this represented a golden age for lone 
mothers. Even though fathers were just as reluctant to meet their financial 
obligation, lone mothers were not as pressurised by the courts or the Department 
of Social Security to help them hound these men, as they are today. Thus, 
although the experience of lone motherhood did undergo a brief change for the 
better, as Marsden's study shows some things remained the same: 
According to wives it was comparatively easy for men either to lie 
about their earnings, to give only flat-rate earnings, or only the 
earnings of their main job. Alternatively, husbands were sometimes 
able to produce lists of H.P. commitments and purchases of a kind 
which the wife living on national assistance had not dared or been 
bl . 20 a e to enter mto. 
This temporary attenuation in the treatment of lone mother families may also 
have come about because, by comparison, governments up until the 1970s were 
not under the same financial constraints as their predecessors, or their successors. 
This perhaps also explains why proposals to make lone mother families primarily 
the responsibility of the whole community were discussed - even by the 
government - in this era. 21 (Just as they were during another 'abnormal' period in 
the twentieth century - during the First World War). However, this does not 
mean that in periods of economic decline governments will always make greater 
efforts to make fathers pay. Although the findings of this study suggest that this 
17 Weeks, 1989, p.232. 
18 For a more detailed discussion see, for example, Lewis, 1995a; Land and Lewis, 1997; 
Macaskil, 1993; Marsden, 1969. 
19 For example, the Maintenance Orders Act, 1958, introduced attachment of earnings where 
failure to pay was due to wilful refusal or culpable neglect; in 1957 the government allowed the 
courts access to official records to find out an absent fathers address. 
20 Marsden, 1969, p.153-p.154. 
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is perhaps the case, obviously, more research over a longer time span is 
necessary to demonstrate this conclusively. Although it is noteworthy that other 
major reforms to the bastardy laws, and the introduction of wife maintenance, 
took place in the 1870s: another period of economic recession. Thus, although 
the system of child support throughout the twentieth century has undergone some 
changes, these have only taken place within narrow limits. While the first half 
and the final decades of the century were, and are, characterised by attempts to 
shift the responsibility for lone mother families onto individual fathers wherever 
possible, the pendulum swung a little towards the state in the years in between. 
The treatment of lone mother families has also been subject to change. Despite 
the gains made by lone mothers in the decades preceding the 1980s, this trend 
has once again been reversed, although, as yet, they are not expected to enter a 
workhouse. However, their current low standard of living is set to decline 
further. Even though lone mothers are over-represented in the poorest 10 per 
cent of the population,22 New Labour intends to continue the process of 
impoverishing them further which the Conservative Government began in the 
1980s when it overhauled the social security system. As from 1998, new lone 
mothers will no longer be entitled to the lone parent premium when their income 
support entitlement is calculated. Consequently, they will fall deeper into 
poverty. As will their children, which seems particularly unjust given the 
Conservative Government's rhetoric of 'putting children first'. How they will 
manage on such low levels of benefits is unclear because, as Baroness Hollis has 
pointed out, at the present time lone mothers on benefit 
receive £2 per day per child - the price of a hamburger, to feed, 
clothe and keep her child warm. 23 
Because this state of affairs is intolerable, it is surprising that more academics 
have not opened up the limits of the debate and put forward alternative 
21 See Finer 1974. 
22 Clarke et al. 1993, p.8-p.9. 
23 HL, Parliamentary Debates, 9 February 1994, co1.1673. 
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suggestions to deal with the problem of lone motherhood. Although this is not 
the kind of study that governments would necessarily wish to fund, Benn has 
argued for a return to the kind of feminism as practised by Mary W ollstonecraft 
who 
had a passionate and concrete set of concerns, about bread and 
housing, the living conditions of servants and children. She saw the 
corroding effect of inequality all around her. She lived with the 
degradations of a genteel poverty. And she understood that politics 
is central to the human condition.24 
Benn also argues that the problem with feminism today is that 
acclaimed feminists of our time are largely created and sustained 
through the media rather than a political movement, and on the 
whole reflect that patronage: they write about culture, not politics. 
They write less about the world than about reflections on the world.25 
Of the few authors who have recently addressed the problem from a wider 
perspective are Eekelaar and Maclean.26 They have argued for state support of 
lone mother families. Although they are aware that this would be objected to on 
the grounds of cost, and on the grounds that it might be an incentive to family 
breakdown and a disincentive to family reconstruction, they are not convinced 
'h d . ·,27 t at parents will be induced to separate by mo est economIC attractIOns. 
However, these authors are also aware that this will not be a discussion for 
political debate because there 'is a view that no member of a community owes 
any obligation injustice to less well-offmembers,.28 
However, just because current thinking on lone mother families is dominated by 
29 . d 30 h· . the discourses of authors such as, Murray, and DennIS and Er os, t IS IS 
24 Benn, 1996, p.31. 
25 Ibid. 
26 1986. 
27 Ibid., p.112. 




insufficient reason to abandon attempts to find alternative solutions, even though 
they may prove to be as futile as similar efforts were in the early part of the 
century. After all, Sidney Webb's argument for the endowment of motherhood is 
just as applicable today: 
We shall have to face the problem of the systematic endowment of 
motherhood, and place this most indispensable of all professions 
upon an honourable basis. At present it is ignored as an occupation, 
unremunerated, and in no way honoured by the State.31 
Pedersen32 has explained why the campaign for the endowment of motherhood 
failed in the first half of the century. She argues that one of the primary reasons 
why it was rejected, other than because of its costs, was because this proposal 
made those responsible for shaping legislation more determined to defend the 
male breadwinner model. Such a proposal was also clearly unthinkable at a time 
when many people, including politicians, viewed the lower social classes with 
considerable contempt. Although eugenicism may no longer exist officially, 
there are probably many people today who would feel the same way as Ellis did 
in the 1930s about the endowment of motherhood, and for the same reasons: 
To endow the reckless and indiscriminate motherhood which we see 
all around us, to encourage it, that is, by State aid, the production of 
citizens a large proportion of whom the State, if it dared, would like 
to destroy as unfit, is too ridiculous a proposal to deserve 
discussion.33 
However, unless the decline of full-time employment and the growth of part-
time, insecure work is halted - as well as the widening gap between the rich the 
poor - the day may yet come when society has little alternative but to adjust its 
way of thinking about welfare. Recent research by nutritionists, paediatricians, 
academics and even by the government itself has shown the re-emergence of 
malnutrition in Britain on a scale similar to that in the 1930s. As we have seen. 
31 Quoted in Ellis, 1937, p.S13. 
32 1993. 
33 Ellis, 1937, p.S13. 
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it was primarily concerns about the health of children which forced the subject of 
the endowment of motherhood onto the political agenda in the first half of the 
century. As this may happen in the future, new proposals for supporting the poor 
will need to be ready and waiting. Atkinson has started on this work by outlining 
his proposal for a citizens income. Under this scheme, the escape from poverty 
will no longer depend on a person's access to the labour market but, instead, it 
will be conditional on their 'participation' in society. Atkinson states that the 
definition of 'participation' would include 'people at work, those retired, sick or 
unemployed; in education or training; and caring for dependants,34. 
Clearly, it has to be hoped that such a scheme comes about, and not least because 
Beveridge's welfare state, which was based on the principle of insurance, is no 
longer applicable to conditions in the late twentieth century. Although a citizens 
income would obviously not be a cheap solution to problem of poverty in our 
society, there would perhaps be less wastage of taxpayers money than under 
many of current schemes for social support. After all, millions of pounds have 
been thrown at the Child Support Agency to little effect and further research of 
this kind might find that a great deal more money is also being wasted on similar 
agencies and government departments. Furthermore, universal benefits are far 
cheaper to administer than means-tested ones not only in terms of man hours but 
also because of the technology that is required to calculate them. As discovered 
in the course of this study, the cost of replacing the Child Support Agency's 
computer system, which is already inadequate to deal with task before it, 
threatens to wipe out all the savings that have been made since the Agency began 
its work. As this is likely to recur again in a few years, and is probably not a 
phenomenon that is unique to this administrative machine, there is a clear case 
for investigating the better use of taxpayers money. 
Because the provision of a citizen's income is dependent on participation in 
society, it will not lead to an increase in dependency. On the contrary, it will 
reverse the current pattern whereby there are vast numbers of mothers 
34 This proposal was recently outlined in The Observer, 8 June 1997. 
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shouldering a double burden of unpaid and remunerated work, in contrast to ever 
increasing numbers of unemployed men. This is not to suggest that child care 
should be undertaken by women and paid employment by men, it is simply to 
suggest that in these days of declining work opportunities, it would make more 
sense for the state to pay a parent to look after children rather than continue with 
the process whereby the work load is unequally distributed within society. If 
such a policy should lead to greater numbers of lone mother families, which will 
not necessarily be the case, this does not have to be bad for children. If marital 
breakdown and unmarried motherhood is more likely to occur amongst the 
poorest sections of the community, then this suggests that monetary problems 
may, in part, be responsible for the formation of such families. Studies have 
shown that the high rate of lone motherhood within the Afro-Caribbean 
community is the result of the inability of black men to support their families, 
because they are more likely to be unemployed than other men, as opposed to 
being more irresponsible?5 Thus, if a citizen's income ensures that wealth is 
more equally distributed in society, there may even be a decline in the numbers 
of lone mother families. Moreover, the levels of crime may be reduced. This is 
not because the children of such families are responsible for the current crime 
wave. The claim that there is a correlation between these two variables is 
unfounded, not only because academic research has been unable to prove it, but 
also because of the very nature of single parenthood. The population of lone 
mothers is fluid: women move in and out of this condition, only spending an 
average period 35 months as lone mothers. It is therefore impossible to compare 
their offspring with those of the married population at anyone given time.36 In 
contrast to this, some studies have demonstrated a link between crime and 
poverty, alienation and boredom.37 Others have blamed criminal behaviour 
today on the ethos of individualism: 
The mass media parades the glittering prizes of the haves daily in 
front of the have-nots ... Inequality is no longer concealed, it is 
35 See, for example, Fisher et al., 1986. 
36 Ermish in Murray, 1990, pA5. 
37 Dickinson, 1994, p.21. 
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flaunted. The social script that the market provides does not hold 
society together, it actually encourages it to fall apart.38 
A citizen's income would therefore be more than a good thing. However, as it is 
probably idealistic to expect that it will ever come about, effort should also 
perhaps be devoted to putting forward the proposal that in the light of the CSA's 
failure, we may as well return to the court based system under which the 
previous maintenance scheme was administered. After all, the evidence here 
shows that this met with similar compliance rates to the Child Support Agency 
but, in contrast to the latter, was cheaper to run. It was also better for children 
because fathers were left with enough money to give them the occasional treat. 
As Bainham says, 'decent health, adequate housing, proper child care facilities, 
and a decent income are the real "basics" of family life,.39 
38 Mooney and Young, 1994, p.38. 
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